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Thesis Abstract 
Governing open source software (OSS) communities is defined in the 
relevant literature as the formal and informal means to control and 
coordinate the collective efforts towards common objectives (Markus, 
2007). OSS communities are not based on a fixed structure. Instead, the 
structure emerges through collaboration. Participants, technical artefacts, 
ideas, resources, and interactions are fluid (Faraj et al., 2011) in the sense 
that they are reconfigured over time, depending on the context of the 
community. This has raised governance challenges in terms of determining 
“how open is open enough” (West, 2003). Governing a fluid complex 
technically-mediated ecosystem, such as OSS communities, requires 
determining whether to keep the boundaries open to all, which may risk 
the quality of the deliverables, or restricting the contributions to an elite 
population, which restrains collaboration (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012).   
In this thesis, I argue that OSS governance is a boundary decision to 
determine and legitimise the practices that best govern the collective effort 
in a particular context (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). The current literature 
focused on two types of boundaries; the external boundary that separates 
OSS communities from the commercial world; and the role-based boundary 
that identifies the roles and responsibilities of the individuals (Chen and 
O’Mahony, 2009). The former boundary has been extensively discussed in 
the literature by focusing on how firms reap the benefits of OSS products 
without exploiting the collective effort. The latter boundary focuses on 
individuals as the main actors of the community.  
The current views on OSS governance have two main limitations. First, 
current accounts focus on creating a governance structure that facilitates 
the collaboration among dispersed individuals, neglecting the issues of 
fluidity and dynamicity. As a result, scholars continue to build their studies 
on taken-for-granted assumptions overlooking the transformations that 
have occurred to the overall settings of the OSS community. One of the 
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overlooked areas is the emergence of vertical (i.e. domain-specific) OSS 
communities, which is the main interest of this thesis. 
Second, technology, in the context of OSS, is either considered as an end 
product or a medium of governance. Current studies failed to address the 
materiality of technology, where materiality refers to the ways in which the 
properties of technology are arranged and rearranged in relation to each 
other to accomplish governance practices in a particular context. The 
materiality of technology entails different possibilities for governance 
practices, which is not sufficiently addressed in the literature. Therefore, I 
argue and demonstrate that any attempt to explain OSS governance 
without addressing materiality is considered incomplete.  
In this thesis, I demonstrate that OSS communities are governed through 
boundary decisions, where decisions refer to delineating the boundaries of 
the community. This is achieved by identifying the actors, actions, and 
resources required to control and coordinate the collaborative effort in a 
particular context. Boundary decisions entail remaining sensitive to the 
changes that occur to the context and change the boundaries accordingly. 
I adopt grounded theory approach to conduct a case study on Kuali; a 
vertical OSS community that develops ERP system for the higher education 
sector. The research findings contribute to the OSS governance literature 
by developing a theoretical foundation that explains OSS governance as a 
boundary decision. The emergent theory explains OSS governance in terms 
of context, control, resources, and materiality. I illustrate through empirical 
evidence how these constructs interact with each other to govern the 
collective effort. The thesis contributes to the OSS literature by bringing to 
the fore the dynamicity and materiality of OSS governance. The thesis also 
has implications in the area of boundary management. OSS communities 
represent a non-traditional organisational settings, and thus provides novel 
theoretical insights with regards to boundary management.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Study 
An open source software (OSS) community consists of diverse and 
geographically distributed individuals and organisations collaborating to 
produce software under open source license (Sharma et al., 2002), which 
allows freely revealing the source code to the public for use, modification, 
and redistribution (von Krogh et al., 2012). OSS communities represent 
collaborative communities (Adler and Heckscher, 2006), where the diverse 
and geographically dispersed contributors pool and govern their shared 
resources in order to achieve common objectives. The contributors 
collaborate with respect to agreed-upon rules, values, and norms to 
produce non-rivalry and non-excludable public good (Franck and Jungwirth, 
2003; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005; von Krogh et al., 2012). 
OSS communities have created special forms of organisations to coordinate 
their efforts and communicate with external entities (O'Mahony and 
Bechky, 2008). They are recognised as alternative organisational forms 
that differ from hierarchal and market structures (Adler and Heckscher, 
2006; Shah, 2006). OSS communities tend to distinguish themselves from 
their proprietary counterparts by applying special governance mechanisms 
to control and coordinate the diverse resources in order to achieve mutual 
objectives (Markus, 2007). However, the dispersed nature of the 
community scatters the governance among different entities and artefacts 
that lack a unified formal organisational structure, and thus create 
challenges to understand OSS governance (Crowston et al., 2012; 
Izquierdo and Cabot, 2015).  
Governance in general, in both for-profit and not-for-profit organisations, 
refers to strategic rules and regulations (Markus and Bui, 2012) that 
monitor, supervise, and control the behaviours of individuals (Lattemann 
and Stieglitz, 2005; Provan and Kenis, 2008). Governance focuses on all 
levels of an organisation, ranging from individuals performing mundane 
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operational tasks to the high level strategic tasks (Markus and Bui, 2012). 
In addition, governance concerns about motivating divergent individuals to 
achieve common objectives (Lattemann and Stieglitz, 2005; Schaarschmidt 
et al., 2015).  
In the context of information technology (IT), governance refers to the 
process of setting a framework for decision rights and accountabilities to 
manage the formulation and implementation of IT solutions (Weill, 2004). 
IT governance is an integral part of the organisation’s overall governance 
(Van Grembergen et al., 2004) and cannot be isolated from other assets 
(Weill, 2004). It ensures the harmony between organisational and IT 
strategies (Grant and Tan, 2013) by specifying structures, processes, 
relational mechanisms, and responsibilities that encourage desirable 
behaviour in the use of IT (Weill, 2004). As the desirable behaviour change, 
the organisation is required to alter its corresponding governance (Van 
Grembergen et al., 2004; Weill, 2004). Therefore, IT governance is 
considered as a dynamic and adaptive process (Weill, 2004; Grant and Tan, 
2013). However, with the advancement in the information and 
communication technologies, new organisational forms have been 
generated, and therefore require effective IT governance (Tiwana et al., 
2013).  
OSS communities are considered as an example of these new 
organisational forms as they have introduced a fundamental new 
institutional framework to regulate community-driven software 
development process (Mockus et al., 2002; Watson et al., 2005; Shah, 
2006). OSS communities have transformed the software development 
industry from manufacturer to service provider (Sharma et al., 2002). They 
became important competitors in the software industry (Lerner and Tirole, 
2002; Mockus et al., 2002; Franck and Jungwirth, 2003) and contributed 
to the development of outstanding software products, such as Linux and 
Apache (Benkler, 2002; Xu et al., 2005). Therefore, OSS communities need 
effective governance mechanisms to ensure their sustainability.  
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OSS governance is described in the literature as the formal and informal 
means to coordinate and control divergent individuals and organisations to 
achieve mutual objectives (Markus, 2007). Mainly, OSS governance is 
discussed in terms of three main perspectives: culture, structure, and 
process (von Krogh et al., 2012). The cultural perspective describes OSS 
communities as value driven, and accordingly the community members are 
controlled and coordinated through OSS ethos (e.g. Stewart and Gosain, 
2006), such as altruism, reciprocity, and reputation. The structural 
perspective highlights the fluidity of OSS communities, which means that 
the OSS communities are not based on a fixed structure. Therefore, the 
community cannot be governed using the conventional hierarchal- or 
market-based governance mechanisms (de Laat, 2007). Accordingly, 
scholars argue that a governance structure emerges from the 
communication patterns between the contributors. Hence, different 
communities form different structures. From a process point of view, OSS 
governance is explained as a set of rules and practices, such as control, 
coordination, and communication (e.g. Sharma et al., 2002). However, the 
existing literature overemphasises on the collaborations among developers 
at the software development level neglecting the role of the various user 
groups and the non-technical tasks.  
Despite the variations in explaining OSS governance, scholars agree that 
governance is emergent, adaptive, and evolves overtime. However, the 
current accounts based their studies on communities that rely on 
autonomous members, lack formal institutional existence and corporate 
involvement, and the collaborations are not restricted to a list of 
deliverables or project deadlines (e.g. Howison and Crowston, 2014; 
Aaltonen and Lanzara, 2015). This neglects three important points with 
regards to OSS governance.  
First, the existing literature overlooks the transformations that have 
occurred to the OSS communities since their inception in the mid 1990’s. 
OSS communities have been transformed from autonomous communities 
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to hybrid forms that merge communities, markets, and hierarchal work 
practices (Shaikh and Vaast, 2016). In this thesis, I focus on one of the 
salient transitions that have occurred to OSS communities; the transition 
from horizontal self-governed OSS communities to vertical restricted 
communities (Fitzgerald, 2006).  
Horizontal refers to the communities that are developing infrastructural 
applications, such as operating systems and mail servers. These 
communities, which are dominating the existing literature, are open to wide 
range of users regardless of their professions and attract developers with 
generic technical skills. Current studies presume that horizontal OSS 
communities consist of autonomous individuals, mainly volunteers, who are 
collaborating without a defined basis of authority. Since these individuals 
share different interests and motives, OSS governance is mainly described 
as the means to control and coordinate autonomous individuals in order to 
develop a reliable OSS product (Markus, 2007).   
On the other hand, vertical OSS communities are more focused on 
producing domain-specific software. Vertical OSS products are co-produced 
for strategic reasons, targeting specific users, and they are designed by 
specialised developers as their specifications are more complex and 
domain-specific. Thus, vertical OSS communities attract individuals that 
are knowledgeable in that particular domain. Besides, vertical OSS 
communities are more likely to inherit the work practices of the 
corresponding domain (or industry) in order to direct the efforts of the 
community members towards a common objective (Benlian and Hess, 
2011). For example, vertical OSS communities tend to rely on employment 
contracts rather than voluntarily contributions, and the development 
process is restricted by a predefined list of deliverables. Therefore, 
governing vertical OSS communities challenges the presumptions that are 
dominating the relevant literature. 
 16 
 
The transformations that have occurred to the settings of the OSS 
communities lead us to the second neglected aspect of OSS governance, 
which is fluidity. OSS communities are fluid because they allow resources 
to freely flow in and out of the community. In fact, the fluidity is considered 
as the fundamental characteristic of OSS communities as it stimulates 
collaborations (Faraj et al., 2011). However, fluidity raises challenges with 
regards to governance because the community contracts and expands 
unpredictably (Aksulu and Wade, 2010), and accordingly collaborations 
“occur in unparalleled scale and scope” (Faraj et al., 2011:1224). This 
means that OSS communities are dynamic as they continuously change 
their boundaries overtime by including and excluding resources based on 
the context. The dynamic change of boundaries is referred to in the relevant 
literature as dynamicity (Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011). 
The dynamicity of boundaries in OSS communities is an essential aspect of 
governance (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008) because it balances between 
growth and control (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). This notion of 
boundaries challenges the conventional perspectives that describe 
boundaries as static demarcations separating what is inside and outside an 
OSS community (Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011). Based on that, I argue that 
OSS communities are governed through decisions to aggregate and control 
the fluid resources of the community. These decisions trigger boundary 
dynamics in the community, and thus they are known as boundary 
decisions.  
Third, the materiality of technology is another neglected aspect of OSS 
governance, where materiality refers to the ways in which the properties of 
technology are arranged in relation to each other to accomplish governance 
practices in a particular context (Barrett et al., 2016). Technology mainly 
refers to the OSS code, the Internet platform, and the technical artefacts 
used for development and communication. In the relevant literature, 
technology is either described as an end product or as a mediator that 
enables governance practices (Shaikh, 2016). However, in this thesis, I 
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highlight that technology is inherently dynamic (Tiwana et al., 2010) and, 
at the same time, inseparable from its surrounding context (Faraj et al., 
2011). The properties of technology are not fixed; instead they are 
arranged and rearranged as the community evolves. The current studies 
demonstrate that the context of the OSS community shapes how the OSS 
code is designed. Besides, the design of the code determines the necessary 
resources and the type of technical artefacts required to facilitate 
collaborations (Crowston et al., 2012). This means that boundary decisions, 
i.e. governance, cannot be sufficiently explained without encountering 
materiality. 
This thesis responds to the growing call (e.g. Tiwana et al., 2013) for 
explaining governance mechanisms that are practiced in dynamic 
technically-mediated ecosystems, such as OSS communities. I argue that 
such communities are governed through boundary decisions. Although the 
importance of boundary decisions was discussed in the early publications 
related to OSS communities, less attention has been given to their role and 
consequences with regards to governance.  
1.2. Research Questions and Objectives 
In this thesis, I aim to answer the following questions: How governance 
practices emerge in vertical OSS communities? And how OSS community 
governing contribution shapes its organisational boundary over time? To 
answer these questions, I have conducted a case study on Kuali; an OSS 
community that develops and maintains an enterprise (ERP) system for the 
higher education (HE) sector. Although the primary focus of the thesis is 
on a vertical OSS community, the research findings contribute to various 
types of OSS communities, and to a wider range of virtual and online 
communities.  
The topic of OSS governance has been extensively discussed; however the 
literature failed to offer a definitive definition for OSS governance (Markus, 
2007) or a solid theoretical explanation that realises the dynamicity of the 
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OSS communities and the role of materiality in governance (Crowston et 
al., 2012). Therefore, I have adopted a grounded theory approach to gain 
an in-depth understanding of how the community is governed by shaping 
its boundaries through time. In this thesis, I aim to develop a theoretical 
foundation to explain OSS governance by highlighting the neglected 
concepts of dynamicity and materiality. 
1.3. The Significance of the Research 
The meaning of OSS has changed dramatically during the past two decades 
(Curto-Millet and Shaikh, 2017). OSS has been transformed from being 
restricted to back-office infrastructural software products to a software 
development approach and a strategic business model. Reputable firms 
adopt OSS as their business models and place their products into OSS 
communities to attract innovation (Barrett et al., 2013). Linux operating 
system and Apache web server are the most reputable OSS projects; 
however there are other prevalent products in various domains. For 
example, Sendmail email server, BIND domain name software on the 
Internet, OpenOffice desktop application, Eclipse programming 
environment, and eGroupware enterprise system (Crowston et al., 2012). 
The OSS literature illustrates that OSS is a moving phenomenon (Barrett 
et al., 2013), which raises governance challenges. Nevertheless, the 
relevant literature reveals that different OSS communities managed to 
develop governance mechanisms to aggregate and control the dispersed 
resources to create value (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 2009). This 
illustrates that OSS communities successfully managed to convert the 
widely distributed resources into products that compete with commercial 
software in many different industries (Aaltonen and Lanzara, 2015). 
Despite their fluidity, OSS communities became pervasive phenomena that 
have the potential to transform global economy and society (Hallerbach et 
al., 2013). Therefore, the area of OSS governance offer insights for theory 
development (Tiwana et al., 2013). 
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Although the topic of OSS managed to develop a literature of governance 
of its own (Shaikh and Henfridsson, 2017), scholars failed to develop a 
unified definition of OSS governance or an OSS governance theory 
(Crowston et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to explain OSS governance, 
scholars often borrow concepts from governance theories that were 
developed for hierarchal- or market-based organisations. These 
conventional governance mechanisms focus on establishing a structure that 
supports social coordination and administrative regulation, overlooking the 
dynamicity of the community (Aaltonen and Lanzara, 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, the central themes of the existing OSS governance 
literature is on how to motivate volunteers to contribute to the public good 
(e.g. von Krogh et al., 2012), and how autonomous contributors collaborate 
in the absence of a basis of authority (e.g. O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). 
These studies overlook the dynamicity of the community and role of 
materiality in OSS governance. 
The OSS is recognised as competitive software development approach 
(Benkler, 2002). Besides, it provides potential lessons for other forms of 
virtual collaboration in software development and in governing distributed 
resources (Howison and Crowston, 2014). Accordingly, there is a need to 
understand how such communities govern the collectives while it maintains 
fluid nature and porous boundaries. Besides, governance routines are 
embedded in technology. In fact, the collaboration in OSS communities 
cannot be accomplished without technology. Various technical artefacts are 
increasingly being integrated into OSS communities. Therefore, explaining 
OSS governance without including the material aspects of the technology 
is considered incomplete.  
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the 
background of the study, and states the research questions and objectives. 
It also explains the importance of conducting the research. 
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Chapter 2 represents the literature review. As the research follows a 
grounded theory approach, I have started the research by diving into the 
data with initial insights from the literature. The research involved multiple 
visits to the literature during data collection and analysis processes. 
Therefore, chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first part includes the 
initial literature review, which represents the current state of the literature 
with regards to OSS governance. It mainly reviews how scholars define 
OSS governance. The second part of chapter 2 introduces the concepts that 
have emerged during the processes of data collection and analysis. It 
represents the topic of boundary decisions and materiality in relation to 
OSS governance. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the research methodology. I begin by 
comparing between the different grounded theory approaches. Then, I 
clarify the main tenets of the grounded theory approach that was adopted 
in this thesis. I also explain the rationale behind selecting the Straussian 
approach for the data analysis. Then, I argue for the suitability of a single 
case study as the research design. I also explain why the research is 
targeting the higher education sector. I then provide an overview of the 
case under study; Kuali, by describing its organisational context. Chapter 
3 also explains in details the processes of data collection and analysis. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to the findings of the study; the story 
of Kuali. Each chapter refers to a governance phase of Kuali life. Each 
governance phase is a boundary decision to govern the collective effort and 
cope with the changes in the context of Kuali.  
As the research aims to develop a substantive theory to explain OSS 
governance, chapter 7 explains the emergence of the substantive theory. I 
represent the theory through an OSS governance model. Then, I discuss 
this emergent model in relation to Kuali and also in relation to the existing 
literature. In chapter 7, I also evaluate the research process using the 
criteria proposed by Corbin and Strauss (1990).  
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Finally, I conclude the thesis in chapter 8. I also explain how the emergent 
OSS governance model contributes to the literatures of OSS governance 
and boundary management. I also highlight some important practical 
contributions of the thesis. I then summarise the limitations of the thesis 
and provide suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
In line with the grounded theory approach adopted in this research, the 
literature review was conducted at different stages of the research. Mainly, 
three major rounds of literature review can be identified; however the 
review is mainly presented at the beginning of the thesis to set the stage 
for the subsequent chapters and assist the reader in following the research 
arguments (Urquhart and Fernandez, 2013; Charmaz, 2014).  
The initial literature review was a pre-study to gain an overall 
understanding on the topic, to clearly identify the research problem, and 
get familiar with the appropriate methodologies (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). I have focused on how OSS governance is defined and described in 
the relevant literature. This has provided me with sensitising concepts that 
acted as the departure point for collecting and analysing the data1. The 
initial literature review allowed me to understand the underlying meaning 
and concepts in the raw data without forcing any predetermined theoretical 
frameworks.  
The outcome of the initial literature review is illustrated in sections 2.2 and 
2.3, where I focus on how OSS governance is explained in the current 
literature. I argue that due to the fluidity of the OSS community, scholars 
tend to explain governance by focusing on the daily activities of the 
community actors (human and non-human). In general, sections 2.2 and 
2.3 present the current state of the literature with regards to OSS 
governance. I highlight that the current studies acknowledge the fluidity of 
the OSS community, and define governance as emergent and adaptive. 
Yet, OSS governance is explained using static perspectives. 
                                   
1 In chapter 3, I elaborate on the sensitising concepts that have directed the first phase of 
the data analysis.  
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The second round of the literature review was performed during data 
analysis in order to compare the emergent theory with the existing 
theories. This is necessary to develop a substantive theory (Urquhart and 
Fernandez, 2013) that advances our knowledge with regards to OSS 
governance. This included multiple visits to the literature until the research 
came to an end. The second round of the literature mainly focused on 
boundary decisions and materiality. These topics have emerged from the 
iteration between the different stages of the research (i.e. data collection, 
analysis, literature review). The second round of literature is presented in 
sections 2.4 and 2.5. In section 2.4, I highlight the limitations of the current 
literature with regards to the dynamicity of OSS governance practices. I 
argue that OSS communities are governed through boundary decisions, 
which is an under-theorised area of research. In section 2.5, I highlight 
how the literature overlooked the role of materiality in governing the 
collective effort. Then, I conclude the chapter in section 2.6.  
The final round of the literature review was conducted to locate the research 
findings within the relevant literature. This is represented in chapter 7, 
where I explain and discuss the emergent substantive theory. 
2.2. The Fluidity of the OSS Community 
The term open source software (OSS) can be traced back to 1994 
(O'Mahony, 2007). It initially referred to software products that are 
published under open source license, which allows users to access the 
source code, modify it, and redistribute the modified or unmodified versions 
(von Krogh et al., 2012). According to West and O'Mahony (2008), 
openness refers to the transparency and accessibility of the OSS and its 
associated technical and non-technical processes. Transparency means 
allowing to view the source code, and its related technical and 
administrative details, including the discussions and documentations. 
Accessibility means granting the access to influence the future direction of 
the OSS product. Therefore, OSS is not the opposite of closed or proprietary 
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software; rather it refers to the intensity of openness that serves a 
particular context (Curto-Millet and Shaikh, 2017). The Open Source 
Initiative; the official body for reviewing and approving OSS licenses, has 
approved variety of OSS licenses that fulfil the needs of multiple contexts. 
The OSS is developed and maintained in an OSS community that consists 
of a group of heterogeneous dispersed individuals and organisations 
collaborating through the Internet to produce an OSS product. The 
community members include, but not limited to, programmers, bug fixers, 
end users, administrators, foundations, and firms (Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2008). They collaborate based on agreed-upon rules, values, 
and norms (Franck and Jungwirth, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2012). An OSS 
community is described in the literature in various ways, mainly as an 
online social production (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006; Kane et al., 
2014), a technical community (West and O'Mahony, 2008), a computer-
mediated interaction (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015), and an internet-
mediated collaboration (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 2009; Aaltonen and 
Lanzara, 2015). OSS communities created special forms of organisations 
(O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008) that have proved their efficiency in 
converting dispersed knowledge into a pool of shared resources (Aaltonen 
and Lanzara, 2015). They managed to develop a viable business model that 
has put proprietary software at risk (Benlian and Hess, 2011), yet not 
without challenges. 
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Figure 1: The Fluidity of OSS Community 
 
Adapted from Faraj et al. (2011) 
OSS communities are described as fluid and dynamic because the meaning 
of openness changes overtime within a particular project (Curto-Millet and 
Shaikh, 2017), and thus they are not based on a fixed structure (see figure 
1). It is important to note here that fluidity does not refer to change. 
Instead, it means that the participants, artefacts, ideas, resources, 
individuals, and interactions are in flux and unpredictable (Faraj et al., 
2011; Shaikh, 2016). This produces highly permeable and dynamic 
boundaries (Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011). Besides, OSS communities 
comprise of geographically dispersed contributors that collaborate through 
the Internet, and thus resources are fragmented and distributed across 
dispersed actors (Howison and Crowston, 2014; Aaltonen and Lanzara, 
2015). In addition, the collaborative effort in OSS communities mainly 
evolves around developing a software product that is open, editable, 
interactive, and distributed (Nyman and Lindman, 2013; Shaikh, 2016). 
Communicating through the Internet and utilising complex technical 
artefacts raises the risk of uncertainty and unpredictability in the future 
direction of the community (Cornford et al., 2010).  
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The fluidity of the community is considered as an important feature that 
afford collaboration (Faraj et al., 2011). That is because the absence of a 
predefined structure gives rise to flexible collaborating mechanisms and 
tools, and thus allows the flow of resources to enrich the community. On 
the other hand, fluidity blurs the boundaries of the community, and 
accordingly raises governance challenges in terms of determining “how 
open is open enough” (West, 2003). Governing a fluid community requires 
determining whether to keep the boundaries open to all, which may risk 
the quality of the deliverables, or restrict the contributions to an elite 
population, which restrains collaboration (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). 
This has triggered the need for special governance mechanisms to govern 
OSS communities (Shaikh and Henfridsson, 2017).  
The topic of OSS governance has gained a substantial amount of attention 
in academia and practice (Aksulu and Wade, 2010). Relevant research 
spans several fields in management studies and information systems, such 
as knowledge collaboration (e.g. Faraj et al., 2011), innovation (e.g. von 
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), online communities (e.g. Jarvenpaa and 
Lang, 2011), and virtual communities (e.g. Gallivan, 2001). Therefore, 
there are widely varying definitions of governing OSS communities that are 
scattered in the literature. However, OSS governance is best described in 
terms of observing the day-to-day activities of the community members; 
i.e. through practice lens. This is further explained in the next section.  
2.3. OSS Governance Practices 
OSS governance is defined in the relevant literature as the formal and 
informal means to control and coordinate the collective effort in order to 
achieve common objectives (Markus, 2007). OSS communities experience 
a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability due to its fluidity. This 
encouraged researchers to focus on the daily practices to understand how 
governance practices emerge and evolve (Chua and Yeow, 2010). While 
the majority of the literature on OSS governance does not explicitly 
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reference practice theory, scholars often adopt concepts that are consistent 
with the practice-based perspective. 
Study 
conducted by 
Objective/Inquiry Data collection method 
Nakakoji et al. 
(2002) 
Investigate OSS 
collaboration model 
-Interview members about how the OSS is 
developed, what communication tools ae 
used, how they do business from OSS 
-Examine mailing lists to understand the 
communication pattern, which refers to 
the community structure 
Sack et al. 
(2006) 
Understand the role of 
technology in governance 
-Ethnographic observation, text mining of 
the emails, implementation tool, and 
documentation to understand how the 
community structure is formed (roles, 
decision rights) 
O'Mahony and 
Bechky (2008) 
How OSS community 
manage divergent 
interests? 
-Observation of meeting, technical 
presentations, conferences 
-Interviews 
-Analyse archives: look at detailed 
interactions, and structural development 
Hemetsberger 
and Reinhardt 
(2009) 
How the community 
overcomes the challenges 
of collaboration, and 
manage divergent 
interests? 
-Observe the communications in 
websites, chats, and mailing lists to 
understand what they are doing 
-Join the community to understand the 
“work philosophy” 
Chen and 
O’Mahony (2009) 
How an OSS community 
establishes its boundaries? 
-Observe project meetings & conferences 
-Interviews about membership, 
sponsorship, decision making 
-Analyse archives: mailing lists, 
documentations  
Chua and Yeow 
(2010) 
Explore the nature of 
cross-project coordination 
-Analyse the communication and 
development tools: what they are, how 
they are used 
-Trace coordination interactions through 
observation 
Ferraro and 
O'Mahony (2012) 
Understand the 
membership process 
-Analyse membership documents; i.e. 
who has joined and what role is assigned, 
the activity of each member 
-Examine the evolution of the community 
through interviews and analysing archival 
documents, such as meeting notes. 
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Howison and 
Crowston (2014) 
Understand collaboration -Ethnographic study: participate in an OSS 
project as a user, subscribe to the mailing 
lists, follow-up the bug tracking system 
-Archived-based field study 
Li et al. (2016) How does the fluidity of 
OSS communities change 
the stability of governance 
practices? 
-Analyse user activities and their digital 
traces from activity logs. 
Table 1: Examples of Studies that Focused on Daily Practices to Explain OSS 
Governance 
The collective effort of the OSS community is technically mediated. This 
means that they take place through variety of artefacts and objects. The 
outcomes of the collective effort is published in the Internet. The 
governance rules and regulations are implicit and scattered in various 
technical artefacts, such as the online documentations, email discussions, 
and bug tracking systems (Izquierdo and Cabot, 2015). Therefore, scholars 
do not solely rely on interviews, rather they observe and trace the day-to-
day activities through logging into the various technical artefact used in the 
community. In fact some scholars (e.g. Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 
2009; Germonprez et al., 2014; Howison and Crowston, 2014) participated 
in OSS communities by using the OSS product and joining the 
communication in order to understand governance. Table 1 provides 
examples of studies that focused on daily practices to explain OSS 
governance. The following are the main governance practices that are 
discussed in the literature. 
2.3.1. Social Practices 
OSS communities are considered as a type of collective action (von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003), and thus rely on social practices to distinguish 
themselves from software companies (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). von 
Krogh et al. (2012) describe the social practices as the “school of virtue” to 
attract and retain contributions, and to extend the contributions beyond 
personal preferences. In fact, early publications assert that the absence of 
social practices demotivates participants (Sharma et al., 2002). The social 
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practices are explained in the literature in terms of values, norms, and 
beliefs. 
Values, as defined by Stewart and Gosain (2006), are the preferences of 
behaviours and outcomes of the community participants. A key value that 
governs OSS communities is reputation (Raymond, 1998; Markus et al., 
2000; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005; Di Tullio and Staples, 2013). 
Reputation is a valuable asset (Franck and Jungwirth, 2003) that assists in 
creating an OSS community, motivating participations, and ensuring 
sustainability (Markus et al., 2000; Di Tullio and Staples, 2013). In 
addition, contributors are driven by idealistic motives as they assume that 
their contributions are directed towards a public good (Franck and 
Jungwirth, 2003). Therefore, OSS communities also promote the values of 
altruism, reciprocity, knowledge sharing, and gift-giving (Raymond, 1998; 
Sharma et al., 2002). 
Shared norms are the assumptions and expectations within the community. 
Stewart and Gosain (2006) illustarte how norms govern the collective 
effort. For example, they argue that the OSS code has to go through formal 
or informal channels before distribution. Besides, any activity in the 
community has to be attached to the name of the owner, and the name is 
never removed without the owner’s consent. Another common norm, as 
explained by Stewart and Gosain (2006), is avoiding forking, where forking 
refers to the act of splitting the OSS project into independent projects. 
Although forking does not violate the OSS license, it weakens the 
community. Moreover, there are agreed-upon norms to incentivise 
newcomers and familiarise them with the community, such as providing 
welcoming and guiding documentations (Ren et al., 2007; Hemetsberger 
and Reinhardt, 2009). 
Beliefs refer to the mutual knowledge and understandings of causal 
relationships (Stewart and Gosain, 2006). The members of the community 
believe that their work (technical and non-technical) will continuously be 
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improved by others (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005), and thus believe 
that the quality of the code is better than the code in a closed software 
(Raymond, 1999; Stewart and Gosain, 2006). This suggests that beliefs 
regulate the relationships among community members, and thus control 
the behaviour of individuals.  
However, with the diffusion of OSS concepts in the commercial world, the 
aforementioned social practices have been reinterpreted to meet the needs 
of the business context on one hand, and to ensure the sustainability of the 
OSS communities on the other hand. Rolandsson et al. (2011) argue that 
introducing OSS concepts in the software industry reduced the significance 
of the ideological aspect of the OSS development process. In other words, 
OSS communities have moved beyond being social movements with limited 
resources and power (Germonprez et al., 2014). Therefore, the practices 
that stem from social movements, such as knowledge sharing and gift-
giving, are still relevant; however were reconfigured to be business-
oriented. In addition, Nyman and Lindman (2013) demonstrate that the 
shared norms were also redefined to avoid the exploitation of the collective 
effort. They demonstrate that forking the OSS code became a governance 
practice to ensure the sustainability of the community. They acknowledge 
that forking the code may cause effort redundancy; however it ensures the 
availability of the OSS to a wider range of users. This suggests that the 
social practices are not fixed. Instead, they evolve depending on the 
context.  
2.3.2. Defining Membership Process 
The membership process in OSS communities resolved an essential 
governance dilemma; how to coordinate the efforts of impermanent 
members? (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). The membership process 
identifies who is in and out of the community, and determines the roles of 
the community members (West and O'Mahony, 2005; O'Mahony and 
Bechky, 2008). It is also used to regulate the community-firm relationships 
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by setting clear boundaries between the OSS community and the 
commercial world (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). 
The membership process is apparent since the emergence of OSS 
communities as it ensures high quality contributions (Markus et al., 2000); 
however membership criteria differs depending on the context (West and 
O'Mahony, 2005). In some communities, the membership is open to the 
public (Demil and Lecocq, 2006), while in others the membership is 
preserved for certain candidates who meet the objectives of the community 
(de Laat, 2007; Feller et al., 2008). In some cases, joining a particular 
community requires testing the technical skills of the members as well as 
their knowledge regarding the software license to ensure that the members 
comply with the community rules (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012). Moreover, 
memberships may also require fees to cultivate the community 
(Rolandsson et al., 2011). In all cases, the membership type selected 
depending on the objectives and context of the community. 
2.3.3. Creating Governance Structure 
Creating a community structure is about forming a basis of authority 
(O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007), and defining roles and responsibilities 
(Demil and Lecocq, 2006; Shah, 2006). It is evident that scholars focused 
on the messiness of the everyday practices of the human and non-human 
actors in order to understand the community structure (De Paoli and 
D'Andrea, 2008). Scholars argue that OSS communities do not represent a 
strict hierarchy nor a completely flat structure (Cornford et al., 2010; 
Martinez-Torres and Diaz-Fernandez, 2014). Instead, they represent a 
special governance form (Demil and Lecocq, 2006).  
Unlike the hierarchal organisations that rely on authority, and market 
structures that rely on property rights and price mechanisms, a community 
structure relies on shared values and norms (Adler and Heckscher, 2006). 
Therefore, it is essential that OSS community members agree upon a stable 
structure and pattern of relationships to achieve their mutual goals 
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(Cornford et al., 2010). The current literature is based on the assumption 
that OSS communities are not necessarily created with a specific structure 
in mind. Instead, the structure emerges as a response to the needs of the 
members and their communication patterns (Nakakoji et al., 2002). 
Accordingly, the structures that are explained in the literature depend on 
the case understudy. However, they are mainly described as peer-
production community, network, and bazaar. 
A peer-production community is a model of social production that is based 
on volunteerism and self-selection (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006). It 
refers to a group of individuals who collaborate in a decentralised manner 
to produce information, knowledge, or cultural goods without relying on 
markets or bureaucratic forms (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006). OSS 
communities are one of the most prevalent form of peer-production 
communities (Andreev et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2013) and are 
characterised by four main features.  
First, an OSS community is not associated with a common employer or 
workplace (O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). Second, the community 
resources are pooled and coordinated to achieve common objectives, which 
avoids the constraints associated with resource allocation in hierarchies and 
markets (O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; Andreev et al., 2010). Third, 
community members do not own the output of their effort (O'Mahony and 
Ferraro, 2007). Fourth, tasks are accomplished and peer-reviewed in a 
distributed manner to best fit the community objectives (Andreev et al., 
2010).  
However, scholars interested in this area (e.g. Benkler and Nissenbaum, 
2006; Andreev et al., 2010) acknowledged that peer-production settings 
raise issues with regards to motivation and organisation. Peer-production 
relies on the efforts of volunteers which cannot be governed neither by 
central authority nor by monetary compensation. Most importantly, the 
peer-production perspective does not reflect the current hybrid nature of 
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OSS communities that merges between OSS and market-driven work 
practices. Therefore, Feller et al. (2008) demonstrate that peer-production 
communities are not capable of creating a product that can compete in the 
commercial world, which is essential for the sustainability of the OSS 
community. Instead, they suggest that OSS communities resemble a 
network form. 
Networks are suitable governance structures for a project-based 
community that does not rely on routine-based procedures, and produces 
an intangible asset (Powell, 1990). Therefore, an OSS community is 
recognised as a network as it consists of interdependent individuals, firms, 
and not-for-profit organisations (Feller et al., 2008). These actors 
collaborate to create a product based on implicit and open-ended contracts 
that adapt to contingencies (Jones et al., 1997). An effective network 
provides independent participants the access and the ability to exchange 
strategic resources (Feller et al., 2008). This raises the challenges of 
coordinating and securing the exchanges among the community members. 
On the other hand, Demil and Lecocq (2006) argue that OSS communities 
do not resemble a network for two main reasons. First, in a network setting, 
the identity of the actor and its previous actions are considered as 
important factors for coordination, which is not required in an OSS 
community. Second, persistence is an essential attribute of network 
participants, which contradicts with the OSS concepts. Thus, scholars (e.g. 
Raymond, 1999; Demil and Lecocq, 2006) suggest that the nature of OSS 
license promotes a bazaar-like environment.  
The term “bazaar” was first coined by Eric Raymond to describe certain 
stages of implementing an OSS, which differs from the usual cathedral-like 
approach practised in the commercial world. Raymond (1999) clarifies that 
particular stages of the OSS development, such as testing and debugging, 
can be performed in a bazaar-like structure. However, it is impossible to 
originate and carry out an OSS project using a pure bazaar approach 
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throughout the development process. Raymond argues that a successful 
OSS project starts with a well-established design. This indicates that 
governance structures are not stable, and their dynamicity depends on the 
context. 
However, Demil and Lecocq (2006) used the term “bazaar” not only to 
reflect the development process, but to include any sort of communication 
and coordination between OSS contributors. That is because bazaar 
environment does not impose any sort of restrictions on joining, leaving, 
and contributing to the community (Rolandsson et al., 2011). Besides, 
communications with the community members are regulated neither by 
price nor by formal mechanisms. Although bazaar governance is suitable 
for information goods, Demil and Lecocq (2006) argue that pure bazaar 
structure is a failure due to the existence of uncertainty and weak control. 
Similarly, Benlian and Hess (2011) argue that, at present, the collective 
effort of OSS community members is referred to as a “project”. This means 
that the bazaar-like collaboration does not explain the current state of OSS 
communities. This view has been supported by a more recent research 
conducted by Germonprez et al. (2014). They argue that the terms 
“cathedral” and “bazaar” provided rich insights in explaining the 
governance of OSS communities during the early days. However, these 
terms are not compelling anymore because nowadays the bazaar has 
borrowed some of the cathedral’s work practices. Software vendors are 
adopting OSS concepts as part of their business strategy. This indicates 
that OSS communities are moving towards more formal and structured type 
of governance.  
As a conclusion, each OSS community represents a governance structure 
that fulfils its specific requirements (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Di Tullio and 
Staples, 2013). The practices of the human and non-human actors of the 
community constitutes the community structure. Therefore, the community 
structure is not fixed, rather it emerges based on the communication 
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patterns of the members (Singh and Tan, 2010). Accordingly, the roles and 
decision-rights are also emergent (Nakakoji et al., 2002; Faraj et al., 
2011).  
2.3.4. Choosing OSS License 
OSS license is considered as the most essential feature that distinguishes 
OSS from other software products (Demil and Lecocq, 2006; de Laat, 
2007). The license ensures that the activities of the members are aligned 
with the objectives of the community (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003). As OSS 
communities started to build alliances with firms, the OSS license became 
an essential governance aspect for defining the identity of the community 
(Ojha and Rao, 2014). The OSS license has given the OSS the impetus to 
compete with proprietary software and regulate the commercialisation of 
the OSS products (Feller et al., 2008; Schaarschmidt et al., 2015).  
According to Open Source Initiative (2014), the free availability of an OSS 
product does not mean that it cannot be used for commercial purposes. 
The OSS license allows commercialising the software without appropriating 
it. In other words, the license disallows placing any sort of restrictions to 
exclude an individual or entity from reaping the benefits of the product. 
OSS projects gained the interests of for-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations, and accordingly the Open Source Initiative allowed various 
types of OSS licenses to emerge in order to serve these interests. Although 
these licenses differ in the restrictions they apply on the derivative work, 
they are common in freely revealing the source code of the software to the 
public.  
Licensing agreements inscribe legal and contractual aspects of the OSS 
community (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 2009). The selection of the 
license is done based on the objectives of the community. Therefore, as the 
community evolves, the license may change. The current studies 
demonstrate that the characteristics of OSS licenses have impacts on 
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attracting and retaining participations, and the overall progress of the 
development process (Stewart et al., 2006).  
2.3.5. Managing Divergent Interests: Resolving Tensions 
OSS communities have permeable boundaries that allow resources to freely 
flow in and out of the community (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 2009; 
Arazy et al., 2016), and thus diverse interests emerge (O'Mahony and 
Bechky, 2008). Managing divergent interests is a governance practice to 
reconcile these tensions. In this context, resources include, but not limited 
to, individual capabilities (e.g. technical and administrative skills), ideas, 
interests, money, time, and technical artefacts (Feller et al., 2008; 
O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Faraj et al., 2011). In fact, the OSS code is 
considered as a resource as well (Rolandsson et al., 2011). 
The relevant literature is dominated by studies focusing on the individual 
capabilities as a major resource because they make a difference in practice 
(Whittington, 2006). Current studies demonstrate that communities attract 
different capabilities based on the objectives of the community. The firms 
that spin-out an OSS project to invite innovative ideas attract hobbyists 
because they are intrinsically motivated, and thus tend to have a higher 
rate of contribution (Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006). On the other hand, 
domain-specific OSS communities attract knowledgeable participants who 
are capable of developing functionalities in that particular domain 
(Fitzgerald, 2006). More recent publications extend the definition of 
resources form individual capabilities to include any collective 
arrangements that are directed towards a common goal (e.g. Aaltonen and 
Lanzara, 2015).  
The diversity of resources triggers different sorts of tensions. The classic 
tension is the one described by Franck and Jungwirth (2003) as the tension 
between donators and rent-seekers. Donators refer to the individuals and 
organisations that are contributing to the benefit of the group and not 
expecting to receive any rewards out of their contributions. In contrary, 
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rent-seekers are those who act in a self-interest manner aiming for 
monetary or non-monetary returns from their contributions. Franck and 
Jungwirth argue that the OSS community needs the effort of both type of 
contributors, and thus a successful governance model is the one that 
enables rent-seeking without crowding out donators. Moreover, Kane et al. 
(2014) highlight a different type of tension; the tension between knowledge 
retain and change. They argue that the openness of the community 
continuously invites new perspectives to the community. This requires the 
community to manage the divergent interests by responding to the new 
participations while maintaining the current production and knowledge. 
The divergent interests and their corresponding tensions are typical in fluid 
communities, and thus tensions cannot be avoided and they cannot be 
permanently resolved. In fact, how the community responds to these 
tensions stimulates governance practices (Faraj et al., 2011). Often, such 
tensions are resolved by emergent coordination mechanisms without 
imposing specific rules and structures (Kane et al., 2014; Arazy et al., 
2016).  
2.3.6. Control 
The OSS is freely available over the Internet. However, the community 
maintains a sort of control to ensure the quality of the software and 
maintain the integrity of the collective work (Chen and O’Mahony, 2009). 
Control in OSS communities is either explained in terms of controlling the 
behaviour of individuals or controlling the code development process. The 
former is about attempting to ensure that individuals act in a manner that 
is consistent with the desired objectives (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015). The 
latter refers to controlling the technical direction of the OSS, such as the 
design of the software and the schedule of releases (O'Mahony and Bechky, 
2008). 
The current literature presents different ways to control the behaviours of 
individuals. The most conventional way is the membership process which 
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is mainly used to select individuals that are more likely to meet the 
expectations of the community (Markus et al., 2000). Besides, in the 
absence of a formal control mechanism, individuals are controlled through 
social values and beliefs (von Krogh et al., 2012). In addition, OSS 
communities often practice monitoring and sanction in conjunction with 
other controlling mechanisms (Sharma et al., 2002). In terms of controlling 
the code, OSS communities mainly rely technology to facilitate the code 
development process (Cornford et al., 2010). They also tend to limit the 
accessibility to certain developers in order to ensure the quality of the 
deliverables (de Laat, 2007).  
2.3.7. Facilitating Collaboration 
Facilitating collaboration, i.e. coordination and communication, focuses on 
the practices of exchanging data (e.g. code, information) between 
community members, which is the core of the OSS community (Ren et al., 
2007). Facilitating collaboration has been considered as a main governance 
practice since the early publications on OSS governance; however it has 
been explained from an economic point of view.   
Earlier studies in the field explained facilitating collaboration in terms of 
reducing the transactional cost to produce an economically effective OSS. 
Those studies assumed that an OSS community lacks defined boundaries, 
and thus the collaborations are described as unbounded set of agents that 
utilise unbounded set of resources to accomplish unbounded set of tasks 
(Benkler, 2002). Therefore, minimising the cost of the transaction is 
achieved by allowing individuals to self-select the tasks that best suit their 
capabilities and interests (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006). 
According to the relevant literature, facilitating collaboration in OSS 
communities is enabled and constrained by technology (Jarvenpaa and 
Lang, 2011), where technology in this context refers to the OSS code, and 
the technical artefacts used for coordinating code development and the 
communications between the members. Besides, technology also includes 
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the Internet platform as it promotes the fluidity and dynamicity of the 
community (Cornford et al., 2010; Ojha and Rao, 2014).  
Development tools are used to coordinate and peer-review the 
development of the source code (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 2009). They 
are used for designing the code architecture, setting standardised coding 
process, restricting accesses, and scheduling releases (Baldwin and Clark, 
2006; Feller et al., 2008). The communication tools include emails, version 
control systems (VCS), and bug tracking systems. These tools are used to 
collectively discuss the technical and administrative issues (Hemetsberger 
and Reinhardt, 2009). They also act as repositories for the communications 
and discussions to allow the community members to reflect in their work, 
and look for solutions. 
Technology is co-produced by the collective effort and constitute 
governance practices (Kane et al., 2014). It is apparent that the relevant 
literature mainly focused on the collaboration between developers at the 
software project level (Crowston et al., 2007; Chua and Yeow, 2010). 
Besides, the current accounts are based on the inherent assumption that 
individuals self-select their tasks (Shaikh and Henfridsson, 2017). This 
overlooks the emergence of vertical domain-specific OSS communities 
where roles and tasks are assigned to specific individuals.  
In addition, the coordination mechanisms that are discussed assume non 
face-to-face interactions between contributors, and thus tends to compare 
the interactions in OSS communities with the conventional face-to-face 
collaborations (Faraj et al., 2016). This overlooks the fact there is a growing 
trend of face-to-face meetings between community members, which makes 
the communication less transparent to the public (Shaikh, 2016). This 
suggests that the current accounts regarding facilitating collaborations 
neglects the transformation that has occurred to the overall settings of the 
OSS communities. 
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2.3.8. Summary 
In this section, I reviewed the main governance practices that are discussed 
in the literature. It is evident that the practices have been extensively 
discussed in terms of what actors (individuals and technology) do in order 
to attract and retain, mainly voluntarily, contributions to develop a high 
quality public good. It also focuses on what actors do to control and 
facilitate collaborations.  
However, OSS governance practices are not simply about what actors do 
in order to govern the collective effort. Actually, what actors do is only the 
point of departure for understanding practices (Nicolini and Monteiro, 
2016). Therefore, the study of OSS governance practices requires 
examining the social and historical conditions of the practices, their scope, 
the required resources, and their consequences (Hemetsberger and 
Reinhardt, 2009; Chua and Yeow, 2010). In other words, studying OSS 
governance practices entails examining all the elements that constitute a 
practice. Also, examining the traces of the practices and their impact on 
the wider context.  
As I have clarified in the introduction of this chapter (section 2.1), the 
literature review in the next sections was conducted in parallel with the 
advanced stages of the data analysis. In section 2.4, I argue that the nature 
of the OSS allows resources to flow in and out of the community. This 
means that the boundaries of the community are not fixed, and thus the 
governance practices are not fixed. Therefore, to better understand 
governance, it necessary to understand how the boundaries of the 
community are delineated. I highlight that, although the existing literature 
acknowledges that the OSS community continuously changes its 
boundaries, it neglects the role of boundary decisions as governance 
mechanisms. 
During data analysis, it was evident that the materiality of technology is an 
integral part of governance practices. Materiality refers to how the 
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community arranges the material properties of technology to accomplish a 
governance practice. Therefore, in section 2.5, I review the literature on 
the role of materiality in OSS governance. 
2.4. Boundary Decisions 
OSS communities are not governed by an individual practice. Instead, 
context-specific practices govern the collective effort. The governance 
practices are recurrent within the same OSS community; however they are 
not identical. “Each occurrence has a unique combination of actors, 
artefacts, time, and context” (Li et al., 2016:3). Therefore, Chen and 
O’Mahony (2009) demonstrate through empirical evidence that governing 
OSS communities requires regulating two types of boundaries.  
First, identifying the boundary between the community and firms, which 
regulates the commercialisation of the OSS product and prevents the 
exploitation of the community efforts. This type of boundary has been 
extensively discussed in the relevant literature (e.g. West and O'Mahony, 
2005; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008; Morgan et al., 2013), where 
boundaries are explained as static demarcations that describe what is 
included in and excluded from the OSS community.  
Second, Chen and O’Mahony (2009) also underscore the importance of 
identifying the boundaries between individuals and organisations. This type 
of boundary identifies the participants of a particular practice, and their 
roles and decisions rights. However, this view focuses on creating a 
governance structure that facilitates the collaboration among dispersed 
individuals, neglecting the issues of fluidity and dynamicity. In addition, 
this view highlights the role of human agency in governing the community 
neglecting the materiality of technology. 
A major step in the direction of filling these gaps, scholars (e.g. Jarvenpaa 
and Lang, 2011; Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012) directed the attention of 
OSS governance literature towards boundary decisions. A boundary 
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decision is situating practices in a particular context by identifying the 
actors (human and non-human), resources, and domain of action (Ferraro 
and O'Mahony, 2012). These decisions change the boundaries of the 
community to cope with changes in the context and objectives of the 
community. 
I begin this section by illustrating that the concept of boundary decision is 
common in the field of economy; however it had been introduced to the 
literature of OSS due to the popularity of OSS in the software industry. I 
illustrate that OSS communities are governed through boundary decisions 
and I provide examples of boundary decisions from the literature.  
2.4.1. Introducing Boundary Decisions to the Literature of OSS 
In conventional organisations, boundary decisions are the decisions that 
delineate the boundaries of the organisation (Barney, 1999). They refer to 
the activities related to possessing and distributing organisational 
resources, and defining the domain of action (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990). 
Boundary decisions were introduced by economists (e.g. Coase, 1937) as 
a governance mechanism to manage work practices in a particular firm 
(Barney, 1999). Using concepts from transaction cost economics (TCE), a 
firm determines the boundaries of its practices by deciding whether to 
perform the practice within the boundaries of the firm or outsource them 
using market-oriented governance mechanisms to reduce the cost of 
exchange and improve efficiency; i.e. build or buy.  
Initially, the decision to outsource a practice was highly influenced by the 
concepts of TCE that focuses on reducing the cost of the transaction. This 
neglects the importance of the resources that influence the quality of the 
transaction (Barney, 1999). Performing the practices internally requires 
specific resources to carry out the activities (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). 
Therefore, boundary decisions are considered as strategic complex 
decisions that do not solely rely on cost-related factors. This has 
encouraged further studies to understand boundary decisions using agency, 
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resource-based, and capability-based views, along with TCE concepts (e.g. 
Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Mayer and Salomon, 2006; Holcomb and Hitt, 
2007). 
IT outsourcing is a boundary decision to shape the boundaries of IT-related 
practices in a particular firm (Valorinta, 2011). It was initially explained in 
the literature from a cost-related aspect. However, the emergence of new 
technology has dramatically altered the definition of boundaries and 
boundary decisions (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Modern organisations are 
becoming more dispersed in terms of functional, geographical, and 
hierarchical boundaries. This has called for developing a more 
comprehensive view of boundary decisions (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005).  
However, it is evident that the current literature on boundary decisions 
neglects the different types of technology and their impacts on boundary 
decisions (Lindgren et al., 2008). OSS is an example of a technology that 
challenges the conventional boundary literature due to the permeability and 
the dynamicity of the community boundaries that allow resources to freely 
flow in and out of the community (Faraj et al., 2011). Therefore, scholars 
argue that the practices handled by OSS communities cannot be considered 
as outsourcing due to the absence of a centralised organisation and 
standard software development practices (Winter et al., 2014). Besides, 
the permeable boundaries hinder the reinforcement of contracts because, 
according to Dahlander and Magnusson (2008), governing the community 
members is like herding cats; any attempts to impose control on them 
scatters them. In addition, OSS communities started as social movements, 
and thus effectiveness and efficiency were not the ultimate goal of 
boundary decisions. Instead, fulfilling the intrinsic motives, and enabling 
knowledge sharing and collaboration were essential aspects that had to be 
taken into consideration (De Noni et al., 2013). 
In the context of OSS governance practices, boundary decisions refer to 
the delineation of the community boundaries by “deciding who can 
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legitimately participate in, contribute to, and join in an organization’s 
activities” (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012:546). In OSS communities, 
boundary decisions are based on shared understanding and agreement. 
Therefore, not only they identify the scope and the actors of the governance 
practices, they also legitimise them (Nicolini, 2013). Boundary decisions 
became a major concern in the literature of OSS governance due to the 
growing popularity of OSS development model in the software market. OSS 
introduced governance practices that involve resources from both the 
community and the firm. This has caused blurred boundaries around the 
community, and thus challenged governance practices (Jarvenpaa and 
Lang, 2011). 
Boundary decisions have been discussed in the literature of OSS 
governance; however implicitly. In the rest of this section, I argue that 
boundary decisions shape the governance practices, and shape the 
community boundaries. Unlike the existing literature that describe 
boundaries as static demarcation that separates community from firm, and 
as segregation between actors and resources  (e.g. Benkler, 2002), I 
illustrate that boundaries also integrate the dispersed resources and the 
collective effort. The following are examples of boundary decisions that 
were evident in the relevant literature; however implicitly considered as 
governance mechanisms.  
2.4.2. Examples of Boundary Decisions 
Fitzgerald (2006) argue that the OSS communities have been incrementally 
transformed to new generation OSS that balances between market-driven 
and OSS values. These transformations are not only triggered by the size 
of the community and the line of codes (de Laat, 2007; De Noni et al., 
2013). Instead, they emerge from ongoing boundary decisions to cope with 
dynamic changes in the requirements of the OSS community (Kane et al., 
2014).  
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In the following subsections, I explain how OSS communities have changed 
since their inception in the mid 1990’s. Even though they have not been 
labelled as such, the following are examples of boundary decisions. They 
illustrate how OSS communities are governed by including and excluding 
actors and resources based on the changing context of the community. This 
means that boundary decisions determine the practices that achieve the 
objectives of the community in that particular context. 
2.4.2.1. Autonomous OSS Communities 
The early explanations of OSS governance stemmed from the ideological 
direction of the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Originally, the FSF was 
found in the 1980’s to create communities that share and develop software 
beyond intellectual property rights (von Krogh et al., 2012). The FSF 
considered any sort of restrictions on the transparency and accessibility as 
immoral (von Krogh et al., 2012). Therefore, the proponents of FSF believe 
that the source code has to be freely available to all for use and 
modification. In addition, they enforce derivative work to be distributed as 
“free software” and all changes to be returned to the original author. This 
was essential to avoid firms from exploiting and commercialising the 
collective effort of FSF (West, 2003).  
In the mid 1990’s, some members of FSF started to take a more pragmatic 
direction by negotiating the degree of openness with the software industry 
in order to enhance the quality of the produced software (O'Mahony, 2007). 
These members initiated the OSS movement. They believed that the source 
code has to be open rather than free. The OSS proponents were moderate 
in comparison to the radical FSF camp (de Laat, 2007) as the former 
allowed individuals and firms to customise and redistribute the co-produced 
software as they desire (West, 2003). Overtime, the OSS movement 
evolved and moved apart from FSF (Raymond, 1999). 
Despite the differences between “open source” and “free software” camps, 
early publications in the field of governing OSS communities were 
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influenced by the tenets of FSF and considered openness as the opposite of 
closed software (e.g. Ljungberg, 2000). Therefore, OSS communities were 
described as autonomous because they are initiated by individuals or 
groups and grow organically overtime; independent from any organisation 
(de Laat, 2007; West and O'Mahony, 2008). de Laat (2007) describes the 
governance practices in such communities as spontaneous because such 
communities include group of hackers who are challenging the software 
industry by defending the right of publicly distributing the source code of 
the software products (de Laat, 2007; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). The 
members spontaneously govern the collective effort without any explicit 
coordination and control mechanisms. Adopting spontaneous governance 
practices is compatible with the context of a community that is dominated 
by volunteers. The governance practices are mainly directed towards the 
daily activities of the developers in the project level of the community 
(Raymond, 1999).  
Boundary decisions in autonomous communities, as summarised in table 2, 
mainly focus on legitimising OSS governance practices that are capable of 
maintaining a competitive OSS (Benlian and Hess, 2011). Scholars consider 
social practices as a precondition for any formal and informal governance 
mechanism (Markus et al., 2000). Practices that assure trust, reputation, 
and altruism (Stewart and Gosain, 2006) are necessary to motivate 
volunteers in co-producing high quality software (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). 
Besides, the community highly relies on voluntarily contributions. 
Therefore, contributors join the community by their own will and participate 
according to their objectives and interests (Kane et al., 2014). Accordingly, 
memberships are fluid (Sharma et al., 2002) causing porous boundaries 
that allow greater inflow of resources (Faraj et al., 2011; Aaltonen and 
Lanzara, 2015). Members self-select their tasks, where tasks are not 
associated with any particular attributes, such as qualification (Nakakoji et 
al., 2002). In addition, the community does not adhere to project deadlines 
or list of deliverables (Mockus et al., 2002; Sack et al., 2006). 
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Boundary decisions: based on emergence (i.e. spontaneous) 
Social practices: 
-Rely on values and norms to attract volunteers 
Roles and responsibilities: 
-Participants self-select their tasks 
-Roles are not associated with attributes (e.g. qualification) 
-No project deadlines 
-No list of deliverables 
OSS License: 
-Non-restrictive license 
-Mainly non-excludable, non-rival 
Membership: 
-Participants join according to their own will 
-Fluid: resources and participants freely flow in and out 
Control: 
-Meritocracy 
-Pluralistic 
-Clan control 
Table 2: Boundary Decisions in Autonomous OSS Communities 
The fluidity of membership has encouraged exercising control based on 
meritocracy. This means that individuals with higher technical and 
administrative skills are more likely to hold authoritative positions, and thus 
control the future direction of the project. Control in autonomous 
communities is pluralistic (O'Mahony, 2007). Scholars argue that the 
conventional control mechanisms, such as output control and behavioural 
control, cannot be applied in autonomous OSS communities due to the lack 
of a centralised organisation (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015). The informal 
clan control is the most evident control mechanism in autonomous 
communities (von Krogh et al., 2012). Clan control focuses on minimising 
divergent interests to emerge through socialisation (Schaarschmidt et al., 
2015). 
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2.4.2.2. Sponsored OSS Communities 
As the OSS approach gained momentum in the software industry, the 
meaning of openness was altered to refer to the intensity of code 
transparency and the degree of accessibility to the development process 
(West and O'Mahony, 2008). Autonomous communities have realised the 
need to be sponsored and move beyond the efforts of individuals. This was 
achieved by adding sort of formality to their structure and processes 
(O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). Therefore, the perception of openness in 
the relevant literature has moved beyond the binary conception of open 
versus closed software to OSS as a business strategy to reap the benefits 
of openness (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005). Besides, sponsorship has 
emerged as an important feature of an OSS community (O'Mahony, 2005). 
In other words, OSS communities are more likely to be sponsored rather 
than autonomous.  
Sponsored OSS communities take various forms. They may refer to a group 
of individuals working on an OSS project that was internally developed by 
a firm without a prior community (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015). Then, the 
firm releases the code to the public in order to support, diffuse, and extend 
the project (West and O'Mahony, 2005). A sponsored OSS community also 
refers to an autonomous community that created a legal shell (de Laat, 
2007) to protect its rights with the popularity of OSS in the business world, 
and to plan the future direction of the community (O'Mahony, 2005; West 
and O'Mahony, 2005). The community sponsor, which could be a firm, a 
government agency, or a not-for-profit organisation (West and O'Mahony, 
2005), is the governing body of the community and controls the code 
development process (West and O'Mahony, 2008). 
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Boundary decisions: balance between growth and 
control 
Roles and responsibilities: 
-Roles with titles and attributes 
Membership: 
-Consistent/stable membership 
Control: 
-Homogeneous 
-Restricting transparency and accessibility 
Table 3: Boundary Decisions in Sponsored OSS Communities 
One of the main objectives of the sponsorship is to attract contributions in 
order to allow the community to grow and thrive. At the same time, the 
sponsor has to control the contributions to assure efficiency and quality 
(West and O'Mahony, 2008). Therefore, sponsoring an OSS community is 
a boundary decision that focuses on balancing between growth and control. 
Sponsoring a community increased the sponsor’s desire to control the 
development process in order to ensure quality, security, and sustainability. 
Accordingly, control in sponsored OSS communities is homogenous, where 
the sponsoring body is the centre of control. 
Unlike autonomous communities that rely on spontaneous governance 
practices, sponsored communities have their internal explicit and formal 
tools for governing the collectives, such as code modularisation, division of 
roles, and a clear decision-making process (de Laat, 2007). As summarised 
in table 3, sponsored OSS communities identify roles that are associated 
with clear descriptions and attributes (de Laat, 2007). In addition, the 
membership process is more stable in comparison to autonomous 
communities (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). 
2.4.2.3. Hybrid OSS Communities 
OSS communities have reached to a level of success and maturity such that 
they cannot ignore the outside world (de Laat, 2007). Therefore, some OSS 
communities tend to form a hybrid community that includes a combination 
 50 
 
of market, community, and hierarchy in order to fulfil the heterogeneous 
requirements of the members (Demil and Lecocq, 2006; Shah, 2006; 
O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). A hybrid OSS community builds alliances 
with diverse service providers to offer payable complementary services, 
such as consultation, data migration, support, and training (Bonaccorsi and 
Rossi, 2003). These service providers also contribute to the development 
of the resources and expertise within the community, and accordingly 
improve the quality of the OSS product (Stewart et al., 2006). It is 
important to note here that the hybridity is not limited to the community 
structure. Hybridity may also include designing the software in a way that 
merges OSS and proprietary software development processes (Sack et al., 
2006), or mixing face-to-face and virtual communication patterns between 
the community members (Watson‐Manheim et al., 2012; Kane et al., 
2014). In general, forming a hybrid OSS community is a boundary decision 
to fulfil the heterogeneous requirements of the community. 
Scholars demonstrate through empirical evidences that the OSS 
communities tend to adopt a hybrid approach to handle the shortcomings 
of the OSS communities and harness the benefits of both traditional and 
OSS software development models (Sharma et al., 2002). There is a 
consensus in the literature that OSS development has various advantages 
over the proprietary software development approach (Deodhar et al., 
2012). For example, OSS development process minimises time-to-market, 
and involves lower software and hardware costs (Sharma et al., 2002; 
Singh and Tan, 2010). Therefore, software companies adopt OSS 
development process as part of their business model.  
Moreover, other scholars argue that the software industry form a hybrid 
OSS community to resolve innovation issues (Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 
2006). Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) argue that software companies release 
one or more of their products to the public in order to diffuse the product, 
which is an important stage of innovation process. This has allowed the 
proliferation of different OSS license agreements that balance between the 
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market needs and the OSS concepts. The hybrid model facilitates the 
innovation process by securing complementary services to the community 
members and providing incentives to the development of the “mundane but 
necessary tasks”, as described by Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003). The high 
reliance on the Internet and the availability of various technical artefacts 
assists software companies to target and attract the suitable external 
knowledge (Liang et al., 2016).  
The hybridity of the OSS communities raises enquiries with regards to the 
governance practices that balances the community-firm relationships (De 
Noni et al., 2013). Initially, conventional OSS communities drew a rigid 
boundary between the industrial and OSS work practices. However, the 
transition to a hybrid community requires both the OSS community and the 
software industry to reconfigure their work practices, and thus negotiate 
their boundaries. Therefore, governance practices in hybrid OSS 
communities aim to merge the benefits of OSS and the business world, as 
summarised in table 4. 
Boundary decisions: fulfil heterogeneous requirements 
Roles and responsibilities: 
-Attract capabilities that meet the objectives of the community 
-Invite diverse resources 
Membership: 
-Firm impose their strategic rules 
-Joining the community according to certain criteria 
OSS license: 
-Restrictive OSS license 
Control: 
-Tight control 
-Hierarchal control 
Facilitating collaboration: 
-Securing communication 
-Standardising the technical artefacts 
Table 4: Boundary Decisions in Hybrid OSS Communities 
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The boundary decisions in hybrid communities are explained in a study 
conducted by Shah (2006). The study compares between the governance 
of a “gated” and an “open” OSS communities; hybrid and autonomous 
respectively. Shah demonstrates that each community experiences 
different boundary decisions. In terms of attracting participants, it is 
evident that the “open” community relies on social practices. In contrary, 
the “gated” community imposes a restrictive OSS license and sets clear 
rules to align the actions of individuals with the overall objectives of the 
community. Besides, the “gated” community exercises tighter control on 
the code development process. In terms of resources, Shah demonstrates 
that the “gated” community attracts the interests of professional 
developers, while the “open” community attracts hobbyists, who are often 
driven by fun and enjoyment. 
Moreover, Rolandsson et al. (2011) studied the consequences of adopting 
OSS concepts as a part of a company’s strategy. This study demonstrates 
how an OSS community reacts to the tensions caused by merging market 
strategies with OSS approach. Firms have to impose rules that align the 
OSS practices with the strategy of the firm. This has triggered the need to 
build a hierarchal control in order to balance between openness and 
bureaucracy. Merging industrial and OSS practices also raises the need to 
secure the communications among the community members. 
In summary, creating a hybrid OSS community invites diverse resources 
that are likely to directly or indirectly influence the governance practices of 
the community (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015). This means defining a 
restrictive membership and granting the access only to those who meet 
certain criteria (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 2009). The more the 
community is dependent on external resources, the more it restricts the 
membership process (Chen and O’Mahony, 2009). Moreover, the literature 
on motivation has been redirected from motivating individuals to 
motivating firms to engage in OSS projects (O'Mahony, 2007). 
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2.4.2.4. Vertical OSS Communities 
A substantial amount of the literature focuses on how contributors are 
motivated to build the community, share a basis of authority, and govern 
themselves in a community that creates and maintains a horizontal OSS 
product (Fitzgerald, 2006). As mentioned earlier, horizontal refers to 
infrastructural applications- such as operating systems, web servers, and 
databases- that are characterised by standard technical requirements. It is 
evident that OSS products are increasingly moving from back office 
invisible infrastructures to domain-specific vertical domains that serve 
particular industries (O'Mahony, 2007; Benlian and Hess, 2011). Vertical 
OSS communities introduced OSS concepts to professional software 
development processes in conventional organisational settings. They are 
targeting specific industries and domains, and thus context became an 
important aspect in governing an OSS community (Shaikh, 2016). 
In horizontal communities, the participant’s willingness to contribute is the 
essence of the development process (Howison and Crowston, 2014). 
Therefore, self-governed participants communicate via the Internet in the 
absence of contracts and managerial authority (Aaltonen and Lanzara, 
2015), and borrow elements of organisation only as required (Winter et al., 
2014). In contrary, vertical OSS communities are domain-specific 
(Fitzgerald, 2006) and consist of knowledgeable individuals collaborating 
according to work practices that are relevant to that particular domain 
(Rolandsson et al., 2011). Therefore, boundary decisions in vertical OSS 
communities ensure that the governance practices are domain-specific; i.e. 
aligned with the objectives of the domain.  
Unlike horizontal OSS communities that attract wide range of contributors, 
vertical communities rely on the efforts of selective knowledgeable group 
of developers and users to maintain the mission of a particular domain. 
Therefore, the membership process is not open to the public; rather it is 
selective and based on certain criteria (Ferraro and O'Mahony, 2012).  
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Accordingly, the produced software is published under a more restrictive 
OSS license (de Laat, 2007). 
Boundary decisions: create domain-specific 
community 
Roles & responsibilities: 
-Select domain-specific resources 
-Selective knowledgeable individuals 
Membership: 
-The domain/industry impose its strategic rules 
-Joining the community according to certain criteria 
OSS license: 
-Restrictive OSS license 
Control: 
-Gated OSS development process 
Facilitating collaboration: 
-Securing communication 
-Standardising the artefact 
Table 5: Boundary Decisions in Vertical OSS Communities 
According to Fitzgerald (2006), one of the main differences between 
horizontal and vertical OSS communities is the software development 
process. In a vertical community, the development process is gated. In 
other words, although the source code and the community collaboration is 
transparent; the accessibility is limited to a selective group of individuals. 
In addition, horizontal and vertical communities vary in their development 
steps. A typical software development process includes planning, analysis, 
design, and implementation. Fitzgerald argues that in a horizontal 
community these steps are concatenated and performed by the same 
developer because the requirements of horizontal applications are generally 
understood. On the other hand, the development process in a vertical 
community is performed by multiple individuals. The planning is often 
assigned to the key players of the community to maintain domain-specific 
objectives. Requirements analysis and design are more complex and 
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performed by knowledgeable individuals. Besides, the requirements of a 
vertical OSS are explicit and well documented. 
Crowston et al. (2012) support the findings of Fitzgerald and explain that 
the software development steps are neglected in horizontal communities 
because the project team has a common understanding of the system. 
Besides, the requirements are scattered in email discussions and bug 
reports. This means that the governance practices of vertical OSS 
communities challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions in the relevant 
literature, and thus require further studies (Aksulu and Wade, 2010; 
Benlian and Hess, 2011). 
2.4.3. Summary 
The aforementioned examples illustrate how OSS communities evolved 
from an ideology to a business model (Deodhar et al., 2012). It is important 
to point out here that these examples should not be considered as 
chronological changes that has occurred to the OSS community. Instead, 
these are illustrations to show that OSS communities continuously change 
their forms. They may change from one form to another, and also may 
combine the features of multiple forms based on the overall context 
(O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). 
 An OSS community begins with a certain form and gradually attracts 
diverse stakeholders to ensure the survival of the community. However, 
the newly joined stakeholders have their own objectives and interests that 
may not totally overlap with the direction of the community. Similarly, with 
the advancements in information and communication technology, OSS 
communities also include and exclude technologies based on their 
requirements. Accordingly, the community continuously change the 
boundaries to govern the collective effort.  
The current literature illustrates that OSS communities combine both 
dynamic and stable elements. On one hand, OSS communities are fluid and 
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comprise of porous boundaries that encourage dynamicity. On the other 
hand, the community maintains a certain form of stability in order to be 
governed (Arazy et al., 2016). This fluidity is not only a characteristic of 
OSS communities; rather it’s essential to make governance possible (Faraj 
et al., 2011). However, current accounts on governing OSS communities 
focused on creating a governance structure that facilitates the collaboration 
among dispersed individuals, neglecting the issues of fluidity and 
dynamicity (Aaltonen and Lanzara, 2015). Future research should further 
our understanding of how boundaries emerge, maintain, change over time, 
and what triggers these changes (Crowston et al., 2012). 
It is also evident that these examples mainly focused on delineating 
boundaries around individuals as the key participants, neglecting the vital 
role of technology in governance practices. In a recent literature review, 
Crowston et al. (2012) urged scholars to attend to the materiality of 
technology in governing the community. For example, they argue that the 
type of technical artefact in-use is an important input. Besides, the 
interactions between various technical artefacts have implications on 
governance. This highlights the importance of materiality in governing OSS 
communities, as will be further clarified in the next section. 
2.5. The Role of Materiality in OSS Governance 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a conceptual foundation to theorise OSS 
governance. However, this cannot be achieved without taking into 
consideration the materiality of the technology for its powerful implications 
on governance (Shaikh and Henfridsson, 2017). As mentioned previously, 
materiality, in the context of this thesis, refers to the ways in which the 
properties of technology are arranged and rearranged in relation to each 
other in order to entail different possibilities for governance practices in a 
particular context (Barrett et al., 2016).  
Therefore, to understand governance, it is essential to understand how 
technology is designed, used, and redesigned to accomplish governance 
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practices. In the relevant literature, technology is expressed in a variety of 
ways. Throughout this thesis, the term “technology” refers to the OSS code, 
and the various technical artefacts used for communication and 
coordination, such as wikis, emails, code version control, and bug tracking 
systems. It also refers to the technical platform necessary for the 
community to function and survive. 
As argued in the previous section, OSS communities are governed through 
decisions that trigger boundary dynamics, i.e. boundary decisions. There 
are various governance practices that are evident in OSS communities. 
Boundary decisions determine the practices that fulfil the requirements of 
the context, and identify the required resources, where technology is 
considered as an essential resource. However, the OSS code and the 
technical artefacts are editable and configurable (Cornford et al., 2010; 
Nyman and Lindman, 2013) in order to accommodate the changing rules 
and principles of the surrounding context (Hemetsberger and Reinhardt, 
2009). This means that both the OSS community and technology are in 
flux. 
The existing literature mainly focuses on how technology enables and 
constrains governance mechanisms in OSS communities. For example, 
scholars extensively explain how email and forum discussions enable the 
categorisation of the members in terms of their interests and expertise, 
which allows task distribution and coordination (e.g. Barcellini et al., 2008; 
Bird et al., 2008). In addition, there are various studies that focus on how 
the development artefacts, such as the version control system, are capable 
of drawing the dispersed community together and coordinating the 
software development process (e.g. Cornford et al., 2010; Shaikh and 
Henfridsson, 2017). However, what has been overlooked is the fact that 
the properties of technology are not predetermined and not arranged in 
isolation. Instead, these properties become meaningful and consequential 
only when they are used in-practice. In other words, the role of materiality 
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in governing OSS communities is an overlooked area of research (Tiwana 
et al., 2013). 
According to Kallinikos et al. (2013), OSS communities represent complex 
ecosystems where the design and use of technology are in flux. Hence, 
technology is in a constant state of change; incomplete. This 
incompleteness, according to Kallinikos et al. (2013), represents both an 
opportunity and a problem. It is an opportunity because it accommodates 
the fluidity and dynamicity of the surrounding context; however it is a 
problem because it raises challenges with regards to the stability and 
control of the design and use of the technical artefact. Based on that, in 
this thesis, I focus on the materiality, i.e. emergent properties of 
technology, rather than focusing on technology per se. 
Materiality is a relatively new concept in the context of online communities, 
and OSS communities in specific. However, scholars (e.g. Orlikowski and 
Scott, 2008; Leonardi, 2011) have called for attending to the role of 
materiality in the change and stability of organisations. They argue that, 
with the advancements in information and communication technologies, it 
is essential to adopt an inseparable ontology when theorising the relation 
between objects, entities, actors, and work practices. Therefore, in this 
thesis, I adopt a relational perspective in theorising materiality. I argue 
that the material properties of the technology are defined and redefined 
through interactions, and influence the dynamicity and stability of the OSS 
communities, i.e. influence boundary decisions.  
There are recent modest attempts in the literature that highlight how the 
objectives of the community are entangled with the materiality of 
technology (e.g. Aaltonen and Lanzara, 2015; Shaikh, 2016). These studies 
demonstrate that the properties of technology are not fixed. Instead, they 
continue to evolve even after implementation, and thus generate new forms 
of agency that cope with the new objectives and settings of the community 
(Bolici et al., 2016; Shaikh and Henfridsson, 2017). For example, Shaikh 
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and Vaast (2016) conducted a study on the communications available in a 
version control system (VCS) in Linux community, where communications 
were initially open and transparent. They studied a decade’s worth of 
communications and demonstrated that as VCS is used overtime, it has 
created temporary “pockets” that are less transparent. They argued that 
these spaces address issues that cannot be solved by the community in the 
conventional open spaces. This suggests that the materiality of technology 
is relational in a sense that the properties of VCS evolve and emerge in 
relation to the surrounding context. This is considered as one of the main 
points of departure for developing a theoretical foundation to explain OSS 
governance. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The literature review stresses two main shortcomings. First, the role of 
boundaries in governing OSS communities is under-theorised and lacks 
empirical evidence (Faraj et al., 2016). There are few attempts to explain 
governance practices through boundary decisions in OSS communities 
because it is difficult to capture the stability of the practices while 
considering the fluidity using the conventional structural-based 
perspectives (Li et al., 2016). The current accounts focus on creating a 
governance structure that facilitates the collaboration among dispersed 
individuals, neglecting the issues of fluidity and dynamicity. As a result, 
scholars continue to build their studies on taken-for-granted assumptions 
overlooking the emerging issues that has occurred to the overall settings 
of the OSS community. 
Therefore, there is a mismatch between the previous studies and the 
emerging issues regarding OSS communities, which calls for a conceptual 
revolution (Winter et al., 2014). One of the neglected areas of research is 
how vertical OSS communities are governed. In recent years, it is evident 
that OSS communities are moving towards vertical domains; i.e. becoming 
domain-specific, as explained in section 2.4.2.4. These communities 
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challenge the presumptions that have dominated the relevant literature. 
For example, joining vertical communities is restricted to knowledgeable 
(i.e. specialised) contributors, which differs from the volunteer-based 
contributions discussed in the literature. Besides, OSS governance 
practices are mainly explained in terms of communities with high degree of 
uncertainty and unpredictability. However, vertical communities are 
domain-specific and are created for a specific purpose, and thus less 
ambiguous. These different settings trigger the need for further studies. 
Second, technology is considered as either an end product or a medium of 
governance (Shaikh, 2016). Current studies failed to address the role of 
the material characteristics of the technology in accomplishing governance 
practices (Faraj et al. 2011). How the properties of the OSS code and the 
technical artefacts are arranged and re-arranged in relation to each other 
to govern the dynamic community remains under-theorised. In this 
respect, the research questions are: How OSS governance practices 
emerge in vertical OSS communities? How governance practices shape the 
boundaries of the community overtime? Table 6 lists the definitions of key 
terms used throughout the thesis.  
Term Definition 
Governance Formal and informal means to control and coordinate the 
collaborative effort to achieve mutual objectives. 
Example of governance practices: control, managing divergent 
interests, defining membership (see section 2.3) 
Boundary decisions Identifying and legitimising the governance practices, their 
actors, and required resources based on the context. These 
decisions trigger boundary dynamics in the community. 
Technology Refers to the OSS code, and the various technical artefacts 
used for communication and coordination, and any technical 
platform/software necessary for the community to function 
and survive. 
Materiality The ways in which the properties of technology are arranged 
and rearranged to entail different possibilities for governance 
practices in a particular context 
Table 6: Main Definitions used in the Thesis 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1. Introduction  
In chapter 2, I have summarised the literature on governing OSS 
communities. I have illustrated that the current accounts explain the 
dynamicity of the governance practices using fixed structural mechanisms. 
Besides, the current literature neglects the role of materiality in OSS 
governance practices. In this chapter, I describe how I have designed the 
research framework in relation to my research questions: How OSS 
governance practices emerge in vertical OSS communities? How 
governance practices shape the boundaries of the community overtime? 
I begin this chapter, in section 3.2, by clarifying the grounded theory 
approach adopted in this research. Then, in section 3.3, I explain the 
rationale behind selecting a single in-depth case study as the research 
design. Then, I describe the organisational context of Kuali; the case under 
study. Although the processes of data collection and analysis were 
conducted simultaneously in an iterative manner, I explain them separately 
and sequentially for clarification purposes in sections 3.4 and 3.5 
respectively. Finally, I summarise the chapter in section 3.6. 
3.2. Research Framework: Grounded Theory Approach 
The ultimate purpose of this study is to build a substantive theory that 
explains OSS governance. The focus of the research is on vertical OSS 
communities that challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions in the 
relevant literature. As explained in chapter 2, there is a lack of theoretical 
foundation to assist researchers in explaining the emergence and 
dynamicity of the OSS governance practices, especially in vertical OSS 
communities. Therefore, in this thesis, I follow a grounded theory approach 
that is suitable for phenomena that are emergent and poorly understood 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
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Grounded theory is an inductive data-driven methodology (Walsh et al., 
2015). It aims to develop theory that is grounded in empirical data, rather 
than setting hypotheses and testing theories. Accordingly, I have started 
the research without a definitive theoretical basis. The research was driven 
by sensitising concepts from the initial literature review. The aim was to 
develop empirically-driven theoretical explanation with regards to OSS 
governance.  
It is evident that there is an increase interest in grounded theory approach 
in the field of information systems over the past decade (Urquhart and 
Fernandez, 2013). However, grounded theory was criticised for producing 
low level of theory development due to the misuse of the grounded theory 
concepts (Urquhart et al., 2010). Therefore, I begin this section by 
providing a brief historical background about grounded theory and the 
emergence of the contentions and conflicts in the adoption of grounded 
theory. Then, I explain the grounded theory approach that is adopted in 
this thesis.  
3.2.1. Types of Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory was initially developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm 
Strauss, which was represented in their famous book “The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory” in 1976 (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The aim of the book 
was to provide an alternative to the deductive approaches that require 
precise hypotheses to be developed before data collection (Kelle, 2010). 
Emergence is the key principle of grounded theory, where the research 
process and outcome emerge from data, rather than forcing categories on 
data. Besides, the researcher should employ theoretical sensitivity by 
combining the concepts that have emerged from the data with the 
researcher's previous theoretical knowledge (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
These basic rules have evolved considerably producing multiple types of 
grounded theory approaches. The first type is the Glaserian approach, 
which is the closest to the classical grounded theory. Glaser remained 
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consistent with the original grounded theory approach. He proposed two 
levels of coding; substantive and theoretical coding. According to Glaser 
(2002), the substantive coding aims to categorise data into as many 
categories as possible, while theoretical coding focuses on integrating the 
substantive codes to form a theory. The Glaserian approach is mainly based 
on emergence. Novice researchers find this approach challenging to be 
translated and applied in practice because emergence is highly reliant on 
theoretical sensitivity, which requires solid background in relevant 
theoretical directions (Kelle, 2010). 
The second type is known as the Straussian approach. It was developed by 
Strauss as he was aware of the difficulties that face novice researchers in 
generating theoretical concepts. In 1987, he published a book titled 
“Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists” to train students in grounded 
theory procedures (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). He proposed more 
systematic coding procedures and suggested three levels of coding: open, 
axial, and selective coding. Similar to the substantive coding in the 
Glaserian approach, open coding involves scrutinising the collected data to 
produce concepts. Axial coding involves aggregating concepts into 
categories. Strauss proposed a coding paradigm model to analyse the 
categories in terms of contexts, causation, intervening conditions, and 
consequences. Finally, selective coding sets the relations between the 
categories to develop a theory.  Strauss elaborated his approach in a book 
titled “Basics of Qualitative Research”, which was co-authored with Juliet 
Corbin (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
 A more recent type of grounded theory took a more flexible path. A famous 
example is the constructivist grounded theory developed by Cathy Charmaz 
(Charmaz, 2014). The advocates of this type assume that grounded theory 
constitutes of set of practices and principles; not a methodology. Charmaz 
argues that the grounded theory guidelines are flexible and can be applied 
with various methodological assumptions and approaches. She named her 
approach “Constructivist Grounded Theory” to acknowledge subjectivity 
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and highlight the role of the researcher’s position, perspective, and 
interactions in the process of theory development (Charmaz, 2014). 
In summary, “there is no definitive grounded theory method” (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008:373). Despite the variations and contentions between the 
different types of grounded theory approaches, they all have the central 
elements of grounded theory. In the rest of this section I explain the main 
tenets of the grounded theory that have been adopted in this research.  
3.2.2. The Grounded Theory Approach Applied in the Thesis 
In this thesis, I adopt grounded theory approach throughout the research 
process including data collection, data analysis, and theoretical 
development. I have applied the basic tenets of grounded theory approach, 
as suggested by Urquhart et al. (2010), which are: 
1. The research was not driven by pre-conceived assumptions or pre-
formulated hypotheses. This does not mean that I have ignored the 
literature (Suddaby, 2006). Instead, an initial literature review was 
conducted and helped in clarifying the research topic and formulating 
provisional research questions. Besides, the initial literature review 
acted as sensitising concepts that guided the data analysis. 
2. I have relied on multiple sources of data to provide an opportunity 
for triangulation.  
3. ‘Slices of data’ of various types were selected by a process of 
theoretical sampling (Walsh et al., 2015). According to Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), theoretical sampling is the process of combining data 
collection and analysis to decide what data to collect next and where 
to find them. This allows the researcher to capture concepts as they 
emerge, which advances the development of theory. This is what 
distinguishes grounded theory from other qualitative research. In 
addition, in line with grounded theory tenets, data was not focused 
on individuals and organisations. It also included events, incidents, 
interactions, and consequences (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).  
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4. Constant comparisons were performed as the data were collected. 
Constant comparisons aimed to assign a common meaning to 
multiple data incidents (Locke, 2001). As concepts emerge and 
labelled they were compared to other incidents in data. This 
continued until the existing categories were saturated.  
5. Since the main purpose of the grounded theory method is theory 
building, I had to maintain theoretical sensitivity, which refers to the 
theoretical awareness of the researcher. I have developed this 
awareness by frequently referring to the relevant literature 
(Goulding, 2002) and by staying close to data (Charmaz, 2014). In 
addition, as argued by Corbin and Strauss (2008), the more I was 
involved in data analysis, the more I developed theoretical sensitivity. 
During data analysis, I have followed the Straussian coding phases (i.e. 
open, axial, and selective) and the Straussian coding paradigm. I have 
selected the Straussian approach because it provides a sign-posted 
procedure that guides the research (Seidel and Urquhart, 2013). It also 
provides analytical tools that uncover the context in which the target 
phenomenon occurs, and focus on related interactions and consequences 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990), which fits the objectives of the research. The 
coding paradigm is flexible, and thus researchers can construct a coding 
paradigm that is consistent with their particular objectives (Kelle, 2010). 
Moreover, the Straussian approach allows researchers to more 
transparently report on the underlying research processes (Seidel and 
Urquhart, 2013). It is evident that the Straussian coding scheme became a 
common practice in the information systems discipline in general (Seidel 
and Urquhart, 2013). Besides, it has proven to be fruitful in OSS literature 
(e.g. Shah, 2006; Agerfalk and Fitzgerald, 2008; Feller et al., 2008; Shaikh 
and Henfridsson, 2017). 
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Figure 2: The Grounded Theory Approach 
 
Adapted from Urquhart et al. (2010) 
Figure 2 summarises the grounded theory approach followed in this 
research. The figure has been adapted from Urquhart et al. (2010). It 
illustrates that the research started with an initial literature review that lead 
to the area of inquiry and the collection of the first slices of data. Then, the 
research went through an iterative process between data collection, 
analysis, and literature review. This is considered as a central feature of 
grounded theory methodology. This process is further explained in sections 
3.4 and 3.5. 
3.3. Research Design: A Single In-Depth Case Study 
In this thesis, I aim to understand how governance practices emerge in 
vertical OSS communities that are targeting the higher education (HE) 
sector. I have chosen Kuali as the target case. Kuali is a vertical OSS 
community that builds and maintains an enterprise (ERP) system for the 
HE sector. The uniqueness of Kuali community is best understood using a 
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case study research that allows exploring Kuali in its natural settings (Yin, 
2014).  
I have conducted a single in-depth case study using a grounded theory 
approach to understand “what is going on here”, which is a central question 
in grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). According to Eisenhardt 
(1989), a grounded theory that is developed from a case study is likely to 
have higher level theory. That is because, the iterative process of grounded 
theory moves the research beyond description and strengthens the 
research design as well as the validity of the findings. Besides, scholars in 
the field of organisation studies and information systems (e.g. Orlikowski, 
1993; Urquhart, 1997; Boudreau and Robey, 2005) demonstrate that the 
case study method is compatible with grounded theory because case 
studies focus on contextual and processual elements that aid in 
conceptualising the phenomenon under study. 
In the remaining of this section, I explain the HE settings with regards to 
adoption and implementation of OSS project. Then, I describe the 
organisational context of Kuali community.  
3.3.1. OSS in the Higher Education Settings 
The HE sector often falls into the build-buy dilemma when purchasing, 
developing, and maintaining information systems (IS) in general. The 
‘build’ option allows universities to develop IS that are tailored to their 
requirements, which allows universities to gain a full control over the source 
code. This option is suitable for universities that afford leveraging 
developers, maintenance, and project management (Wheeler, 2003). With 
regards to the ‘buy’ option, it transfers the load of code development, 
maintenance, and management to a service provider. However, the ‘buy’ 
option is recognised for its high cost and low control over the source code 
from the university side. Besides, the software market does not meet the 
needs of the HE sector, mainly due to the idiosyncratic nature of the sector 
that includes unique business practices (Courant and Griffiths, 2006). The 
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business process workflow within a university is more complex than any 
other organisation and often not handled by a commercial software 
(Brooks, 2007). 
OSS solutions introduced the concept of ‘collaborate’ to the software 
development process (Wheeler, 2003), which blends the benefits of ‘build’ 
and ‘buy’ options. OSS development process unbundles the software 
development and support granting universities more control over the future 
direction of the software (Wheeler, 2004). Besides, it promotes 
collaboration and pools resources from multiple universities, as well as 
firms, to build OSS applications that can be freely available to the wider 
community (Brooks, 2007). However, this cannot be achieved without 
disciplined and purposeful governance practices that align the OSS 
concepts with the objectives of the HE institutions (Wheeler, 2003). 
The concepts of OSS are not new among HE institutes (Wheeler, 2003). In 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, the software development was carried out by 
scientists and engineers in academic institutions and research labs, where 
part of the development process was to freely share and exchange source 
code for modifications and improvements (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von 
Krogh et al., 2012). The commercialisation of software is tracked back to 
the 1980’s adding constraints to IS adoptions (von Krogh et al., 2012). Yet, 
this did not stop university efforts to continue sharing source codes.  
Linux and Apache, one of the earliest OSS technologies developed by and 
entered to universities, were mainly located in data centres, used by 
technicians, and not exposed to students, faculty, and administrative staff 
members (Masson, 2011). Universities were concerned about the cost, 
reliability, and security aspects of developing and supporting IS for non-
technical users (Wheeler, 2003; Masson, 2011). With the advancements in 
technology and the high demand on involving students and faculty in 
defining business requirements; especially in university specific 
applications like learning management systems, universities successfully 
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produced outstanding systems as OSS solutions (Masson, 2011). Examples 
of OSS produced by universities for universities are Moodle and Sakai2. This 
success encouraged universities to introduce OSS concepts to develop 
enterprise level IS, such as Kuali, the focus of this thesis. Universities found 
that OSS development practices are more effective when the developers 
are the users of the software (Courant and Griffiths, 2006). 
Besides the internal drivers, such as cost, control, and performance 
(Courant and Griffiths, 2006; Benlian and Hess, 2011), that encouraged 
universities to initiate and adopt OSS projects, external factors played an 
essential role as well. Taking the United States (US) as an example, since 
it is one of the leading countries in promoting OSS in the HE sector (Courant 
and Griffiths, 2006), two main factors supported the diffusion of OSS 
among the American universities. First, the financial support provided by 
not-for-profit foundations which are dedicated to promote the activities of 
HE institution (Courant and Griffiths, 2006; Wheeler, 2007), such as 
Andrew W. Mellon and William and Flora Hewlett Foundations (Kuali 
Foundation, 2014). Second, the public policy in USA highly supports the 
OSS development. For example, in 1999, the US government 
recommended the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee 
to set a research strategy that uses OSS development as the new model 
for promoting the high end computing software needs in the United States3.  
The focus of this thesis is to understand the governance practices in OSS 
communities that are dedicated for and sponsored by the HE sector. 
Current studies represent how the OSS concepts created new forms of 
organisations and new governance practices where the individual-level is 
the main unit of analysis. By exploring Kuali community, I aim to 
understand how governance practices emerge and evolve in a vertical OSS 
                                   
2 Moodle and Sakai are open source learning management systems used in schools and 
universities. 
3 Developing Open Source Software To Advance High End Computing, October 2000: 
https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pres-oss-11sep00.pdf 
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community that challenges the taken-for-granted assumptions that are 
dominating the relevant literature.  
3.3.2. Research Site: Kuali Community 
Kuali is an OSS community dedicated to develop applications for the HE 
purposes by the HE employees. Kuali community was selected for its 
uniqueness as it challenges the presumptions that are dominating the 
existing literature. According to Kuali Foundation (2014), Kuali community 
was initiated in 2004 by Indianan University (IU) in USA when IU decided 
to replace its technically obsolete financial system. At that time, the world 
has just survived the millennium bug and various reputable ERP systems in 
USA have collapsed. The HE sector was under high pressure to reduce its 
expenditures. Therefore, IU refused to go through the painful experience 
of either building their own software or buying a commercial package. 
Instead, IU took a strategic decision by exploring a third option, which is 
collaboration. As a result, IU looked out for strategic alliances interested in 
developing a financial application tailored for the HE context.  
IU joined the National Association of College and University Business 
Officers (NACUBO) to explore an innovative approach to build a financial 
system for HE institutes. IU and a group of universities started-off with 
implementing Kuali Financial System (KFS), which was based on the 
functionalities of IU’s existing legacy financial application4. Kuali community 
was not a conventional OSS community. Instead, it followed a community-
source approach that has opened-up the OSS code, but imposed 
restrictions on the OSS development process by implementing Kuali-
specific framework called Rice. In other words, Kuali founders formed a 
gated vertical OSS community to control the code and align OSS 
development process with the HE settings in USA. 
                                   
4 IU’s legacy finance system was technically obsolete. However, functionality-wise, it 
covered the basic requirements of the American universities. 
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In 2005, the success of KFS was appealing to the community of universities 
in USA, and thus provided a stepping stone to expand the scope of the 
community from developing KFS to the development of an open source ERP 
system. Thus, ERP modules were added, including the research and student 
systems. Each module was considered as an OSS project. Besides, non-
American universities were also invited to join Kuali community in order to 
enrich Kuali projects. Subsequently, the founders realised that each 
project, university, and country had different requirements. Therefore, it 
was necessary to form a foundation to ensure consistent governance 
practices across different contexts.  
Accordingly, in 2006, Kuali Foundation was established and received the 
not-for-profit organisation status to facilitate collaboration between various 
HE institutes, where developing OSS is one of their core objectives. Kuali 
founding partners comprised of Indiana University (IU), the University of 
Arizona, the University of Hawaii, Michigan State University, San Joaquin 
Delta Community College, Cornell University, and NACUBO. Kuali 
Foundation consists of board of directors and members. The membership 
is open to universities, research and development centres, and for-profit or 
not-for-profit organisations. The Foundation also sought to collaborate with 
Kuali commercial affiliates (KCA’s) to provide complementary services to 
the community, such as planning, implementation, hosting, and supporting 
services.  
Throughout the first decade, the implementation of Kuali products was 
carried out by HE employees and restricted by HE rules. These constraints 
hindered Kuali community from coping with the increasing demands and 
expectations of the stakeholders, especially with the advancements in the 
technology. Therefore, in 2014, Kuali community spun-off a for-profit 
company called KualiCo to improve and sustain Kuali products.   
Kuali community maintains various OSS projects; however this thesis 
focuses on three major OSS projects; the Kuali Financial System (KFS), the 
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Kuali Student (KS), and the research administration system, which is called 
Kuali Coues (KC). These three projects have been chosen for their well-
established communities and repositories of archival documents that 
illustrate Kuali governance practices.    
3.4. Data Collection 
OSS communities are known for their diversity and transparency of data 
for researchers (von Krogh and Spaeth, 2007), such as the publicly 
available email discussions, meeting minutes, and technical 
documentations. The existing literature on governing OSS communities is 
dominated by research studies focusing on the project level of the 
community, as illustrated by Crowston et al. (2012) in their recent literature 
review. The project level refers to the development team of a particular 
software. The current studies explain OSS governance as an emerging 
process that is determined by the communication patterns of the 
developers while building and maintaining the OSS (Demil and Lecocq, 
2006; O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007).  
Due to the theory-building nature of this thesis, I have combined multiple 
types of data (Eisenhardt, 1989) to gain a coherent understanding of Kuali 
community and its governance practices. The data represents different 
levels of the community, including the executive level. The variation of data 
sources across levels and the uniqueness of Kuali community provided an 
opportunity to understand how governance practices emerged in Kuali. 
Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 provide a detailed explanation of the secondary 
and primary data collection respectively. Section 3.4.3 describes the 
theoretical sampling procedure of data collection, and provides a summary 
of the collected data. 
3.4.1. Secondary Data: Archived Documents and Videos 
The data collection process began in October 2013 with an in-depth study 
of Kuali email archives, meeting minutes, developer’s guides, and technical 
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regulations in order to gain familiarity with the community settings 
(Charmaz, 2014). These documents are available to the public; however a 
free Kuali online account was required for obtaining the access. Kuali 
archive goes back to 2010. It provides information on the organisational 
settings of the community, the day-to-day activities, governance 
structures, policies, and rules and regulations. During the data collection 
period (2013-2016), the archived data were distributed amongst 6 different 
technical artefacts, as shown in table 7. I have accessed these artefacts, 
and scanned the available data. Then, I extracted related materials, 
organised them in separate documents, and uploaded them into Nvivo 
software to facilitate the analysis process. 
Technical 
artefact 
Description of artefact Extracted Secondary data 
Kuali main 
website 
Contains general information about 
Kuali Foundation, and Kuali 
products. 
Background information 
about Kuali Foundation, and 
Kuali projects 
Meeting minutes 
Kuali Jira Issue and bug tracking system for 
all Kuali projects 
Regulations with regards to 
reporting, following-up, and 
resolving issues 
Kuali Wiki A documentation system that 
includes Kuali project plans, 
meeting minutes, role descriptions, 
contribution regulations, and 
process workflows 
Kuali governance structure 
Documentations: e.g. Kuali 
rules and regulations, KFS 
Developer guides  
Kuali Information 
System (KIS) 
A repository of all Kuali people, 
projects, teams, and organisations. 
Information related to 
individuals and organisations 
involved in Kuali projects 
Google Drive Kuali shared documents KFS email discussions 
YouTube Includes Kuali official videos, such 
as interviews with Kuali leaders, 
seminars, and sessions of Kuali 
Days5. 
Kuali Days’ sessions during 
2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 
Table 7: The Secondary Data and their Corresponding Technical Artefacts 
                                   
5 Kuali Day: an annual conference organised by Kuali Foundation to gather community 
members in a face-to-face event. 
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Regarding the archived emails, they include conversations since 2010 only. 
Each conversation contains multiple threads.  I have focused on the email 
discussions of the KFS team members because the KFS project is the 
frontrunner and has reached to a mature stage. Therefore, the KFS-related 
email discussions were rich in terms of diversity of topics. The email 
discussions were transparent and archived in Google Drive. They were 
categorised into technical and functional email folders. The technical folder 
consists of email conversations among KFS technical team members from 
various universities and commercial affiliates regarding KFS technical 
issues. The functional folder consists of email conversations among KFS 
functional team members discussing issues related the use of KFS 
functionalities. Besides, the functional folder also includes discussions 
related to new functional requirements.  
The technical and functional folders have been manually scanned in order 
to extract a variation of topics and avoid replication. I have targeted email 
discussions that illustrate the code development process, community 
support, coordination, collaboration, and how the community handles the 
university-specific requirements. During the process of extracting email 
threads, it was noticeable that the technical issues are more diverse; there 
is less replication in the email topics. Therefore, I was able to find 45 
technical email topics dated between the years 2013 and 2014 that cover 
different technical aspects of the KFS project. On the other hand, the 
functional topics are replicated. Functional users raise similar enquiries over 
time, and accordingly the search range was extended to the year 2012. As 
a result, 21 different functional email topics were extracted. They are dated 
between 2012 and 20156. 
The email conversations also involve references to previously raised issues 
in Kuali Jira system. Therefore, these issues (e.g. enhancements, bug 
                                   
6 Appendix illustrates sample technical and functional email threads. Note that I have 
extracted the conversation and organised them in a way that shows the original email and 
the corresponding replies. 
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fixing) have been reviewed to understand how they were assigned, followed 
up, and resolved. In general, the email discussions reflect the 
communication patterns among Kuali members in the project level of the 
community. They also explain how individuals were coordinated through 
defined roles and responsibilities. It also illustrate the use of technical 
artefacts to facilitate coordination mechanisms. In addition, the email 
communications demonstrate the ethos of an OSS community, such as 
knowledge sharing and community support. 
The secondary data also include the meeting summaries of Kuali Board 
members that were published on the main website of Kuali community. All 
available meeting summaries were selected; from January/2010 to 
December/2015. The meeting summaries illustrate the macro-level 
discussions of Kuali community, such as the financial aspects of Kuali, the 
HE policies in USA, planning, and the process of prioritising projects. 
Meeting summaries also include presentation slides introducing Kuali to 
newcomers, and summarising Kuali progress to the Board.  
In addition, KFS developer rules and KFS regulations documents have been 
reviewed. These documents are published in Kuali website and Kuali Wiki. 
They contain instructions for the technical and non-technical members on 
how to join and contribute to the community. All secondary data were 
uploaded into Nvivo software to facilitate the analysis process.  
Speakers 
(pseudonym) 
Session Event 
S1 Empowering the Community Kuali Days 2011, J.W. Marriott 
Indianapolis, USA 
S2 Economics, Operations and 
Strategy of Kuali 
Kuali Days 2012, Austin, USA 
S3 Welcome Kuali Days 2014, Day1, 
Session1, South Africa 
S4 Introduction Kuali Days 2014, Day1, 
Session1, South Africa 
S5 Strategic overview of Kuali Kuali Days 2014, Day1, 
Session1, South Africa 
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S6 Stellenbosch University's 
journey to a Kuali decision 
Kuali Days 2014, Day1, 
Session4, South Africa 
S7 Kuali Collaboration in South 
Africa 
Kuali Days 2014, Day1, 
Session4, South Africa 
S8 Kuali’s mission & progress in 
2015 
Kuali Days 2015, Austin, USA 
S9 An overview of Kuali product 
offerings 
Kuali Days 2015, Austin, USA 
S10, S11, S12, 
S13 
Explaining the Economics, 
Operations, and Strategy of 
Kuali for Higher Education 
Kuali Days 2015, Austin, USA 
Table 8: List of Kuali Videos 
The final type of secondary data was based on official Kuali videos that are 
published in YouTube. The videos are 20 to 45 minutes long and represent 
keynote speeches of Kuali administrative and technical leads during various 
sessions of Kuali days, as summarised in table 8. The speakers are core 
personnel in American and non-American universities and companies who 
played an essential role in building Kuali community, defining the core 
values of Kuali, and reconfiguring the rules and regulations as the 
community evolved. The content of the videos complemented the data 
gathered from the interviews, especially with regards to the historical and 
background information about building Kuali community, and how the 
governance practices evolved over time. The videos were transcribed and 
uploaded to Nvivo as well.  
3.4.2. Primary Data: Interviews 
The primary data was based on 16 semi-structured in-depth interviews that 
were conducted via the Internet using Skype and Google Hangouts 
applications. Each interview lasted for 30 to 60 minutes, and was recorded 
with permission. The interviewees are categorised into administrators and 
technicians who are, at the time of data collection, employees in Kuali 
Foundation, Kuali Commercial Affiliates, KualiCo, or the contributing 
universities. The administrator category includes members responsible for 
the functional side of Kuali projects, such as executive directors, strategic 
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advisors, and business analysts. The technicians represent those who are 
responsible for the technical side of the projects, such as programmers, 
and IT consultants. Table 9 presents descriptive information about the 
interviewees. Some of the interviewees have multiple roles in the 
community; however table 9 displays their job title as shown in Kuali 
Information System.  
Interviewee 
(pseudonym) 
Organisation Team Job title 
Admin1 Kuali Foundation Kuali 
Foundation 
Executive Director 
Admin2 Kuali Foundation Kuali 
Foundation 
Strategic Advisor 
Admin3 University (USA) KC Director, Research and Information 
Systems 
Admin4 University (USA) KFS Senior Consultant to the CIO 
Admin5 University (USA) KFS Financial Management Services 
Admin6 University 
(Canada) 
KS CIO UT (KS) 
Admin7 University (USA) KC Senior Director, Research 
Partnership Services 
BA1 KualiCo KFS Business Analyst 
BA2 University (USA) KFS Business Analyst 
PM1 KualiCo KFS Product Manager (previous KFS 
functional member in a university) 
Tech1 KualiCo KFS IT Consultant 
Tech2 KualiCo KFS Analyst 
Tech3 University (USA) KFS Applications Programmer 
Tech4 University (South 
Africa) 
KS Senior Consultant (KS) 
Tech5 KualiCo KC Research Compliance Product Owner 
Tech6 University 
(Canada) 
KS Project manager (KS) 
Table 9: Details of Interviewees 
The interviews were conducted in two rounds that took place between 
03/07/2015 to 03/08/2015 and 15/12/2015 to 28/03/2016 respectively. 
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The interviewees were identified during the process of analysing Kuali 
archived documents. The regulation documents illustrate that the Kuali 
Foundation is the governing body of the community, and accordingly the 
employees of the Foundation played an essential role in the governance 
process. The Foundation included (at the time of data collection) 14 
employees; 12 of them were Board directors and officers that were elected 
in a yearly basis, and they were also holding administrative positions in 
their corresponding universities. The remaining 2 employees, which have 
been chosen as interview participants, were purely representing the 
Foundation. They are aware of the governance practices since the inception 
of Kuali. The first participant is the executive director of Kuali Foundation, 
who then became the gatekeeper for the second round of interviews. The 
second participant is the strategic advisor of Kuali Foundation, who is also 
one of the community founders. The rest of the participants of the first 
round were identified from the email discussions. 
During the first round of interviews, I ensured to focus on the context of 
the American universities as they form the majority of the community. The 
initial coding process revealed that the target Kuali projects (i.e. KFS, KC, 
KS) were designed with the American HE settings in mind. However, there 
were some unique requirements determined by the federal governments of 
the states. Therefore, representatives from universities of different states 
within USA have been selected to understand how Kuali community 
responded to those specific requirements.  
In addition, the analysis of the first round of interviews revealed that the 
context of country has an influence in the governance practices, and 
accordingly the second round of interviews included representatives from 
South Africa (SA) and Canada. Universities from these countries were 
chosen in particular because they have implemented at least one Kuali 
project of interest (i.e. KFS, KS, KC) and went through the process of 
implementation and post-implementation, and thus experienced the 
emergence and reconfiguration of various governance practices. Besides, 
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they have representatives in Kuali Board, and accordingly have influence 
on the future direction of the projects. In addition, the corresponding 
universities in SA and Canada have implemented KS project, which has 
been developed from scratch and had a very slow progress in comparison 
to the KFS and KC due to the complex user requirements. Accordingly, they 
have faced different challenges with regards to governance (this will be 
further explained in chapter 5).  
Moreover, the reason for selecting SA is because it has different HE 
requirements in comparison to the context of USA, which is dominating the 
design of Kuali projects. An interview was conducted with a senior technical 
member from SA that was present during all implementation stages of KFS 
and KS projects and is experienced in both the administrative and technical 
aspects of the projects. Furthermore, Canada was chosen because it has 
similar educational settings with USA, but different governmental policies 
that had influenced the governance of Kuali projects in Canada. Interviews 
have been conducted with a senior administrative and a senior technical 
member of KS project in Canada. To sum up, the objective of choosing SA 
and Canada in particular was to cover different user perspectives and 
different contexts in order to enrich the research data. 
The interviews were semi-structured based on interview guides. I have 
prepared a different interview guide for each participant. Figure 3 
represents a sample interview guide7. As recommended by Charmaz 
(2014), the interview guide is a detail of all possible questions that are 
related to the research questions to assist the researcher in being 
spontaneous during the actual interview. Therefore, I have prepared a 
guide for each interviewee. The guides mainly included general questions 
related to the interviewee’s day-to-day activities, the workflow process, the 
communication patterns with geographically dispersed team members, and 
the design and use of the technology and how it has influenced the 
                                   
7 Appendix A includes more samples of interview guides 
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coordination and control of the projects. Besides, each guide included 
question that were specific to the role of the interviewee in Kuali 
community. The actual interview included more questions that were 
inspired by the interviewee’s answers. The interview provided real-time and 
retrospective data about Kuali. They provided different perspectives on the 
previously collected secondary data (Gioia et al., 2013). The interviews 
were transcribed and uploaded to Nvivo. 
Figure 3: A Sample Interview Guide 
 
 
3.4.3. Theoretical Sampling 
As the research was following a grounded theory approach, the data 
collection and analysis were performed simultaneously in an iterative 
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manner. The data collection was guided by theoretical sampling process. 
The research started with an initial set of data that acted as a point of 
departure (Charmaz, 2014). The initial sample was based on Kuali 
secondary documents, which were used to understand the structure of the 
community, the different roles and responsibilities, and the day-to-day 
activities. In particular, I have started by analysing the regulation 
documents and email discussions because they illustrate the governance 
rules in principle and in practice respectively. The regulation documents 
explicitly state the roles and responsibilities of individuals and organisations 
in the community. On the other hand, the email discussions illustrate how 
the rules and regulations were applied in practice. This was evident in how 
the members respond to the different enquiries raised in the emails.  
However, the initial sample did not explain how governance practices 
changed over time. Therefore, I then started looking into the meeting 
summaries of Kuali Board. The Board consists of representatives from the 
partner universities. The meeting summaries provide valuable information 
on the project management of all Kuali projects, such as planning, 
managing resources, and distributing tasks. They also demonstrate the 
process of prioritising projects, and balancing the specific university-related 
needs with the common requirements of the community. This has provided 
an overview on the overall context of the Foundation on one hand, and the 
changing requirements of Kuali projects on the other hand. Appendix B 
includes samples of meeting summaries. 
Analysing the meeting summaries revealed that they lack sufficient 
historical information. This means, the meetings do not explain the 
circumstances that surrounded the inception of Kuali and how the 
governance practices emerged in the first place. This was important 
because Kuali represents a unique form of vertical OSS communities that 
is targeting the HE sector. Therefore, it was necessary to interview 
administrative and technical members to fill in these gaps.  
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As described in section 3.4.2, the interviews were conducted through two 
rounds. Analysing the first set of interviews revealed gaps in the data, 
which prompted for more interviews. By the end of the second round of 
interviews, I have found that there are official videos of core personnel in 
Kuali that will complement the previously data gathered from the 
interviews.  
Research data Collection period Description 
KFS functional 
emails 
Oct/2013 – Mar/2015 -21 email discussions, total word 
count: 9496 
-Dated from Aug/2012 to Mar/2015 
KFS technical 
emails 
Oct/2013 – Mar/2015 -45 emails discussions, total word 
count: 17650 
-Dated from Jan/2013 to Dec/2014 
Documentations 
(KFS rules and 
regulations) 
Jan/2015 -24 documents, total word count: 
23033 
Kuali Board 
meeting summaries 
Feb/2015 – Dec/2015 -51 meetings, total word count: 
46733 
-Dated from Jan/2010 to Dec/2015 
Interviews Jul/2015-Mar/2016 -16 semi-structured, 30-60 mins long 
Videos Mar/2016 -7 videos, transcriptions’ word count: 
42828 
Table 10: A Summary of the Research Data 
Further data were collected based on the analysis process in order to enrich 
the research data and support the emergent theoretical concepts. The 
process of theoretical sampling continued till the research reached to a 
point of saturation, which is the point where data did not provide additional 
theoretical insights (Locke, 2001; Charmaz, 2014). Table 10 illustrates a 
summary of the collected data. In the next section, I provide a detailed 
explanation of the analysis process. 
3.5. Data Analysis 
The secondary and primary data were analysed through coding, constant 
comparison, and theoretical sampling. In grounded theory research, coding 
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is the process of breaking down the data into manageable segments, 
conceptualising them, and putting them back together in a different way to 
develop a theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). As explained in Section 3.2.2, 
I have adopted the Straussian approach to coding, which involved open, 
axial, and selective coding.   
Figure 4: Summary of the Data Analysis Process 
 
Figure 4 summarises the data analysis. Although the analysis was an 
iterative process, the figure illustrates a linear transition for clarification 
purpose. The following is an explanation of the three coding phases.  
3.5.1. Open Coding 
Open coding was the first analytical step. It was an interpretive process to 
assign meaning to raw data (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Corbin and Strauss, 
2008). Open coding was sensitised by the initial literature review. In 
particular, it was mainly driven by four sensitising concepts. The first 
sensitising concept was the definition of OSS governance as declared by 
Markus (2007), which states that OSS governance is “the means of 
achieving the direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially 
autonomous individuals and organizations on behalf of an open source 
software development project to which they jointly contribute” (p.152). 
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This highly cited definition has been selected because it is comprehensive 
and summarises how OSS governance is explained in the relevant literature 
in terms of structure, practices, and culture (von Krogh et al., 2012; Di 
Tullio and Staples, 2013).  
The second sensitising concept is the consensus in the literature with 
regards to the fluidity and dynamicity of OSS communities. However, at the 
same time the current accounts explain governance by focusing on fixed 
structures that facilitate the collaboration among dispersed individuals, 
neglecting the issues of fluidity and dynamicity (Aaltonen and Lanzara, 
2015). The third sensitising concept is the emphasis on the role of 
technology as a mediator or as an end product.  This view does not provide 
sufficient explanation on the role of the material characteristics of the 
technology in coordinating the dispersed community resources (Faraj et al. 
2011). The fourth sensitising concept was based on the call for redirecting 
the scholars’ attention towards governing vertical OSS communities (e.g. 
Crowston et al., 2012). These communities, according to the literature 
review, have different settings in comparison to those described in the 
literature, and thus require further exploration. These sensitising concepts 
were the “points of departure for studying the empirical world while 
retaining the openness for exploring it” (Charmaz, 2014:30-31). 
The process of open coding involved two steps: conceptualisation and 
categorisation. The main purpose of conceptualisation was to develop 
concepts (Corbin and Strauss, 1990), where concepts refer to the 
underlying meaning of the data and the patterns that emerge from them 
(Goulding, 2002). The aim was to develop concepts that explain how Kuali 
community governed the collective effort, and how the governance 
practices evolved overtime. According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), 
concepts are the main unit of analysis during the coding process. They can 
take the form of an event, incident, object, and/or interaction. I have 
developed concepts in the form of salient incidents and interactions that 
were related to governing the collective effort in Kuali community. 
 85 
 
Conceptualisation first required breaking down the qualitative data into 
manageable pieces to examine them, and compare them for similarities 
and differences (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Nvivo software provided a 
convenient way to perform a line-by-line reading of the secondary and 
primary data. It also facilitated the process of segmenting the data and 
labelling them with meaningful codes. The transcriptions of interviews and 
videos were then conceptualised using the terms used by the participants. 
The archived documents were treated as texts and were situated in their 
context (Charmaz, 2014). The analysis of the archived documents involved 
identifying key individuals, organisations, and processes related to each 
document. Individuals were classified by their role in the community, their 
work place, and previous experiences. Organisations were classified by type 
(university or firm), location (i.e. country), and their role in Kuali 
community. Therefore, the concepts that emerged from analysing archive 
documents used terms that are close to the context of the document.  
During conceptualisation, besides analysing the primary and secondary 
data, I have also focused on the design and use of the technology in Kuali 
community. From the interviews, data revealed that Kuali did not inherit 
the conventional OSS development process where volunteers are invited to 
co-develop the OSS code. Instead, the OSS license, the structure of the 
code, and the coding regulations were continuously changed to meet the 
change in the context of Kuali. Moreover, I have observed how the technical 
artefacts were designed and utilised by different user groups in different 
Kuali projects. Although the technical artefacts were standardised among 
all Kuali projects, their features and use were altered based on the context. 
This is further explained in the findings chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6).   
Initially, conceptualisation generated provisional concepts that were 
gradually refined as further data were collected and coded (Goulding, 
2002). Constant comparison was the primary analytical tool during this 
step. Incoming data were constantly compared with the emergent concepts 
in order to identify gaps in the data, which informed further data collection. 
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Besides, the emergent concepts were also repeatedly compared across 
incidents, participants, time, and context (Locke, 2001) to understand 
governance practices in Kuali. This was facilitated through the use of Nvivo, 
which provides set of tools that assist in searching for particular text or 
patterns. After an iterative process of creating provisional and comparative 
list of concepts, conceptualisation produced concepts that were descriptive 
and close to data. 
The second step of open coding was the categorisation. The categories are 
higher in level and more abstract than concepts (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990). Categories pull together the concepts into theoretical framework 
(Goulding, 2002). This involved sorting, synthesising, and aggregating the 
concepts into categories that correspond to OSS governance. Constant 
comparison was applied again at this stage by going through a recursive 
process of comparing concepts to data in order to understand the emergent 
patterns with regards to governing vertical OSS communities. Table 11 
illustrates the outcome of open coding. I have chosen 22 salient concepts 
that made the most analytical sense (Charmaz, 2014). These concepts 
were aggregated into 8 categories corresponding to the governance of Kuali 
community. 
Concepts  Categories 
Considering the context of HE in USA 
Contextualisation 
Considering the context of Kuali 
projects 
Considering the context of 
international universities 
  
Choosing suitable OSS license 
Controlling the code 
Fulfilling HE needs 
Gating the community 
Selecting resources 
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Membership and partnership 
Structuring the community 
Assigning roles 
  
Who can contribute 
Setting properties of OSS 
code 
What is contributed 
How to control contributions 
Issues with contribution model 
  
Balancing university and community 
needs Managing divergent 
interests Adjusting local workflow to Kuali 
workflow 
  
Coordination and communication 
Facilitating collaborations Organising meetings 
Using standard technology 
  
Creating KualiCo Restructuring the 
community Adjusting community roles 
  
Adjusting technical artefacts Reconfiguring coordination 
and communication 
Adjusting means of communication 
Table 11: The Outcome of Open Coding 
As shown in table 11, the open coding produced 8 categories. The first 
category, contextualisation, is not directly related to OSS governance. 
Instead, it is about be sensitive to the evolving context of Kuali community, 
which outlines the overall direction of the community. The remaining 7 
categories refer to the salient governance practices of Kuali community that 
were evident in Kuali during the period between 2004 and 2016. These 
categories highlight the dynamicity of the community and the materiality 
of technology. 
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Open coding revealed that the inception of Kuali community was highly 
influenced by the previous experiences of the American universities with 
respect to ERP projects. In addition, the conventional OSS governance 
practices that were explained in the relevant literature were reconfigured 
to align with the HE settings in USA. Therefore the meaning of openness 
did not refer to the complete transparency and accessibility, rather the 
community decided to draw boundaries around the OSS code and the OSS 
development process to meet the needs of the HE sector in USA. 
In summary, the process of open coding segmented the data into concepts 
and categories. The next coding phase, i.e. axial coding, reassembled the 
data back by locating and linking actions and interactions within a 
framework that gave it meaning and explained why interactions were 
occurring and what consequences were anticipated (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008). 
3.5.2. Axial Coding 
The aim of axial coding was to reassemble the data that was fractured 
during open coding in order to develop a substantive theory. It was mainly 
about looking for clues on how the categories fit together (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). According to Goulding (2002), open code categories are 
not standalone. Instead, their properties are connected and can be 
aggregated in a hierarchal, linear, or recursive form. Therefore, the axial 
coding phase started by examining the 8 open code categories in detail, 
and how they are related to each other. This was done to identify the core 
phenomena in Kuali community. The following is an explanation of how and 
why the categories (in italics) were linked in a linear form. 
Based on the analysis of Kuali data, Kuali community was formed in 2004 
to develop Kuali Finance System (KFS) for the HE institutes in USA. The 
inception of Kuali was preceded by contextualisation. This practice set the 
community goals based on the requirements of the context. Accordingly, 
Kuali community aimed to build a university-specific OSS community to 
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prevent non-universities from influencing the functionalities of the finance 
system. Therefore, controlling the code emerged as the salient governance 
practice.  
As the open source KFS evolved, it attracted the interests of other 
departments within the universities (i.e. other than the finance 
department). Therefore, during 2005, the scope of the community was 
expanded from developing a finance system to the development of a full 
ERP-suite. The expansion required inviting new members to the community 
in order to enrich the community with diverse resources. Therefore, Kuali 
Foundation was formed in 2006 to facilitate governance practices. The 
governance practices that have emerged were structuring the community, 
setting the properties of the OSS code, managing divergent interests, and 
facilitating collaborations.  
However, the community faced various administrative and technical 
challenges to handle the needs of the diverse stakeholders. Therefore, in 
2014, KualiCo, a for-profit company, was formed to take over the 
development of Kuali projects. KualiCo was also granted the authority to 
control the direction of Kuali projects. The decision to introduce market 
considerations within the community changed the boundaries of Kuali 
community. KualiCo was introduced as a key player, which included and 
excluded actors, actions, and rules. Accordingly, the community was 
governed by restructuring the community, and reconfiguring coordination 
and communication.  
From the above analysis, it means that the boundaries of Kuali were not 
fixed. Instead, the community boundaries evolved as the scope and context 
changed over time. Thus, OSS governance practices changed as the 
community developed. It was noticeable from the data that Kuali went 
through three governance phases. Each phase emerged from a boundary 
decision. In other words, each governance phase emerged from decisions 
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to change the boundaries of the community in order to accommodate the 
changes in the surrounding context.  
The boundary decisions are: creating the community, balancing interests, 
and sustaining the community. The governance phases were explained in 
details by the interviewees, and also explicitly mentioned in the secondary 
data (e.g. meeting minutes, emails). Each phase was preceded by the 
processes of analysis and design (i.e. contextualisation) to determine the 
new scope and objectives. Each phase experienced a set of activities and 
routines that correspond to governance practices. This is summarised in 
figure 5. 
Figure 5: Kuali Life Span 
 
  Source: Author’s Own Figure 
Accordingly, the concepts and categories were aggregated and ordered 
chronologically to represent the three governance phases of Kuali, where 
the governance phases are the core phenomenon. As shown in table 12, 
the core categories correspond to the boundary decisions that moved Kuali 
to different governance phases. The categories correspond to the salient 
governance practices of each governance phase. The concepts refer to the 
routines, actions, and incidents that are related to each governance 
practice. Notice that the category contextualisation is not included in the 
table. That is because it refers to the ongoing processes of analysis and 
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design that were evident in Kuali community to realise the dynamicity of 
the context. This is further explained in the following lines. 
Concepts Categories 
Core phenomena 
(Boundary decisions) 
Choosing suitable OSS license 
Controlling the code Creating the community 
Fulfilling HE needs 
Gating the community 
Selecting resources 
   
Membership and partnership Structuring the 
community 
Balancing the interests 
Assigning roles 
Who can contribute 
Setting properties of 
OSS code 
What is contributed 
How to control contributions 
Issues with contribution model 
Balancing university and 
community needs Managing divergent 
interests Adjusting local workflow to Kuali 
workflow 
Coordination and communication 
Facilitating 
collaborations 
Organising meetings 
Using standard technology 
   
Creating KualiCo Restructuring the 
community 
Sustaining the community 
Adjusting community roles 
Adjusting technical artefacts Reconfiguring 
coordination and 
communication Adjusting means of 
communication 
Table 12: Identifying Core Phenomena 
After identifying the core phenomena, I have organised the results of axial 
coding using a coding paradigm model that is influenced by the Straussian 
paradigm. A coding paradigm is an analytical tool to understand the 
circumstances that surround the core phenomenon, and therefore enrich 
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the analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The Straussian paradigm, as 
explained by Corbin and Strauss (1990), comprises of the main properties 
of a core phenomenon, which are: 
 Phenomenon: refers to the central idea of event.  
 Context: refers to the properties of the phenomenon.  
 Strategies: are the actions and interactions that manage or respond 
to the phenomenon. 
 Conditions: either refer to the incidents that cause the phenomenon 
to occur or intervene the actions/interactions. 
 Consequences: are the results of strategies when dealing with the 
phenomenon.  
The core phenomenon represents the category while the properties of the 
phenomenon become sub-categories. The sub-categories address the 
where, how, why and with what consequences the phenomenon occurs to 
further conceptualise the phenomenon. It is important to point out here 
that the Straussian coding paradigm is only a tool and not a set of 
directives. Therefore, adjusting the coding paradigm to fit the data rather 
than trying to force the data into predetermined categories is a common 
practice by researchers (Urquhart 1997). Accordingly, as shown in table 
13, I have adjusted the properties in a way that is consistent with the data 
and the objectives of the research. Then, I have applied the paradigm to 
each core phenomenon.  
Core 
phenomenon 
Building 
community 
Balancing interests Sustaining 
community 
Conditions Analysis and 
design: 
- Considering the 
context of HE in 
USA 
Analysis and design: 
-Considering the 
context of Kuali 
projects 
-Considering the 
context of 
international 
universities 
Analysis and 
design: 
-Considering the 
context of 
international 
universities 
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Governance 
practices 
-Controlling the 
code 
-Structuring the 
community 
-Setting properties of 
OSS code 
-Managing divergent 
interests 
-Setting means of 
collaboration 
-Setting properties of 
technical artefacts 
-Restructuring the 
community 
-Reconfiguring 
coordination and 
communication 
Consequences -Building a 
community source 
-Universities are the 
controllers 
-Functionally driven 
community 
-Prompted the need 
to build a full open 
source ERP suite 
-Tight control 
-Projects struggle with 
restrictive Rice 
-Projects are 
progressing slowly 
-Triggered the need to 
rethink Kuali strategy 
and spinout KualiCo 
-KualiCo is the 
controller 
-Universities are 
influencers, not 
controllers 
-The community 
source model was 
transformed to a 
vendor-customer 
model 
Table 13: The Paradigm Model of the Core Phenomena 
The core phenomena corresponds to the 3 major boundary decisions in 
Kuali life. Each boundary decision delineated the boundaries of Kuali 
community by determining who/what is in and out of the community, the 
actions, the scope of the community, and the required resources. 
Accordingly, each boundary decision started a new governance phase 
because it included different objectives, community settings, and bundle of 
governance practices.  
The properties of the boundary decisions are conditions, governance 
practices, and consequences. The conditions refer to the processes of 
analysis and design. These are ongoing processes to realise the changes 
that occur to the surrounding context, and accordingly trigger the 
conditions that cause the boundary decision. The governance practices are 
the actions and interactions that respond to the boundary decisions. The 
consequences refer to the main outcomes of the governance practices. 
Mainly consequences contribute to the emergence of a new conditions, and 
thus trigger new boundary decisions.  
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The coding paradigm provided insights to answer the research questions 
that evolve around dynamicity and materiality. Arranging the core 
phenomena in a chronological order and explaining them in terms of 
conditions and consequences represent the dynamic nature of Kuali 
community and how the governance practices emerge and evolve. With 
regards to materiality, it was evident the setting the properties of the OSS 
code and the technical artefacts emerged as salient governance practices 
in Kuali community to control the coding process and to facilitate 
collaboration. This means that materiality was inseparable from the 
governance practices, as will be further explained in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
The coding paradigm also assisted in the process of articulating the 
developed substantive theory (Locke, 2001). The completion of the 
paradigm model provided a theoretical structure, which was the building 
block for the selective coding phase. However, before moving to the 
selective coding phase, it was necessary to ensure that the research has 
reached to a point of theoretical saturation (Goulding, 2002), which means 
that further data collection does not provide insights to construct new 
categories or refine existing ones (Charmaz, 2014). Open and axial coding 
were iterative processes. They were brought to an end when the emerging 
categories were sufficient to construct a coherent story about the 
phenomenon under study (Locke, 2001; Creswell, 2007). Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 narrate the story of Kuali and provide data illustrations on Kuali 
governance phases and their properties. 
3.5.3. Selective Coding 
The selective coding was the final phase of data analysis. It aimed to 
explain the relationship between the core phenomena that emerged from 
the axial coding phase. The first step of selective coding was to identify the 
core category that integrates the core phenomena into a holistic theory.  
According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), the core category has to be central 
and appears frequently in the data. This means that all other major 
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categories can be related to it in a logical and consistent way. In addition, 
the name or phrase used to describe the core category should be 
sufficiently abstract. The core category should have the analytical power to 
pull all the other categories together to form contextual explanation of OSS 
governance rather than descriptions. Identifying the core category required 
analysing the paradigm.  
Figure 6: The Development of Substantive Theory 
 
Source: Author’s Own Figure 
Referring to the coding paradigm represented in table 12, the core 
phenomena corresponds to the three boundary decisions of Kuali. These 
decisions emerged as a response to the changes in the context, as shown 
in the first row (i.e. condition) of the table. The salient governance practices 
of Kuali challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions in the literature of 
OSS governance. Although the OSS code of Kuali projects was publically 
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available, the OSS development was gated and limited to the HE sector. It 
is evident that the actions and interactions in each phenomena evolves 
around controlling the code to maintain university-driven OSS products. 
This means that creating Kuali as a vertical OSS community was a boundary 
decision to control the code from being influenced by non-universities. 
Table 12 also suggests that the second and third boundary decisions were 
necessary to control the community on one hand, and enable the growth 
of the community on the other hand. 
Based on that, control has emerged as the core category for the substantive 
theory. During axial coding, it was evident that controlling the code in Kuali 
was the main desire to form the community in the first place. It continued 
to be the main driver of governance as the community evolved. Control, 
context, resources, and materiality are the main constructs of the boundary 
decisions. They interact with each other to change the boundaries of the 
community, and thus govern the collective effort. Figure 6 illustrates the 
emergent OSS governance model that illustrates the substantive theory. It 
is explained in details in chapter 7.  
3.6. Summary 
In this chapter, I have clarified the research methodology. I started this 
chapter by explaining the rationale for selecting a grounded theory 
approach as the research framework, and a single case study as the 
research design. Then, I provided details on the different types of data 
sources and the data collection method. Finally, I explained in details the 
data analysis process. I have illustrated the process of moving from data 
to a substantive theory with regards to OSS governance.  
 
 
 
 97 
 
Chapter Content Related to 
4 Core phenomenon: Creating 
the community 
Open and Axial coding 
5 Core phenomenon: 
Balancing interests 
Open and Axial coding 
6 Core phenomenon: 
Sustaining the community 
Open and Axial coding 
7 Theory development Selective coding 
Table 14: Summary of the Next Chapters 
Table 14 summarises the content of the next chapters. In chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 I explain through empirical evidence the properties of the core 
phenomena. Each chapter corresponds to a phenomena, which means each 
chapter explains a boundary decision that moved Kuali community to a new 
governance phase. For each boundary decision, I illustrate the conditions, 
interactions (i.e. governance practices), and consequences. Then, in 
chapter 7, I elaborate on the selective coding phase by explaining the 
emergent OSS governance model. I also discuss how the emergent model 
is related to the existing literature. In chapter 7, I also explain the 
evaluation criteria of the research. 
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Chapter 4: Kuali Governance Phase 1: Creating the 
Community 
4.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I illustrate through empirical evidence that creating the 
community was a boundary decision to create a vertical OSS community, 
and thus the first governance phase was initiated. This chapter is structured 
as per the paradigm model explained in section 3.5.2. This means, I will 
begin this chapter, in section 4.2, by clarifying the conditions that triggered 
the first boundary decision. Then, in section 4.3, I illustrate through 
evidence how the governance practices emerged in Kuali. In section 4.4, I 
illustrate the consequences of creating the community. Finally, the chapter 
is concluded in section 4.5. 
Although Kuali community has formally started-off its activities in 2004, the 
publicly available archived data were logged starting from 2010 only. This 
means that the archived data do not provide sufficient information on the 
inception of Kuali community. Therefore, the sources of data in this chapter 
are mainly interviews and Kuali official videos to provide historical and 
background information about Kuali community. As mentioned in chapter 
3, the interviewees are administrative and technical members of Kuali 
community. The official videos are for various sessions of Kuali Days in 
2011, 2012, 2014, and 2015, where the speakers cover historical 
information about Kuali.  
4.2. Conditions of Phase 1: Considering the Context of HE in 
USA 
The conditions that triggered the need to create Kuali community emerged 
from the processes of analysis and design. One of the major findings of this 
thesis is that each boundary decision in Kuali community was preceded by 
the processes of analysis and design, i.e. contextualisation. These 
processes were not explicitly considered as formal practices in conventional 
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OSS communities (Crowston et al., 2012). They have emerged due to the 
transition from horizontal to vertical domains (Rolandsson et al., 2011). As 
discussed in chapter 2, in horizontal domains, the software requirements 
and the design issues are generic and known to the developers. On the 
other hand, in a vertical domain-specific OSS communities, the software 
requirements rely on the context and the stakeholders (Fitzgerald, 2006).  
As illustrated in figure 7, the processes of analysis and design observe and 
assess the overall context of Kuali community. These processes trigger 
boundary decisions when the community experiences profound changes.  
Then, boundary decisions change the community boundaries by including 
and excluding individuals, objects, actions and rules. As a result, new 
governance practices emerge or existing practices are redefined, and the 
cycle goes on.  
Figure 7: The Cycle of Governing OSS Communities 
 
Source: Author’s Own Figure 
The processes of analysis and design were evident throughout Kuali life to 
gather the continuously changing requirements of the universities and set 
the community goals. Prior to the formation of Kuali community, the 
Boundary 
Decision
Define/redefine 
governance 
practices
Analysis & 
Design
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processes of analysis and design were initially focused on understanding 
and considering the context of the HE in USA. It involved gathering and 
analysing the requirements of the potential stakeholders, and accordingly 
design the finance system, i.e. KFS. Figure 8 summarises the analytical 
process of moving from the research data to the processes of analysis and 
design. 
Figure 8: Data Structure: Phase 1-Analysis & Design 
 
Considering the context of HE in USA required understanding the previous 
experiences of the HE sector with regards to the development and 
procurement of ERP systems in general. Prior to the inception of Kuali, the 
American universities were mainly acquiring their ERP systems from giant 
software vendors, like Oracle and SAP (Admin18). Besides their high cost, 
                                   
8 Please refer to table 8 in chapter 3 for a the list of interviewees 
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these systems were developed for the American market (S19), and thus 
required a lot of customisations to meet the requirements of the 
universities. In addition, the software development, maintenance, and 
upgrades were bundled together preventing universities from controlling 
the software: 
“…in those software companies, higher education is such a small 
segment of it, but you have to upgrade because everything else 
is upgraded10… Even if you don't need the functionality, you have 
to install it in order for this role to work” (BA2) 
S11, a speaker in one of the sessions of Kuali Days 2015, sarcastically 
recalled the struggle: 
“Every implementation of a system involves a full bucket of misery 
and you have to eat it from the beginning to the end and you can eat 
it faster you can eat it slow but you gotta eat the whole thing. 
Those are miserable experiences and they cost us a lot of money, 
and a lot of time, and a lot of aggravation, a lot of coordination” 
Besides understanding the previous experiences, the analysis also involved 
understanding the specificities of the HE sector that has led to the paucity 
of HE-specific ERP systems in the market. The interviewees believed that 
universities are unique in comparison to other sectors, as summarised by 
BA2: 
“We [i.e. universities] do fund accounting. Corporate world does not 
do fund accountings… Each fund has its own restriction, especially for 
research institutions… We also do budgeting. Budgeting is not 
important for corporate world. We do encumbrances, they don't... 
[We] have a sort of a mix of a corporate… and higher ed in the 
                                   
9 Please refer to table 7 in chapter 3 for the list of speakers 
10 The bold parts of the data illustrations are my emphasis to stress the meaning in relation 
to the concept being discussed. 
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fund accounting. So, the software has to be able to manage both 
without having to have issues” 
Despite their uniqueness, there were lots of commonalities among 
American universities in terms of the functional requirements of a finance 
system (Admin6). However, they continued spending money on software 
products that are similar, as explained in the following quotations: 
“…it just seems to me that it was crazy for us to be spending this 
money essentially doing the same thing” (Admin2) 
“…we all report to the same federal agencies. We have similar 
financial statement preparation… when we talk to people at other 
universities, all our faculty acts exactly like their faculty. And our 
purchasing department is very similar to their purchasing. So, we 
are all coming from a very common ground” (BA1) 
As mentioned previously, analysing the requirements is essential for 
designing the intended software. In this context, design refers to the 
functionalities and the technical specifications of the KFS. The data revealed 
that the functionalities of the KFS was based on the existing finance 
application that was used by IU before forming Kuali community. According 
to S5, that functionality was approved by the National Association of 
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO); the finance director 
club in USA at that time. NACUBO approved the design and supported 
further developments because the functionality of IU’s system was flexible 
to accommodate the needs of different types of universities in USA; 
however it was technically obsolete: 
“when they first started with the Kuali financial system, they took the 
Indiana’s old legacy financial system, because functionality-wise it 
was good. So, they started with that” (Admin3) 
“NACUBO, the national association of college and university business 
officers in the US, they were [essential players]. Because they were 
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coming from the financial side of the world and they were looking at 
their member institutions spending 10 20 50 100 million dollars on 
the European software, not exactly the mission of the universities, 
and here is Kuali is offering an opportunity to spend a lot less money 
and get as much. They were very good supporters” (Admin2) 
Wirth regards to the technical specifications, OSS was the chosen solution. 
However, before deciding to adopt the OSS approach, the founding 
universities initially thought of forming a HE-led for-profit company to 
implement the technical specifications of KFS in the conventional way and 
universities contribute to the development of the software. The idea was 
that this company will be led by the universities to avoid the exorbitant cost 
incurred by proprietary lock-in. However, the decision to take the OSS route 
is a means to an end for two main reasons. First, most of the universities 
believed that the proprietary route in commercialising software contradicts 
the ethos of universities in transmitting knowledge to the public. Second, 
it will create barriers for collaboration and code sharing. In other words, 
selecting the OSS option was not an intention. Admin4, a senior 
administrator in a university, recalls the discussions around this point: 
“…one of the things that when we first started talking about Kuali, 
one of the things we began with is a discussion that we are going for 
a company, and the universities are going to contribute to it and 
make software and sell it and treat it like a product by this company, 
like a conventional way… most universities reflect in a very 
deepest way the notion that the purpose of which they 
fundamentally exist in transmitting knowledge from one 
generation to another argues strongly for openness” 
The above quotation illustrates that the OSS path was chosen because it 
takes into consideration the values of universities, such as knowledge 
sharing. In addition, the OSS route realises the specificity of the HE sector 
and fulfils the common needs of the American universities, which were: 
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collaboration, cost reduction, and control (S7). This highlights the 
importance of context in creating and governing OSS communities.  
The founding universities decided to pool their resources to build an open 
source KFS. They nominated functional and technical representatives to 
decide on the future direction of the KFS project. The intention was to 
create a university-specific, i.e. vertical, OSS community that has different 
settings than conventional OSS communities. This has raised concerns with 
regards to the boundary of the community: 
 “[O]n August 30 2004, Indiana University, the University of Hawaii, 
the NACUBO, and rSmart11 put out an announcement that put IBM 
blush, that we were going to build an open source financial 
system… there is period of kind of figuring out ‘ok, well, who is 
going to be in?’” (S2) 
The emphasised parts of the above quotation illustrate the concerns 
regarding delineating the scope of the community, and the legitimate 
actors. This has triggered the first boundary decision; creating the 
community. This is further explained in the next section. 
4.3. Governance Practice of Phase 1: Controlling the Code 
Creating the community was a boundary decision that initially aimed to 
delineate the community borders to determine the objectives of the 
community, and who can legitimately contribute to it. It was also a 
boundary decision to include and exclude the material properties of the 
technology to meet the objectives of Kuali. Fulfilling the HE needs in USA 
was the main concern during that period of time, and thus controlling the 
code was given the highest priority to ensure a university-specific OSS. 
Figure 9 illustrates how “controlling the code” has emerged from the data. 
As shown in the figure, the code was controlled by fulfilling the HE needs, 
carefully choosing the OSS license, gating the community, and selecting 
                                   
11 A company that delivers IT solutions for the higher education sector 
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the resources. In this section, I will elaborate on each of these actions and 
routines.  
To fulfil the HE needs, the community founders had to explicitly define Kuali 
rules to distinguish Kuali from other conventional OSS communities, and 
from competing commercial ERP systems. The most essential rule was 
selecting the legitimate contributors of the community. The functional 
representatives, such as chief financial officers, were selected as the key 
players of the KFS project because they are the ones that best know the 
needs of the HE sector in USA. The functional representatives made sure 
to fulfil the basic needs at that time; functional value, and cost reduction: 
“The big two motivating factors were cost and the fact that we 
thought we could build a better system than the vendors have 
built, more compatible with what higher ed needs” (Admin1) 
In terms of functional value, the role of the functional representatives was 
to maintain a functionally-driven KFS project: 
“We basically said that the rules are going to be defined by the 
functional owners, not the technical people, and this is 
another big difference. Most open source activities are driven by 
the technical people. We said ‘no no no, this is a software design for 
the business administrative support for universities, those people are 
going to make the decisions’ " (Admin2) 
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Figure 9: Data Structure: Phase1-Controlling the Code 
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In terms of cost reduction, the founders used the cash phrase “Keep your 
money in your mission” (Admin2) to attract universities to the newly 
developed Kuali community. Developing KFS was not free of cost; however 
they believed that 
“[their] mission is not to spend money on software. [Their] mission 
is to do research, to teach, and to provide service” (Admin2) 
S5, summarises how implementing KFS was a cost-reduction project: 
“There was no Kuali, those were the choices that we had. And there 
are some pretty eye-popping numbers.. so the quote was $23 million 
put that for financial… our [i.e. Kuali] implementations were in for 
less than $6m. So I can say to our Deans, we left at least $17m in 
your mission, for you to spend on research, for you to spend in 
scholarships, for classrooms, and such” 
The next important step to control the code was to choose the appropriate 
OSS license. The license enables and constrains the behaviour of 
community members, and thus facilitates controlling the code. According 
to Open Source Initiative, there are various approved OSS licenses that are 
used for different purposes. However, the community selected an 
Educational Community Source License; a non-restrictive OSS license, 
because it is aligned with the nature of the HE settings, as described by 
one of the founders: 
“…we wanted to use open source software license… This software 
license says ‘you can go and run with this stuff and do anything you 
want, you want to package it and sell it, you want to mix it with your 
stuff, you want to commercialise it’. We really believed that a non-
restrictive approach to reuse was the best thing in higher ed” 
(S2) 
After selecting the key players and choosing the license, the founders 
decided on the rules related to the software development process. This was 
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important because governing a pool of resources to produce a domain-
specific OSS product raised uncertainty about the quality of the outcome. 
Therefore, the founders decided to gate the community. This means that 
Kuali community was not a pure OSS community; rather it was called a 
community source. The community source approach adheres to the same 
principles of open source; however it opens-up the OSS code, and gates 
the OSS development process: 
“Anybody can download it [i.e. KFS]. But, the only people that were 
making changes are our product team itself” (Tech3) 
Admin1 explains the meaning of community source as follows: 
“…there is a kind of demarcation line. So, anything that goes into the 
development and delivery of the software, up to that point, up to that 
line, is highly controlled to make sure that the software is at its 
highest quality. Once it is delivered and people started to download 
it, it is at the other side of the line, downloading it, using it and 
bringing it on to their campus, then they have complete control at 
that point on what they want to do with the software” 
Gating OSS communities has been previously discussed by de Laat (2007) 
who has focused on enterprise OSS products that are installed inside 
corporations and behind corporate firewalls, which limits the access to the 
insiders. However, this thesis presents a different type of gate that imposes 
restrictions using standard framework tools and workflow processes. Unlike 
conventional OSS communities that “are pretty wide open in terms of 
development rights” (Admin2), Kuali imposed a tighter control over the 
code development process by implementing Rice; a Kuali-specific workflow 
software.  
Rice is the “magic of Kuali” (Admin2). It started off as a workflow engine 
that minimised and optimised the number of approval nodes within the 
processes of KFS. Then, it was further developed to include a middleware, 
 109 
 
identity management, and a web development framework (PM1). Rice 
framework is a technical artefact that facilitated controlling the code of KFS. 
Rice also determined the design standards, and the look and feel of KFS. 
In fact, developers were locked into those standards, as summarised by 
Tech1: 
“…the way the software is written, you follow the standards that were 
originally part of the software design, and you do follow that 
because it is necessary to make the software work. The 
software is almost self-regulating which is interesting… You have 
the initial design… It was constrained enough that if you did not 
follow this design, the change you've made wouldn't work” 
Gating the development process using Rice framework is an example of 
how the material properties of the OSS code and the development artefact 
were modified to meet the objectives of Kuali. The gate was required to 
protect the code because the KFS project is a major system 
implementation. Some of the member universities have a multi-billion 
dollar endowments and budgets, and thus KFS was meant to be a 
significant enterprise system (Tech3). Admin2 explains the importance of 
protecting KFS at that time: 
“…this software [i.e. KFS] is too important. With all the respect, Linux 
is a kernel of an operating system and it is very important, but… 
nobody is individually betting its institution's future on it, whereas 
our chief financial officers were basically going to be betting their 
financial systems and the financial information on this code, and we 
are not going to trust it to just about anybody” 
Adding the gate was also important to satisfy the perceptions of users. A 
gated community gives confidence to the university administration that KFS 
is developed in the same standards as the reputable commercial finance 
systems (Admin4). The potential community members are very 
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conservative chief financial officers in universities who would not trust KFS 
if the development is open to the public (Admin1, Admin2). 
Besides gating the community, controlling the code was also implemented 
through carefully selecting the resources. During the first governance 
phase, resources were mainly focused on individuals and universities. 
Joining Kuali was a selective process because community source involves 
communication among known collaborators, as opposed to the 
conventional OSS communities. This means that joining Kuali was a 
selective process, not voluntarily-based. The selective process was 
applicable to both individuals and universities. The community founders 
selected universities that share the values of Kuali and have “assertive 
respectful leaders” (Admin2) that will assist in building the community. 
Admin2, describes the selection of universities as an assertive process. He 
recalls: 
“There were many awkward conversations when I would go to 
universities to talk to them and they were thinking of joining and we 
would have the awkward conversation at the end of the day saying 
‘don't think this is the right fit’.’ We are not the right fit for you 
and you are not the right fit for us’. In most cases, those were 
people I knew professionally but I knew if I allowed the wrong 
kind of people in, it would not work. So, we were pretty good 
about that” 
As explained in the organisational context of Kuali (chapter 3), Kuali 
community also included for-profit organisations, which were called Kuali 
Commercial Affiliates (KCA’s). It was clear since the early days of Kuali that 
having a community of universities only would be a challenging matter. It 
was expected that universities will face various technical as well as 
administrative challenges associated with the development of the OSS 
code. Accordingly, it was crucial to include commercial affiliates as part of 
the Kuali ecosystem to provide paid technical and administrative services, 
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such as data migration, consultation, training, and support. However, 
including commercial affiliates to a not-for-profit open source project has 
raised doubts among the community members. Therefore, the commercial 
entities were selected based on their ability to share Kuali values and 
contribute to the public good: 
“A few commercial partners wanted to become partners, and we 
basically said ‘we don't think it is a good fit’. We chose them very 
carefully” (Admin2) 
Kuali is a domain-specific community, and thus sharing Kuali values was 
not a sufficient criterion for selecting resources. Functional knowledge was 
a mandatory criterion as well while selecting functional and technical 
representatives of the contributing universities and KCA’s. This concurs 
with the findings of Fitzgerald (2006), who has argued that experienced 
developers are required to ensure a successful development in vertical OSS 
communities. The following are excerpts from different interviews 
illustrating the background of Kuali representatives: 
“my MBA is in investment banking. I mean I have a very good 
understanding of the world of finance” (Admin2) 
“my background is really higher education, financial system, so Kuali 
kind of fall right in my area” (BA2) 
“I've been doing this [i.e. developing ERP systems] for over 40 years, 
and I've been doing this for financial industries, manufacturing 
industries…” (Tech1) 
To sum up, during the first governance phase, Kuali community comprised 
of universities, for-profit organisations (e.g. KCA’s), and not-for-profit 
organisations (e.g. NACUBO). Universities pooled their resources to build 
an open source KFS. KCA’s are hired by universities to either contribute to 
the implementation of KFS or provide complementary services. Creating 
the community was a boundary decision to control the software 
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development process, form strategic relationships with KCA’s, and target 
experts in the domain of HE. This was facilitated through implementing 
Rice; a restrictive development framework, and by selecting knowledgeable 
resources. 
4.4. Consequences of Phase 1 
The research findings revealed that the community source approach was a 
“paradigm shift” (S1) towards governing a vertical OSS community. The 
open source KFS and Rice framework enacted the practice of control and 
legitimised Kuali, not only as a software product, rather as a software 
development approach. Moreover, Kuali has defined new standards and 
best-practices that changed the HE settings in USA. The universities 
became the main controllers of their financial systems, where controlling 
the software was a desire among universities in USA.  
Controlling the code provided a sense of community in the HE environment. 
As a result, more universities have joined the community because they 
were seeking for “conformation that they are doing something the same 
way other schools are doing it” (Tech1). Kuali became the trend in the 
development of financial systems among American universities. 
Consequently, other departments within American universities (i.e. other 
than finance) suggested expanding the scope of Kuali to develop a full ERP 
suite. This has triggered the need to redefine Kuali boundaries, and thus 
redefine the governance practices. This is further explained in chapter 5. 
4.5. Conclusion 
There are two main findings that are addressed in this chapter. First, this 
chapter illustrates the significance of the processes of the analysis and 
design in governing vertical OSS communities. I have showed how the 
context of the HE sector in USA played a significant role in setting the 
boundaries of the community and in the emergence of the main governance 
practice; controlling the code.  
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Second, the role of materiality of technology was evident in governing Kuali 
community during the first governance phase. In the first place, KFS was 
not built from scratch and did not follow the conventional OSS coding 
approach. Instead, the functionality of the KFS was based on IU’s legacy 
finance system, which enforced developers to follow predefined 
specifications. Besides, Rice framework was designed as a Kuali-specific 
development artefact to control the software development process. The 
properties of Rice were set in relation to the context of Kuali during that 
time. 
To sum up, creating the community was a boundary decision that identified 
the scope of Kuali community, which is building an open source finance 
system for universities in USA. Control emerged as the salient governance 
practice to achieve the objectives of the community. Creating the 
community was also a decision that determined the key players of the 
community, and identified the required resources. This boundary decision 
governed the collaborative effort of the community members until the 
founders and stakeholders decided to expand the scope of the community, 
and thus changed the objectives. This triggered the need for a new 
boundary decision, as will be further explained in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Kuali Governance Phase 2: Balancing the 
Interests 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I illustrated how boundary decisions were essential 
to create Kuali community, set the objectives based on the context, define 
the suitable governance practices, determine the key players, and identify 
the resources. In this chapter, I demonstrate that boundary decisions are 
also essential in controlling and coordinating the large ecosystem, i.e. Kuali, 
while remaining sensitive to the changes that occur to the context.  
After the success of KFS, Kuali community expanded its scope during 2005 
from focusing on the finance system to the implementation of a full ERP 
system. Accordingly, the community became responsible for multiple OSS 
projects. Each project refers to a module of the ERP system. In this thesis, 
I focus on the research administration system (KC), and student system 
(KS), as well as the finance (KFS). Due to the expansion, Kuali invited 
representatives from different departments of the universities, and thus 
invited different interests. In addition, international universities were also 
invited to meet global HE needs, rather than restricting Kuali to the 
American context.  
The objective of the expansion was to form a shared pool of diverse 
resources to enrich Kuali community. Kuali projects (i.e. KFS, KC, and KS) 
brought in new rules and resources, and reconfigured existing ones. In this 
chapter, resources refer to the attributes of individuals, capabilities, 
monetary resources, code, ideas, technology, and the divergent interests 
of the stakeholders. It was evident that each project utilised resources 
differently. Therefore, the expansion has caused profound changes to the 
settings of Kuali community. This has triggered the second boundary 
decision; balancing the interests, and accordingly Kuali entered the second 
governance phase. 
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This empirical chapter explains the second boundary decision; balancing 
the interests, and the governance practices during the second governance 
phase. The governance model during the first governance phase was based 
on controlling the code, which was insufficient to channel the resources 
among multiple projects after the expansion. Therefore, balancing the 
interests emerged as a boundary decision to aggregate and channel the 
resources in order to enable the growth of the community on one hand, 
and control the software development process on the other hand. This was 
facilitated by forming Kuali Foundation in 2006 as a not-for-profit 
organisation to govern the collective effort. 
This empirical chapter represents the period between 2005 and 2014. The 
data illustrations in this chapter rely on multiple data sources in comparison 
to chapter 4. The illustrations are based on primary data (i.e. interviews) 
and secondary data, mainly email discussions, meeting minutes, videos, 
and documentations. Similar to the structure of chapter 4, I begin this 
chapter, in section 5.2, by explaining the processes of analysis and design, 
which refers to the conditions that triggered the second boundary decision. 
Then, in section 5.3, I explain how the collective effort was governed during 
the second governance phase. Then, I clarify the consequences of balancing 
the interests in section 5.4. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 5.5. 
5.2. Conditions of Phase 2 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the processes of analysis and design are on-
going in order to remain sensitive to the dynamicity of the community. Prior 
to the inception of Kuali, the processes of analysis and design were focused 
on what the American universities need. However, after the expansion of 
Kuali, the processes of analysis and design involved considering the context 
of each Kuali project, which includes analysing the requirements of the each 
project and its corresponding stakeholders. Besides, as Kuali invited non-
American universities, analysis and design also focused on the international 
requirements of the HE sector.  
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Analysis and design were necessary to reset the community goals and 
identify the required resources for each project. Figure 10 summarises how 
the analysis and design of the second governance phase emerged from the 
research data. The following subsections explain the processes of analysis 
and design in details. 
Figure 10: Data Structure: Phase 2-Analysis & Design 
 
5.2.1. Considering the Context of Kuali Projects 
The scope of Kuali community has been expanded to include multiple OSS. 
In the following lines, I provide a brief history of the newly developed 
systems; KC and KS, in order to better understand the contexts of Kuali 
projects.  
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Similar to KFS project, KC started-off from an existing system. It was based 
on the well-established non-open-source research system that was running 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which was called Coeus. 
The Coeus project already had a community and a governance structure 
(BA1, Tech5). MIT internally developed Coeus 10 years before the inception 
of Kuali due to the lack of research administration systems in the software 
market at that time: 
“…first of all higher ed is a small market. Oracle and SAP tried to 
panel their software for the higher ed. It wasn't designed for higher 
ed. We are constantly trying to shovel a square peg in a round 
hole when we are trying to implement some of those things… so 
when you start with a university it is already small market, and then 
when you come down to ‘who needs a research administration 
system’, you've now narrowed the market even further” 
(Admin3) 
During the development of KFS in 2004, there were attempts to include 
basic functionalities for research administration; however they were 
limited:   
“The KFS had some functionality for research; for preparing proposal 
budgets and managing grants when they come in, but that is all they 
had. We were still looking for solutions for things like regulatory 
compliance” (Admin7) 
In 2005, Kuali founders approached MIT and they have agreed on obtaining 
the intellectual property of Coeus system to be the basis for an open source 
research system, which was then named Kuali Coeus (KC). Kuali benefited 
from the available functionalities of MIT’s Coeus system. At the same time, 
moving under the umbrella of Kuali enabled MIT to upgrade the technology 
through the collective effort of Kuali community. Therefore, the KC project 
was considered as a merger (S5).  
 118 
 
Moreover, unlike KFS, the KC project was driven by governmental policies 
in USA, as described by Admin3: 
“The rules around accounting are very clear in this country… And 
those rules don't change very often... In research, the rules change 
all of the time… [O]ur rules [i.e. KC] change often and driven by 
this wonderful thing called Congress, and by the White 
House… So, a lot of our policies are driven by ‘what is the national 
institute of health is doing to us today?’, ‘what is NASA doing to us 
today’" (Admin3) 
On the other hand, the student system (i.e. KS) “literally started from 
scratch” (Tech6). Unlike KFS and KC, there was “no history to build from” 
(Admin6). Kuali partners refused to start from existing systems because 
“…most of the universities that were partners on that project had 
mainframe systems and they felt they were like 50 years old. So, the 
approach that they followed was to say ‘bring all your requirements 
and we will develop a new system’” (Tech4) 
The student system is huge in comparison to the other systems (Admin1, 
Admin6). In order to start from scratch, founding universities had to 
negotiate the complex requirements in order to accommodate and build a 
system that meets everyone’s needs (Tech6). 
Kuali 
project 
Background 
KFS -Built from an existing system 
-Targeting finance staff (back office) 
KC -Built from an existing system 
-Already had an established community of universities 
-Influenced by governmental policies 
-Targeting different staff and students 
KS -Built from scratch 
-Complex requirements 
-Targeting different staff and students 
Table 15: Background of Kuali Projects 
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As summarised in table 15, each Kuali project had different context, i.e. 
background, technical and functional requirements, stakeholders, and 
target users. Besides, each project “brought new people into the game” 
(Admin2), and thus new perspectives. There were misalignments between 
the newly developed Kuali projects and the existing settings of the 
community. This has triggered the need to shift the boundaries in order to 
accommodate the new requirements.  
5.2.2. Considering the Context of International Universities 
The processes of analysis and design were not limited to the context of 
Kuali projects. They also focused on the requirements of the international 
universities. As explained in chapter 4, during the first governance phase, 
the finance personnel in the contributing universities were the key players. 
Accordingly, the best-practices and the standards of Kuali community were 
based on the requirements of the American universities. However, inviting 
international universities entails considering the culture of the country and 
the history of the potential institutions (S6). Therefore, it was important to 
understand the requirements of the HE institutions worldwide.  
When it comes to software development, the universities worldwide were 
seeking for cost reduction, collaboration with peers, risk sharing, effective 
technology, controlling the code, and compliance with best-practices: 
“It [i.e. Kuali] is designed by us [i.e. universities], we hopefully have 
a lower cost of integration into our existing systems because the code 
is open, and we can unbundle support costs from the software. Our 
costs are shared, our risks are shared, and we can control our own 
upgrades and timing” (S1) 
However, there were variations in the university requirements within and 
outside USA, as summarised by S8: 
“We’ve got the Hawaii system that has community colleges and big 
universities. We’ve got Toronto which is extraordinarily complex 
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internally because they've got lots of different kinds of departments 
and they have both hierarchical and matrix governance structures. 
We’ve got South Africa which is it's the way South Africa does things 
completely different in many ways to the way they're done in the 
United States” 
Besides, the research findings illustrate that each country had different 
motives in joining Kuali. In chapter 4, I have shown that the American 
universities were looking for functional value and cost reduction. However, 
the South African universities initially joined KFS because it offered a cost-
saving exercise, regardless of the compatibility of functionality (Tech4). 
From a Canadian perspective, the open source path, not only provided an 
opportunity to collaborate with peer institutions, it also contained lots of 
escape routes in case they decided to progress on their own. Most 
importantly, Admin6, an administrator in a Canadian university, admits that 
US leadership was the main motive to join KFS project: 
“…from our perspective, our constant peer group… is heavily heavily 
dominated by US universities, private and public... Universities that 
we think of as peers, UC Berkley, University of Washington, these 
were folks that were in that community, and hence it sort of 
legitimised it” 
In general, the variations in the contexts of Kuali projects and the 
international universities have consequences on the overall structure of the 
community and its objectives. Besides, the expansion of Kuali community 
involved the inclusion of resources that were not evident during the 
previous phase. Therefore, balancing the interest emerged as a boundary 
decision to govern Kuali community through balancing between community 
growth and control. This is further explained in the next section.  
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5.3. Governance Practices during Phase 2 
Balancing the interest is a boundary decision that has emerged to start a 
new governance phase that recognises the specificity of each Kuali project 
in terms of its target users, software development approach, and 
investments. It also recognises the global requirements of the universities. 
Balancing the interests mainly focused on aggregating and distributing 
resources. In this context, resources refer to the attributes of individuals, 
capabilities, monetary resources, code, ideas, things, technology, and the 
divergent interests of the stakeholders. The expansion of Kuali community 
entailed different access to resources, and thus gave rise to divergent 
interests. 
However, the existing governance mode at that time was solely based on 
controlling the code, which was insufficient to govern the growth of Kuali 
community and the emergence of multiple trajectories. Therefore, the 
community had to reconfigure the governance model to efficiently channel 
the pooled resources and coordinate the collaboration. During the analysis 
of research data, it was evident that the salient governance practices during 
the second governance phase were structuring the community, managing 
divergent interests, setting the properties of the OSS code, and facilitating 
collaborations. In the rest of this section, I explain each governance 
practice in details.   
5.3.1. Structuring the Community 
Structuring the community is a governance practice that defines the 
members of the community, their roles, and decision rights. This was 
facilitated through the formation of Kuali Foundation in 2006. The purpose 
of the Foundation was to enable collaboration among the distributed 
resources and reconcile conflicting interests. The Foundation comprises of 
board of directors and members that represent each Kuali project. The 
Foundation did not dictate how exactly each project should operate. 
Instead, it maintained a governance structure that allowed each project to 
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govern itself. As illustrated in figure 11, structuring the community was also 
achieved through setting membership and partnership processes, and 
through the emergence of roles.  
Figure 11: Data Structure: Phase2-Structuring the Community 
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5.3.1.1. Membership and Partnership 
The second governance phase focused on inviting diversity in order to 
enrich the community. However, the collective effort had to be governed 
through a membership process to regulate who is in the community and 
define the rights of the community members. Kuali membership required 
contributing an annual due based on the university budget to keep the 
community functioning:  
“…if I speak in US terms… a big university like Indiana it's got about 
three billion dollar-a-year annual budget for eight campuses, you're 
going to pay twenty five thousand dollars a year just to be a member. 
The software is free. You can get software without being a 
member, but just to make everything work … For a very small 
college or school it might be five thousand dollars a year” (S5) 
Setting membership process was an important step to aggregate 
resources; however distributing the resources was done through 
partnership. Kuali partnership was essential to channel the pooled 
resources into different projects. When a university becomes a partner, it 
directs its resources towards a particular Kuali project. Kuali partnership 
was based on the golden rule; those who bring in the money, make the 
rules. Therefore, the partners who were bringing in functional and technical 
resources into the community in a full-time basis, and those who contribute 
higher annual fees, those partners were eligible to make the rules: 
 “When you become a partner in a project, based upon on that project 
funding structure, and they are all different, you pay an additional 
annual fee… and that gives you a seat in the table for that 
project to outline priorities, to influence the project 
direction... So, for that the real value it is becoming a partner” 
(Admin1) 
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In conventional OSS communities, rules are either implicit or scattered. In 
Kuali, rules were explicit and clearly defined in the form of memorandum 
of understanding: 
“And our memorandum of understanding is a very simple document. 
Just a few pages that says how we're going to work together, that we 
agree that anything that comes out of this is an open source work” 
(S10) 
As mentioned previously, companies were also eligible to become Kuali 
partners, and thus the Foundation ensured to maintain a healthy 
community to avoid having “second class citizens in Kuali” (S2). The 
following is an excerpt from Meeting312. It illustrates how Kuali treated 
universities and KCA’s equally: 
“-Members are members, and some are KCAs and some are 
schools; both are members of Kuali.  Conflicts and perceptions could 
be applied to both. 
--We want the best people regardless of KCA or school. 
--If we see inappropriate behaviour, we should address it at the time, 
or by revising our principles.  But, we should start out with equal 
status. 
--We should be more communicative in future when situations arise 
where this may occur.  We want all KCAs to understand their options 
so there is not perception of favouritism” 
Either it is a university or a company, the Foundation needed a partner that 
made commitments, not just payed dues. To be committed is to have the 
                                   
12 During data analysis, each meeting summary was given a code. Refer to Appendix B for 
the meeting codes and their corresponding dates. Appendix B also includes some samples 
of meeting summaries.  
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will to commit and the capacity to collaborate (S7). The following is an 
excerpt from one of the regulation documents: 
“The Partner Contribution Contract: 
When you propose a contribution, you are agreeing to be 
responsible for that contribution until it is completed. This is 
particularly important to understand for enhancement contributions. 
-Your functional staff must be available to write the functional 
specification, review with the sub-committee, and revise the 
specification as needed. 
-Your technical staff must be available to write the technical 
specification, review with the project team and technical committee, 
and revise as needed. 
-Your technical staff must be available to code the contribution, 
participate in code review(s), and revise as needed. 
-Your functional staff must be available to complete partner testing. 
-Your technical staff must be available to resolve issues found in 
partner testing AND in project QA.” 
It is important to clarify here that the processes of membership and 
partnership were not limited to the process of identifying who is in and out 
of the community. Rather, these processes highlight that the properties of 
the universities were not fixed. Instead, they varied depending on their 
relation with the wider context, which has consequences on the decision-
making rights. A university that pays the dues becomes a member, i.e. a 
regular user. A university that pays an extra due and nominate dedicated 
developers becomes a partner, gains access to change the code, and thus 
influence the project direction. Moreover, partners joined and left the 
community also based on their interactions with their surrounding context 
as emphasised in the below quotation: 
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 “over the 10 or 11 years, universities come and go, and it sometimes 
has to do with the philosophical change, sometime it has to do with 
the change of leadership in the institution, sometime it has to do 
with financial constraint” (Admin6) 
The development of an open source ERP system, i.e. Kuali projects, was a 
complex collaborative activity that required multiple stakeholders to utilise 
various resources in order to communicate across university departments 
and beyond university boundaries. The employees in partner universities 
were assigned Kuali-related tasks besides their responsibilities within their 
universities causing blurred roles. Therefore delineating the roles was an 
important governance practice that has emerged after the expansion of the 
community. 
5.3.1.2. The Emergence of Roles 
Unlike conventional OSS communities where individuals self-select their 
tasks based on their interests and expertise, in Kuali, the roles and 
responsibilities of universities, companies, and individuals emerge from the 
negotiations among the different resources. The following explains the roles 
of the Foundation, the KCA’s, and the partner universities.  
Prior to the formation of Kuali Foundation, the community was running 
multiple OSS projects, where each had its own community and its particular 
approach to attract investors and code contributions. In other words, the 
community started off as a federation (S10).  There was a pool of resources 
within each project (e.g. human resources, money, ideas), and a shared 
pool of resources for all (e.g. communication and development tools).  The 
aim of forming Kuali Foundation was to channel these resources in order to 
build an integrated ERP system. Defining the roles of Kuali Foundation 
emerged from the desire to avoid any sort of exploitation of the collective 
effort: 
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“…the Kuali Foundation… is a legal entity. We have bylaws, we have 
elections for officers. All of the members of the Kuali Foundation 
board serve as private citizens. So, I am not the IU representative 
on the Kuali Foundation board of directors, I am [name] with my 
home address. And if I quit IU tomorrow I am still stayed at the 
board. So, that means if I had a conflict of interest between 
what is good for the foundation and good for IU, my moral and 
legal responsibility as a director of the Foundation is the 
benefit of the Foundation. We made that very intentional in 
the design” (S2) 
The Foundation ensured consistent governance across the projects. 
Accordingly, all projects had similar governance structures, which 
comprised of: project boards, functional councils, project management, 
development teams, and subject matter experts. The Foundation 
recognised that each project had its own community (i.e. universities and 
KCA’s), and thus enabled them to govern themselves. The Foundation 
never had been a decision-making body (S10). A senior administrator in an 
American university recalls: 
“There was a discussion about what the role of the Foundation was 
going to be, relative to each of these projects. The model that we 
picked recognised that each project had its own community, 
and set of constituents who were going to make the cases with the 
institutions on their behalf to get investments.…it wasn't the 
Foundation telling each of the projects exactly how to do what they 
had to do. We left the project boards, which represented the investing 
partners for projects, make those determinations” (Admin4) 
Kuali Foundation was responsible for providing generic shared services, 
such as managing Kuali Wiki and the bug tracking systems, packaging, 
branding, and marketing (S2). In addition, the Foundation was also 
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responsible for managing financials, controlling expenditures, and ensuring 
that the software code was open source license as intended. 
In terms of KCA’s, their main roles were related to implementation and 
consultation. Their roles were identified by the community reactions 
towards KCA’s. There was scepticism towards having commercial entities 
in the community. At the same time, the community was aware of the large 
amount of additional technical and functional tasks that are associated with 
the development of OSS projects. Admin1, a senior administrator in Kuali 
Foundation recalls: 
“…there was an incredible scepticism about why in the world 
we would have commercial affiliates alongside this open source 
non-profit foundation… Whether you buy it from a vendor, or you 
build it in your own, or whether you get an open source product like 
Kuali… you have a whole process of figuring out how to implement 
it… how to convert what you have…how to train people… how to 
integrate it… how to work with your data warehouse. All these 
different things and Kuali does not help you with that. So, many 
institutions want someone to help them. They don't want to do it all 
in their own. They want help” 
The partner universities and KCA’s dedicated their employees to work on 
Kuali projects in a full-time or part-time basis. Initially, the Foundation 
defined an explicit description of the roles and responsibilities of each 
individual in Kuali. In some cases, the number of expected working hours 
were also specified, as shown in table 16. The following are excerpts from 
KFS documentations illustrating sample roles and responsibilities: 
 “Project Team 
A functional lead will coordinate all functional and technical support 
and oversight for contributions with other project team members. The 
lead SMEs [Subject Matter Experts] for modules impacted by the 
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contribution will provide functional approval for bug fixes; a 
functional lead will work with the functional sub-committees and 
functional council as needed to provide functional support, feedback, 
and approval for enhancements. A technical lead will provide 
technical support, feedback, and approval, for all issue types. The 
project manager will work with the project team and the functional 
council to provide approval for inclusion in the desired version.” 
(Document Name: Partner Contribution Process) 
 “Board Chair (1 PTE at 120 hours/year) 
Term Length: 2 years 
-Lead board meetings, delegating to the vice chair as needed 
-Meet with the program director prior to each meeting to prepare and 
develop the agenda 
-Work with administrative assistant to track ongoing topics and action 
items 
-Convene working groups as needed to make progress on specific 
action items 
-Conduct board votes as needed to reach decisions on specific topics” 
(Document Name: Governance Roles) 
 
Table 16: Estimated Working Hours for a Functional Council (Source: KFS 
Documentation) 
These explicit predefined roles were influenced by the legacy work practices 
in the HE sector. The findings revealed that different user groups negotiated 
their needs over time and across Kuali projects as necessary, and thus the 
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roles were emergent. For example, when Kuali first started, the functional 
representatives were the decision-makers. They were driving the future 
direction of KFS. The role of technical teams was limited to the design and 
coding based on the inputs of the functional teams. However, the expansion 
of the community altered these roles: 
 “Designers have been involved in the get going of the process, and 
that was never something that we had” (PM1) 
The reason for that is the variations in the requirements of Kuali projects 
raised issues with regards to the design and the interface of the OSS. The 
community started to emphasise on user experiences, which were best 
understood by the technical teams.  
Another example is the emergence of roles based on the context of the 
country and the university. Unlike the case in the American universities, 
the technical teams in one of the South African universities had a greater 
influence on Kuali projects from the very beginning. Tech4 explains: 
“One reason why that might be the case is before we actually 
implemented the software locally, some of our technical people were 
working on the project, helping developing software, but still for the 
American market… So, the technical team had more implementation 
skills specific to that particular software than the functional people. 
So they had even more functional knowledge in some 
instances. Obviously because they were more connected with the 
community” 
Although Kuali Board set fixed role descriptions, the dynamic nature of Kuali 
community resisted predefined roles. The above quotations illustrate that 
the roles and responsibilities were emergent. They were continuously 
negotiated based on the contexts of the project and country. 
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5.3.2. Managing Divergent Interests 
Managing divergent interests was a governance practice that emerged due 
to the inclusion of diverse international universities ranging from small 
community schools to major research universities. As shown in figure 12, 
this required universities to adjust their local work flow processes to meet 
the needs of Kuali. Besides, the existence of diverse universities has raised 
the risk of the community being dominated by the requirements of leading 
universities. In other words, it has raised a tension between the university-
specific needs and the community needs.  
Figure 12: Data Structure: Phase2-Managing Divergent Interests 
 
Kuali community include universities that are entrenched in their work 
practices (Tech1). Universities have divergent interests, and thus the 
community experienced resistance to adjusting university-related work 
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practices to meet the standard working practices of Kuali projects. One of 
the major resistance was with regards to the process of purchasing OSS in 
American universities, as explained by S5: 
“…one of the things we're working on this year [2014] is working with 
our procurement or our purchasing agents. We’re helping them 
understand how to buy free software, and this has been a long 
journey” 
Universities are used to purchase software through a tender; however Kuali 
Foundation is not a company. This complicates the process of joining Kuali 
community. Managing divergent interests is a governance practice that 
looks at such complexities and adjusts the work practices from both 
perspectives. The following is an excerpt from meeting2, where the Board 
members were discussing solutions for the tedious workflow process of 
purchasing an OSS product: 
“[A member] shared that the [a company] is interested in providing 
an overall marketing and outreach program for a variety of open 
source higher ed projects, including Jasig, Sakai, Durapace, and 
Kuali.  This project is a start, to show value and to create a deliverable 
that is useful. This project will help in analysing the procurement 
process and how we can make open source software acquisition more 
viable in the process” 
In addition, the diverse universities of Kuali community have emergent 
university-specific requirements. These requirements were mainly 
implemented through two different ways. First, the university performs the 
implementation internally using their local resources. Then, the university 
proposes to contribute this newly added feature to the base-code (i.e. 
common pool) by going through an agreed-upon approval process. Second, 
if the university lacks the resources to implement the feature locally, it 
requests the corresponding Project Board to discuss the possibility of 
implementing the feature using the pooled resources of the project. In this 
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case, this specific feature will not be implemented unless it is aligned with 
the common community needs. This has caused a tension between the 
community requirements and the university-specific requirements, 
especially that universities are looking at things from their own perspective. 
They view Kuali: 
“1) as an ERP vendor that provides systems they can install, or 2) as 
a community that they can engage with that provides a strategic way 
to move their administrative systems to a new, higher quality, and 
more cost-effective approach” (Meeting28) 
However, at that time, Kuali community was not a vendor. It was a 
community-source: 
“…it [i.e. Kuali] isn't a zero-sum game. This is a game in which 
winning is possible across the board. But it may mean that no one 
school gets exactly what they want all the time” (Admin4) 
Project Boards accommodated this tension by inviting diverse universities 
to be partners in Kuali in order to ensure the coverage of wide range of 
requirements. With regards to KFS and KC, the system requirements were 
clear, and thus the focus was on attracting variety of institutions: 
“For instance, financial systems have 12 partners, all the way from 
very small schools including community colleges, up to major 
research universities. Kuali Coeus, the research, has, I think, 18 
partners now, again very diverse from small and large” (Admin1) 
“…we tried to make sure we had a mix of all of the different things” 
(BA1) 
However, with regards to KS, the requirements were complex. Thus, 
diversity was not sufficient. The KS community was targeting universities 
that have complex business requirements in order to share their 
experiences: 
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“We wanted to have rules for complex relationships… We wanted to 
identify complex business requirements we saw common across 
many different large universities. We wanted to bring that, those 
features, out of the box” (Tech6) 
The tension between university and community needs was also reconciled 
through restricting the process of code contributions. This was achieved by 
either parameterising or prioritising contributions, which highlights the 
materiality of technology. Parameterising features takes into consideration 
that the newly added features may be relevant for certain universities, but 
irrelevant for others. In addition, the relevance of the feature may change 
over time: 
“When I understood it was something that was very specific to [my 
university], I made sure there were feature flags, parameters, you 
can turn this feature off or on. I did the extra work in the software 
to accommodate that” (Admin3) 
“if these things are going to be sharable in the future, I will keep that 
in mind when I write the functional spec. For instance, Hawaii might 
use this, Cornell might use this, so even though California only needs 
this, I parameterise it” (BA2) 
In terms of prioritisation, some contributions were given higher priority due 
to their higher impact on the community. For example, Admin7 describes 
prioritising features in KC project as follows: 
“But I think a lot of us feel like the proposal development module 
being something that a lot of people can use is a greater good issue. 
It also helps us to get new users, new partners to the community, 
whereas a small module who is only used by central administrators 
at a university may not be the thing that gets us new 
partners“(Admin7) 
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It is evident that parameterising and prioritising the code contributions is a 
way to arrange the material features of the OSS code with relation to the 
context. Managing divergent interests shows that the OSS code in not only 
an end product. Instead the code is co-developed and in a continuous state 
of change. The material features of the code are rearranged to enable the 
accomplishment of the governance practice. Further illustrations are 
provided in section 5.3.3. 
The community also reconciled the tension by allowing the emergence of 
roles. Same individuals were sometimes assigned different roles causing 
different interactions, and thus different consequences. For example, some 
Board members toggle between two roles: a university representative, and 
a community representative. During the Board meetings, these roles 
emerge as a significant agent that determines the direction of the project 
(i.e. whether to accept the proposed features or not): 
“So I sort of carry two hats though. I need to carry my hat of ‘this 
is what [my university] needs’, and then I have to have a hat that 
says ‘this is what is good for the community’. My boss understands 
that sometimes I am conflicted in those two roles” (Admin3) 
“…when you are an institutional member and you are voting on the 
road map items, you are paying in your funds to be a paying member, 
and you are definitely thinking about ‘well what am I getting from 
this money?’ or ‘what I need might be different from what my 
companion school who is sitting next to me might need’… So, we have 
to balance ‘what do I really need’ versus ‘what has to get the 
community going’" (Admin7) 
In OSS communities in general, tensions cannot be totally eliminated. The 
fluid and dynamic nature of the community promotes the development of 
diverse requirements and interests. Therefore, managing divergent 
interests is a governance practice that realises the importance of fluidity; 
i.e. existence of divergent interests to enrich the community.  
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5.3.3. Setting the Properties of the OSS Code 
The collaborative effort of Kuali members is directed towards the 
development of software code. This code is shared and continuously 
modified to cope with the dynamic context of Kuali. Therefore, the code is 
not only a product, it is a resource that is co-developed through the 
interactions. The OSS code in Kuali community either refers to the base-
code or to the contributed code. The former is the code of the shared OSS 
projects that is co-developed and used by the distributed teams. The latter 
is the code that is often developed locally within a particular university as 
a result of an internal requirement (i.e. university-specific). The university 
then proposes to contribute this newly developed code to the base-code in 
order to be accessible and used by the community.  
Kuali Board members agreed on setting restrictions on the process of code 
contributions. These restrictions are referred to in Kuali documents as the 
“contribution model” (Meeting4). The OSS code is considered as a resource, 
and hence the “contribution model” sets the standard properties of this 
resource. The properties of the OSS code determine who can contribute a 
code, what is contributed, and how to control the contribution, as 
summarised in figure 13. This section illustrates how the properties of the 
OSS code were arranged and rearranged in relation to the context in order 
to control the code development process. 
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Figure 13: Data Structure: Phase2-Setting the Properties of OSS Code 
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5.3.3.1. Who Can Contribute? 
“…the only people who could develop the software were the known 
developers working for the universities… if we went and had a 
thousand universities all telling us what we should do, we would never 
get anything done” (Admin2) 
The employees of member universities and KCA’s are the only eligible 
contributors of the community. This property has been determined by the 
specificity of Kuali projects: 
“Kuali is a huge ERP system. It is specifically focused to the 
higher education community. It is pretty difficult to sort of 
understand and implement and it usually takes a lot of time and 
effort to understand and implement. So, I mean that sort of limits 
the interest to get out of the community” (Tech3) 
The above quotation clarifies that Kuali did not attract the interests of 
outsiders, nevertheless joining the community continued to be a selective 
process during the second governance phase to control the code 
contribution process. However, due to the distribution of teams across 
projects and countries, the selective process was reconfigured. Unlike the 
selection criteria during the previous phase that were limited to functional 
knowledge and sharing Kuali values, choosing team members during the 
second governance took personal skills into consideration (Tech6). 
Functional knowledge alone became insufficient as the developers started 
to collaborate with wider range of resources. For example, in a highly 
distributed team, one of the main criterion is the individual’s ability to work 
with physical and virtual teams: 
“…for people that are actually going to be working in the product 
team, we also were considering how well they will be able to work 
with other people on the team and particularly their ability to work in 
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a remote team because all of our teams were remotely distributed” 
(Tech3) 
The process of selecting universities was also reconfigured, especially that 
the community was aiming for internationalisation. When Kuali first started, 
the founders avoided the inclusion of European universities because 
“they were way too parliamentary. They were too didactic in their 
requirements, you know, ‘this is the only way will work for us’, and 
[the founders] gave up” (Admin2) 
One possible reason was that the community at that time was looking for 
universities that were flexible to accommodate the needs of global HE 
sector. On the other hand, universities outside USA were uncertain about 
the outcomes of Kuali. However, gradually, partners from Europe joined in 
when they have realised that Kuali projects are capable of handling 
international requirements. 
The specificity and the complexity of Kuali projects limited the contribution 
to the employees of the partner universities and KCA’s. Through time, the 
Foundation realised that they have failed to reach other potential 
contributors who can enrich the base-code. Therefore, the Kuali Board 
members decided to approach potential contributors during Kuali Days; 
especially universities that were joining the event to know more about 
Kuali, i.e. “tire kickers”: 
“[A member] was intrigued by those [i.e. schools] that are interested 
in engaging but are struggling to find the right avenue to begin. [A 
Board member] specifically said that while we are all at Kuali Days, 
it’s important to focus on the conference and the people attending 
rather than our internal meetings” (Meeting28) 
This suggests that “who can contribute” is an emergent property of the OSS 
code. It is defined and redefined depending on the context. 
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5.3.3.2. What is Contributed? 
“What is contributed” is another essential property of the OSS code. It 
includes the standard criteria for the contributed code. First of all, the 
contributed code had to be generic; useful to the community as a whole. It 
had to be customisable and configurable to ensure flexibility and 
reusability. This was also essential to manage the divergent interest, as 
mentioned in section 5.3.2. Each Kuali project had its own Board in Kuali 
Foundation. The contributions were initially assessed within the requesting 
university before they were officially proposed to the Project Board. The 
process of approving a contribution varied depending on the regulations of 
the university and the corresponding Board. 
In USA, the workflow process was typical with regards to KFS project (PM1). 
BA1, a business analyst in KualiCo and a former functional member of KFS 
team in Uni313, describes the KFS workflow within Uni3 and how it was 
approved by the Board: 
“Within the university, a business need is identified. And, then that is 
prioritised with all the other things that the people are asking for. And 
then, it is developed, tested and implemented at the [Uni3]. And 
then, when the [Uni3] is ready to contribute back, they submit their 
proposal to the customer advisory group [previously known as a 
functional council]. Then the advisory group reviews that, and maybe 
add additional requirement, or indicates something that needs to be 
parametrised, so that it can be turned on or off, because maybe some 
schools don't want it exactly the way [Uni3] has developed it. And 
then, once it has been approved by the advisory group it goes to the 
product team [in the Foundation] for review. And then the product 
team pluses it, and then [Uni3] would develop it and test it. And then, 
it would come into base” 
                                   
13 Pseudonyms are used to preserve anonymity and confidentiality. 
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With regards to KC project, governmental policies were part of the approval 
process, and thus KC team adopted a different workflow process to assess 
code contributions: 
“The first thing we are looking at is are any of the regulations around 
research changing and do we need the software to accommodate 
those changes. Sometimes, the regulations may mean a change in 
format, so we have to do some developments to make sure that we 
have the right fields so we can submit certain proposals through the 
US government” (Admin7) 
The workflow process of KS project was more complicated. As mentioned 
in section 5.2.1, KS started from scratch. It did not have any basis to start 
from, and thus the development team was more focused on agreeing on a 
suitable architecture for the KS (Tech6). Accordingly, the workflow process 
started to stabilise by 2011/2012. At that time, KS teams started their 
implementation using agile methodology14, and accordingly had a different 
workflow process in comparison to the other Kuali projects: 
“…when new functionality was identified, we typically wrote epics and 
user stories15. We followed the agile methodology to actually get 
them developed and rolled out. Because the Student project was still 
under development, there wasn't a direct impact to the business 
because none of the schools or universities that were partners that 
actually putting that directly into production” (Tech4) 
“So, in fact, we would take the high priority requirements, put them 
into agile development methodology that the team to work on to 
rollout every 2 weeks into a working product. Then every 2 to 3 
months we would cut the milestone, a milestone would be a complete 
functionality, a set of features that anybody could take and use. And 
                                   
14 Incremental and iterative software development methodology. 
15 Epics in agile methodology are big user stories with broad scope. They have to be broken 
down into smaller stories before the team works on them. 
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then multiple milestones would roll up, let’s say, over a period of a 
year, we will make a release” (Tech6) 
The agile methodology involved collecting the requirements from the 
university representatives, prioritising them, and assigning them to the 
product management to start development. The developers would then 
communicate on daily basis with the university representatives to verify 
and validate the work. Then the software is delivered in an iterative 
manner. This suggests that each project team within the partner 
universities have their own way of processing contributions internally, and 
then contributions were processed in the Foundation in order to be added 
in the corresponding base-code.  
As previously mentioned, the contributed code had to be generic and 
customisable in order to be added to the base-code. However, the process 
of approving the code was tedious. This has encouraged universities to fork 
Kuali projects. This means that, by allowing excessive flexibility and 
imposing tight rules, some universities downloaded the code and continued 
working on it in isolation; without contributing back their work, to avoid 
going through the tedious approval processes. In other words, universities 
kept their contributions locally instead of expanding and improving the 
base-code. This is similar to implementing an in-house application and it 
contradicts with the main purpose of forming a collaborative community. 
Thus, Kuali became inefficient (S1):  
“The process to get a contribution accepted back in the base-code is 
difficult and is something we need to fix because we definitely want 
to know what people are doing, what enhancements, and fixes they 
are making that we can incorporate and not have to offer” (Admin7) 
Accordingly, the Foundation responded to this issue by resetting “what is 
contributed”. The Board members revised the current contribution criteria 
and suggested alternatives. For example: 
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“The guiding principles are to 1) keep the bar low for initial 
contributions, so people don’t begin a fork with other places 
for this; 2) to have the bar high for giving our QA seal of approval; 
3) to gain community support; and 4) to engage at initial conception 
so people don’t wait until they have something already complete… 
[S]haring up front builds collaboration and ensures future QA 
acceptance.” (Meeting 4) 
Resetting “what is contributed” encouraged the community members to 
collaborate and share their contributions. This was essential in order to 
expand the base-code and enrich the community, which was the main 
objective of the second governance phase.   
5.3.3.3. How to Control the Contributions? 
The property “how to control contributions” focused on designing the 
framework that regulates the OSS code according to Kuali standards and 
objectives. During the first governance phase, contributions evolved around 
the KFS project. Controlling the contributions at that time was achieved 
through the implementation of Kuali Rice. This was considered, from the 
community’s perspective, as the best-practice that maintains a vertical OSS 
community. Therefore, Kuali Board members agreed to impose this best-
practice, i.e. Rice, on all other Kuali projects after the expansion.  
However, during the second governance phase, each Kuali project formed 
an OSS community that develops an ERP module. By imposing Rice 
framework, the Board members believed that Rice will channel the 
resources to the different projects, and will control the software 
development process. In other words, they presupposed that Rice will 
facilitate controlling the code. However, the data illustrates that there are 
no best-practices in OSS development. Instead, the practices were 
continuously negotiated in Kuali community. In the rest of this sub-section, 
I provide an overview of Rice project. Then, I illustrate how different Kuali 
projects responded to the act of imposing Rice framework. 
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Rice was an OSS project that was funded by all other Kuali projects. It 
consisted of a separate development team that was responsible for 
gathering the requirements of the various Kuali projects. Rice framework 
was imposed on all Kuali projects due to the nature of the HE settings. It 
has assured a highly structured development process (Admin1, Admin2). 
Therefore, Kuali community did not tolerate developers who had their own 
ways of doing things: 
“All those cowboys and cowgirls, as I would call them, quickly washed 
out of the game. Did we lose the possibility of really talented people? 
Sure. But, we're not writing rocket science software. We are writing 
business software. This is not that complicated. And so, anybody who 
had really good skills in Java, we knew they could do it” (Admin2) 
Rice was initially created to act as a workflow engine for the KFS project. 
Then, it has been extracted and imposed on the other Kuali modules. The 
material properties of Rice had different implications on each Kuali project, 
and thus project teams responded differently. The following is a summary 
of the consequences of imposing Rice on Kuali projects.  
KFS was the frontrunner, and thus Rice framework was developed in KFS. 
However, Rice was initially designed with the data-entry user in mind; the 
type of end user who does not care much about the design of the interface. 
This type of design neglected the fact that Kuali became an integrated ERP 
system that includes different types of users, and thus the appearance of 
the system became a priority as explained by PM1: 
“…it [i.e. Rice] has been a blessing and a curse. There've been a 
lot of benefits, like getting that standardisation, getting that common 
look and feel across the products... The huge drawback is it's 
really really limiting in terms of what you can do with user 
experience” 
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Accordingly, KFS teams started to deviate from Kuali Rice in designing their 
own user interfaces. PM1 continues: 
“Now we are moving away from more kind of, starting to pull back 
from the Rice web development framework, we just call it the Kuali 
nervous system, and looking at using style guides and design 
principles, and things like that to guide the common look and feel, 
rather than being locked into a proprietary web development 
framework that presents a lot of inflexibility in terms of the design” 
However, deviating from Rice framework raised concerns about the 
reliability of the alternative design tools. Consequently, the Foundation 
initiated a project to look into the user experience issues across all Kuali 
projects. The aim of the user experience project, or UX as known among 
Kuali Board members, was to enhance the interactions between the users 
and the systems:  
“[A Board member] noted that many projects are looking at UX and 
there’s a risk in each project attempting to address UX on their own. 
How can we ensure a consistent UX across our projects?... [She] also 
noted some schools are hesitant to adopt our products despite 
functionalities due to inadequate UX. She proposes a 1-year project 
to form a UX team with designers and developers to work with 
individual project teams” (Meeting29) 
With regards to KC, it was a well-established community, as explained in 
section 5.2.1. Accordingly, it reacted to the restrictiveness of Rice in a more 
proactive way. Instead of deviating from Rice, it utilised its well-established 
community and experiences in restructuring Rice framework. However, KC 
project team went through a series of costly projects. Admin3 explains: 
“We got the Kuali nervous system, the KNS... Then, Kuali decided 
that KNS is getting old, and they have used OJB [i.e. 
Object/Relational mapping tool], and they decided that they should 
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go to JPA [a Java program]… At the same time they said ‘we need to 
get off KNS and go to KRAD, the Kuali Rapid Application 
Development’… the board wanted the projects to go… So, in Kuali 
Coeus, we decided to go by the wishes of the board and jumped 
in first and went with KRAD. We took one of our major major 
modules and converted it from OJB to JPA, and converted it from KNS 
to KRAD. And it costed us few million dollars to do that” 
Similarly, KS teams suffered from the restrictiveness of Rice. Although Rice 
provided useful infrastructural services for KS, it has imposed an outdated 
framework that did not meet the requirements of KS stakeholders. The 
developers had to spend 2 to 3 years working on Kuali Rice to customise it. 
Tech6 explains: 
“…we were also straddled with a legacy Kuali Rice which was not 
the right middleware to move forward with for the next generation 
student system. So, Kuali Rice was a drag anchor that caused our 
development velocity to be less than half of what is should have been. 
If my team had the ability and the choice to use a new framework… 
we would have been developing at 2 or 3 times the velocity” 
One of the teams in South Africa proposed a different framework; however 
they have failed to integrate it with KS. Tech4 recalls: 
“It [i.e. Rice] was constraining…. So, Student decided to use [a 
different framework], which was not at all a Kuali framework. So, 
we had to board-out lots of stuff, and they [i.e. Foundation] saw that 
it's not working. Then Rice started to make changes... we were 
forced to use that. The Student project could not say they are going 
to use their own thing again because they did, and it didn't work 
either. So, we were forced to use that. But, that brought a lot of 
complexity” 
Accordingly, KS partners lost their patience. Tech4 continues: 
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“[the development] just took too long. And that's why some partners 
actually left the project as well because it took too long to get to the 
point where they get functional value out of what was developed” 
The restrictiveness of Kuali raised significant architectural issues. 
Upgrading Rice required upgrading all projects that are deploying Rice, 
which is costly to sustain (Meeting5). Rice was critical to the success of all 
Kuali projects, and thus Board members suggested to decouple Rice from 
the projects:  
“Rice is facing a perfect storm: its expenses exceed its income… 
and our expectation for the project is that it does more, rather than 
less. There seems to be a disconnect between Rice’s governance and 
its dual identity as middleware and shared services and its income 
path… The proposal is to separate Rice development from shared 
services and to fund each component differently” (Meeting29) 
Besides the misalignments between Rice and the Kuali projects, Rice also 
hindered the development of the technical skills within the community. 
Kuali Rice was programmed using Kuali-specific programming language 
called KRAD, which had consequences on recruiting developers. Therefore, 
there was a high dependency on core developers in each project 
(Meeting5). Admin3 explains the recruitment issue with regards to the 
American universities: 
“but the problem with that… put an ad in the newspaper and say ‘we 
need a programmer that knows KRAD’, guess how many resumes I 
am going to get? [laugh] I can't get any… even if you find somebody 
that is very smart. But the say ‘if I come and work for you for 3 
years, when I walk away, I'm in worse shape than I was’. 
‘Great! I can be a great KRAD programmer, when I walk away, that 
does not mean anything in my resume’” 
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Recruitment was more difficult for international universities, as described 
by Tech4, a member of KS team in South Africa: 
“…because we were the only university using the Kuali product [in 
South Africa], you can't just go out the street and find somebody that 
knows the framework… That is the thing you don't want to be in open 
source. You want somebody from the street that will be able to 
actually maintain it and look after it” 
The problem of building skills and talents continued to be an issue 
throughout the second governance phase. This was evident in the Board 
meetings during 2013. For example: 
 “we aren’t building up our knowledgebase 
--we have gaps when schools pull their people back 
--are we doing enough to develop new talent? 
--are we doing enough to sustain existing talent, including 
institutional talent” (Meeting 39) 
The second governance phase focused on the possession and distribution 
of resources. However, the Foundation neglected the fact that Rice was a 
resource that had to be bounded: 
“I think we made a mistake that made Rice a bigger body of code, a 
bigger body of services, and therefore instead of being the essentials 
of messaging and identity management, organisation structure and 
definitions and things like that… it became a repository for other code 
pieces that has many applications… It became harder to keep going 
forward building new functionality dealing with the legacy of code that 
has been out in Rice” (Admin4) 
The research findings revealed that the restrictiveness of Rice has been 
entangled with the community choice to control the code development. In 
other words, coupling Rice with all other OSS modules of the ERP (i.e. KFS, 
KC, KS), and designing Rice using a Kuali-specific programing language 
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illustrate how the material properties of technology are interrelated to 
control the OSS code.  
To sum up, the properties of the OSS code were emergent. Setting the 
properties of the code was initially driven by the experience with KFS 
project during the first governance phase. However, as the community 
evolved, these properties were altered due to the changes in the 
surrounding context. This illustrates that the OSS code is a resource that 
needs to be aggregated and distributed. It has properties that emerge 
through interactions.  
5.3.4. Facilitating Collaborations 
Balancing the interests was a boundary decision to embrace diversity and 
reduce the cost of governing the distributed resources. This was evident 
through the practice of facilitating collaborations, as shown in figure 14. 
The expansion of the community distributed the resources across multiple 
level of organisations: Kuali project, university, country, and Foundation 
levels. Coordinating distributed resources was one of the main governance 
challenges after the expansion: 
“We sometimes pull in different directions. We have to be 
coordinated, and that’s not so easy. It's like herding cats” (S3) 
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Figure 14: Data Structure: Phase2-Setting Means of Collaboration 
 
Therefore, the community members were urged to communicate rather 
than making assumptions. They were encouraged to attend face-to-face 
meetings (e.g. workshops, Kuali days) when possible, ask questions, and 
report any issues in Jira in order to get the community support. The 
following in an excerpt from one of Kuali documents: 
 “A KFS Developer is expected to: 
-communicate rather than make assumptions ("when in doubt, ask") 
-when assumptions must be made to avoid impeding progress, 
communicate those assumptions 
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-raise any blockers immediately 
-use the best communication medium available” (Document Name: 
Expectations of KFS Developer) 
One of the major means of facilitating collaborations was through the use 
of standardised technical artefacts for coordination and communication. 
Tech3 summarises the main technical artefacts used during the second 
governance phase: 
“…since probably the beginning of Kuali, we used Jira for issue 
tracking and confluence as a Wiki tool. There was a lot of 
documentation that was put out in the confluence. Over time, we also 
added Google documents, so we had a Google drive that was for 
the Foundation, for documents out in that spaces… We had fisheye 
for doing source code changes as well as doing code reviews” 
It was apparent that the technical artefacts were utilised differently among 
different projects. Initially, standard technical artefacts were imposed on 
all Kuali projects. However, as they were used by different stakeholders, 
their properties were changed. For example, the intention of introducing 
Jira was to act a bug tracking system that directs the work: 
“...they [i.e. team members] will report bugs, but often there are 
times where we break them down to sub-tasks, the assignee is the 
person who is doing the work. And then a watcher is somebody who 
gets a notification when action of the Jira occurs...So, simply, 
everybody relevant is associated with the Jira” (Tech2) 
However, some user groups used Jira as an open forum: 
“…but there have been time when Jira is just has been used as an 
open forum. If somebody found a bug and they said ‘what is going 
on with this and how is it fixed, can you tell us about it’” (Tech2) 
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Moreover, the teams utilised the tools according to the convenience of the 
user. The findings revealed that Jira and Wiki were used interchangeably in 
practice: 
“Some of the subcommittee members and chairs are comfortable 
using Jira and actually put their enhancements in there. But, a lot of 
them are more comfortable using the Wiki” (Tech5) 
In addition, Kuali Wiki was a web-enabled tool that was used to archive and 
share project documentations. Project teams used it differently depending 
on the maturity of the project and preferences of the users. For example, 
figures 15 and 16 illustrate the interfaces of Kuali Wiki for KC and KS 
projects respectively. Since the KC project was built on a well-established 
community, KC project was well documented and thus the KC view in Wiki, 
as shown in figure 15, provides more extensive list of documents. On the 
other hand, KS project started from scratch, and thus less developed in 
comparison to KC project, which is reflected in KS Wiki home page (figure 
16). Moreover, it is evident from KS home page that the users prefer more 
interactive interface. 
Figure 15: Kuali Wiki - KC View 
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Figure 16: Kuali Wiki - KS View 
 
Moreover, the use of the emails is also an example that illustrates that 
technical artefacts are not only mediators. The intention was to consider 
emails as the least reliable communication tool. This was evident in the 
documentations. For example: 
“all communication mediums are not created equal 
we value Face to Face communication over Video-conferencing 
we value Video-conferencing over Voice-only communication 
we value Voice-only communication over Text chat/IM 
we value Text chat/IM over email 
we value email over nothing 
Use the medium with the most appropriate bandwidth for the need” 
(Document Name: Expectations of KFS Developer) 
However, during the early days of the second governance phase, the 
community was heavily reliant on emails to ask for and provide support: 
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“There were definitely times during the implementation when we 
reached out to the mailing lists and said ‘hey we're experiencing this 
problem, have any of you has experienced that?’ and we got good 
feedback and good help. We also used the mailing lists archive in a 
number of occasions to see if there is something out their when we 
ran into a particular problem” (PM1) 
Users across projects and countries heavily used emails to discuss generic 
and university-specific topics. In response to that high reliance on emails, 
the Foundation categorised the mailing lists into technical and functional 
emails to facilitate the discussions. Moreover, emails became a supportive 
tool for the other artefacts. The following are excerpts from email 
discussions where users refer to Wiki’s and Jira’s: 
“According to the ""Contributing Developer Responsibilities"" on the 
foundation wiki 
(https://wiki.kuali.org/display/KFSIMP/Contributing+Developer+Res
ponsibilities), we are to include the JIRA number in the commit 
message. For contributions, do we need to wrap any of our changes 
in a comment with the same JIRA number?” 
“Hi All, does anyone know the status of the above JIRA? We would 
like the ability to cut checks prior to their due date and was 
wondering if anyone is currently doing this?“ 
The above illustrations suggest that the use of technology is not 
predetermined by its design. Instead, the properties of technology emerge 
in practice. 
5.4. Consequences of Phase 2 
During the second governance phase, Kuali expanded its scope to include 
diversity in order to enrich the community. Balancing the interests was a 
boundary decision that aimed to fulfil the interests of the diverse 
stakeholders on one hand, and control the community deliverables on the 
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other hand. The main governance practices were structuring the 
community, managing divergent interests, setting the properties of the 
code, and facilitating collaborations. These practices had two major 
consequences that triggered the need to reconfigure the community 
boundaries and spinout KualiCo. 
First, the governance practices followed the community source approach. 
This has kept the software development process within the university 
boundaries, and thus the overall progress of the projects was slow and 
inefficient: 
“...and that actually was our problem with Kuali, that our 
development, when we kept it with just higher education people, we 
were just too slow” (Admin1) 
Second, the restrictiveness of Rice framework and the different reactions 
from the Kuali projects were accommodated by expanding the base-code 
of Rice. Accordingly, the complexity of Rice has grown over time: 
“When you have a system that is this large, it is more difficult to 
change things. So, it is more difficult for us to change certain tools 
and libraries that we have wanted to. So, some of the complexity 
grows over time and we ended up with a lot of technical debts 
overtime that becomes sort of expensive to change” (tech3) 
“…we've tried make Rice lighter easier more flexible, more easily 
adaptable in projects, but we never quite succeeded. We made a 
whole sale break with the prior approach which led to go to 
KualiCo” (Admin4) 
As illustrated in the aforementioned quotations, the consequences of the 
tight control during the second phase led to spinning out of KualiCo. Kuali 
community had to rethink its strategy. This is further explained in chapter 
6. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
Balancing the interests was a boundary decision to aggregate and distribute 
community resources due to the emergence of multiple trajectories in Kuali 
community. This chapter showed that resources are not fixed entities with 
predefined properties. Therefore the governance practices that were 
evident during the second phase mainly focused on including the properties 
of the resources that are meaningful for a particular context, and excluding 
others. This illustration of governance practices deviates from the current 
views by acknowledging dynamicity. In this chapter, I also provided 
empirical evidence on the role of materiality in governing Kuali community. 
The properties of technology, OSS code and technical artefacts in 
particular, were rearranged to enable governance practices.  
The research findings also revealed that controlling the code was the main 
desire behind forming Kuali community in the first place, and continued to 
be a desire to ensure the quality of Kuali projects. However, imposing Kuali 
Rice was the “collateral damage” (Tech6) that led to the demise of the OSS 
version of the product, as will be further explained in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Kuali Governance Phase 3: Sustaining the 
Community 
6.1. Introduction 
During the first decade of Kuali’s life, Kuali priorities were directed towards 
functional equivalence, with less emphasis given to the design of the 
system and user experiences. Besides, the development process was 
bounded by HE employees and HE rules. Accordingly, the overall progress 
of the projects was slow and inefficient. The community source approach 
also imposed the restrictive Rice framework that raised issues regarding 
the efficiency and sustainability of the community: 
“…for the first several years, the basic question was ‘can we get the 
software out the door in the first place?’… that means creating the 
essential core system... The questions after that… 2010/2011, have 
been much more on sustaining, building, and immigrating… we now 
instead of building and to manage and control a software of particular 
kind, we could try to find a way to achieve more speed of 
development and do it at lesser cost and using more common 
resources across all of the projects” (Admin4) 
Accordingly, the Board members decided to invite portfolio investors, which 
means dedicating certain investments to improve Kuali products; i.e. KFS, 
KC, KS, and Rice. The following is an excerpt from a Board meeting during 
December 2013: 
“Portfolio investors might form a Board just like Project Boards to 
articulate priorities about how to spend those funds. It may 
need to be distinct because investors might not be members of this 
Board. But, those investors shouldn’t steer Kuali in way this 
Board would not endorse… We could consider that Portfolio 
investors could have strong advisory rights… This Board should have 
veto rights if plans aren’t heading in the right direction. The 
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Portfolio investors could counter with the fact of the golden 
rule. Maybe this Board would designate an overlap role, someone 
from the Portfolioness Board on the Foundation Board” (Meeting38) 
Inviting portfolio investors means enabling the community to get over the 
challenges of the first decade, in particular the golden rule and the 
restrictiveness of Rice. This new strategy aimed to direct Kuali projects 
towards improving the OSS products, instead of fulfilling what partner 
needs, as per the golden rule. The portfolio investors will also provide the 
community with separate funds to ensure a faster and a higher impact 
development process, in comparison to the slow steady progress during the 
previous decade. This suggests that the new direction of Kuali community 
became oriented towards improving OSS products. This required engaging 
with expertise outside the HE sector to assist in planning the new strategy: 
 “After much discussion, we began moving toward the idea of 
hiring someone within the community with leadership, 
communication, and organizational skills who can plan this, and 
consider titling it a ‘portfolio-ness planner’, and then that person 
would hire a consultant as needed who has the professional 
expertise. Since we are a non-profit, could we leverage someone 
who has been at another non-profit so we have some outside 
perspective” (Meeting38) 
This chapter explains the third boundary decision; sustaining the 
community, and how it has changed the boundaries of Kuali community. It 
has included and excluded actors, adjusted the roles, reconfigured the way 
technology is used, and the altered the communication patterns among the 
community members. This chapter represents Kuali governance practices 
from 2014 to 2016. It mainly focuses on how the authority to control the 
community has been transferred to KualiCo. During the data collection 
stage, Kuali community was in a transition period, and thus Kuali 
documentations, in particular rules and regulations, were not a reliant 
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source of information. The documentations mainly focused on the period 
before the inception of KualiCo. Therefore, the main sources of information 
for this empirical chapter were interviews, Kuali official videos, and the 
summaries of Kuali Board meetings.  
This chapter is structured in a similar way as chapters 4 and 5, which 
mirrors the axial coding paradigm (chapter 3). I begin this chapter, in 
section 6.2, by explaining the conditions that triggered the third boundary 
decision and moved Kuali community to the third governance phase. Then, 
I illustrate the governance practices of the third governance phase and their 
consequences in sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. Finally, the chapter is 
concluded in section 6.5. 
6.2. Conditions of Phase 3 
Prior the inception of Kuali, the processes of analysis and design focused 
on understanding the context of the HE sector in USA. After expanding the 
community, analysis and design also extended the focus to include the 
global requirements of the HE sector and the backgrounds of the ERP 
modules (i.e. KFS, KS, KC). However, during the second governance phase, 
the community experienced a series of stabilisation and destabilisation, and 
thus the community had to rethink its strategy. The following is an 
explanation of the conditions that triggered the third boundary decision; 
sustaining the community.    
As explained in the previous chapters, the conditions emerged from the 
processes of analysis and design. Figure 17 visualises the process of moving 
from data to analysis and design with regards to the third governance 
phase, which mainly focused on the context of international universities. 
However, due to the profound changes that has occurred to the settings of 
Kuali community, I will explain these processes by first illustrating what has 
enforced changing Kuali strategy. Then I will explain the new strategy, 
which was known as moving to portfolioness. 
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Figure 17: Data Structure: Phase3-Analysis and Design 
  
6.2.1. Rethinking Kuali Strategy 
The second governance phase was about incorporating diversity to enrich 
Kuali projects. Thus, the Foundation has been engaged with multiple 
projects; however none of them was prepared for the next decade. It was 
evident that Kuali projects ended up in different stages of maturity (S2): 
“There were big differences. The technology stack was different. The 
development standards were different. There were major differences 
between them… I think the Foundation never governed the fact that 
all the projects should be at the same technology” (Tech4) 
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The Foundation was concerned whether they “might be stretching the Kuali 
community too far” and “being spread too thinly” (Meeting2): 
“We need to rethink our strategy on some of these key issues: 
--BI [i.e. Business Intelligence] 
--User Experience (not for the back-end users, but for the 
student/faculty facing users) --Technology 
-Cloud enabled 
--Our current governance structure doesn't allow us to focus 
on overall strategic directions above and beyond the partner 
priorities. How can we keep the "those who bring the gold makes 
the rules" value system and still focus on strategy? 
-Can we find resources to "go big?" 
-Can we go "university in a box" and "sell it"? 
We may need to do these projects, above-project, funded separately. 
Each project needs to get those artifacts that allow it to implement 
quickly and effectively. They would be separate projects, with 
separate expertise” (Meeting24) 
As illustrated in the above quotation, Kuali Board decided to rethink the 
strategy that was applied during the first decade of Kuali life. Since Kuali 
projects were developed by HE for HE, the Foundation was capable of 
viewing post-implementation issues to assess its strategy. This is an 
important matter because previous studies neglected the role of post-
implementation in further developing OSS communities (Aksulu and Wade, 
2010). As part of the analysis process, the Foundation Board members 
continuously compared between how they intended to build Kuali projects 
and how they were used, and thus identify the gaps. They have realised 
that the main focus was on the functionalities of the projects to ensure a 
vertical OSS community, where the functionalities were determined by 
Kuali partners, as per the golden rule.  
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Rethinking the current strategy revealed that the design of the interface, 
and the technology in use were given less priority. Besides, the community 
source approach and Rice framework hindered the progress of Kuali 
projects: 
 “The community is friendly but can seem impenetrable. Some 
want a more traditional vendor relationship. Kuali requires CIOs 
and other leaders to figure out how to create a roadmap of what they 
want to do with their systems and be able to match their 
needs/skills/priorities with where Kuali and its projects are… --We 
talk too much about technology or specific functionality. We 
should be focusing on the business benefit to the school by 
joining a community that wants to improve the quality and cost of 
admin systems for higher ed” (Meeting28) 
The above quotation illustrates that Kuali had to introduce market-oriented 
concepts to improve Kuali products, rather than focusing on solving specific 
problems of universities. Therefore, Kuali Board members decided to invite 
portfolio investors. This is further explained in the next sub-section. 
6.2.2. Moving to Portfolioness 
The aim of inviting portfolio investors was to improve the OSS products. 
Therefore, the processes of analysis and design at this stage were focused 
on gathering the requirements that will improve the products. This was 
done by analysing the status of Kuali projects and what are the main 
requirements to move on to the next decade.  
As mentioned in chapter 5, Kuali projects followed the golden rule, and thus 
the partner universities set the requirements of each project. However, the 
new Kuali strategy included the needs of the software market to sustain 
Kuali community: 
“And we were not able to generate the commercial penetration that 
was necessary for the survival of the software” (Admin2) 
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In addition, during the first decade, Kuali community adopted a community 
source model. This means that Kuali contributors were identified, task 
distributions were clear, and project members agreed on work flow 
processes. The development process in Kuali community was similar to the 
corporate world in terms of the organisation. However, improving Kuali 
products required more competent human resources and efficient 
development tools, which did not exist in Kuali community: 
“I would say that it [i.e. Kuali] is similar to corporate method of 
software development, with the only difference being that the culture 
in higher ed in the united states is much more accepting of slower 
time frames, less human resource that might not be a calibre that 
you would find in a corporate world” (Admin1) 
Moreover, following a community source approach, the partner universities 
were in control of the projects by setting the priorities of each project. 
Inviting portfolio investors to improve the products raised issues with 
regards to the domain of control and influence, and the role of the 
community in particular: 
“Should we start now where portfolio fund just influences others? And 
over time, the portfolio sets the priorities? We want to ensure that 
we make progress sufficiently to be effective in portfolio-ness” 
(Meeting39) 
This has called for a shift in the community boundaries to reconfigure the 
governance model that was based on balancing between growth and 
control. This has triggered the third boundary decision, sustaining the 
community, and accordingly the community entered the third governance 
phase. 
6.3. Governing Practices during Phase 3 
Sustaining the community was a boundary decision that focused on 
determining the domain of control and influence in Kuali community. 
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Previously, the partner universities were the influencers and controllers of 
Kuali projects. However, introducing market-driven concepts raised 
uncertainty with regards to the future direction of Kuali projects. Therefore, 
Kuali Board members decide to spinout KualiCo, a for-profit company, to 
be responsible for the code development process. However, this has 
questioned the role of the Foundation, the partner universities, and KCA’s.  
In this section, I illustrate through empirical evidence that the dynamicity 
of Kuali community produced intended and unintended consequences that 
contributed to the change of the settings of Kuali and the surrounding 
context. Therefore, the community continuously changes its boundaries, 
and thus its governance practices, to cope with these changes and govern 
the collaborative efforts. I also illustrate how KualiCo rearranged the 
material properties of the technology to meet the objectives of the third 
phase; improve the products. There were two salient governance practices 
during the third governance phase; restructuring the community, and 
reconfiguring coordination and communication.  
6.3.1. Restructuring the Community 
Sustaining the community was boundary decision to improve Kuali products 
and prepare them for the next decade. This objective created profound 
changes in the context of Kuali as it moved Kuali beyond the desire of 
fulfilling what universities need. Therefore, sustain the community entailed 
restructuring Kuali community, which involved creating KualiCo and 
adjusting the community roles, as shown in figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Data Structure: Phase3-Restructuring the Community 
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6.3.1.1. Creating KualiCo 
KualiCo was formed in August 2014 to control the code development and 
to restructure the Kuali community: 
“So, in 2014 we re-imagined what this community and what Kuali 
could be like. And what we decide to do was to create a company that 
combines the best parts of the community with the best part of a 
company” (S8) 
KualiCo is a higher-education-focused company that is providing OSS 
solutions and selling implementations as cloud services. It was formed as 
an improvement to the idea of inviting portfolio investors. KualiCo was 
formed to control the software development process; however it was not a 
conventional company: 
“We [i.e. KualiCo] are not taking private equity, we're not 
taking venture capital, we're not taking investment outside. 
And that means we're not beholden to Wall Street, we're not 
beholden to quarterly profit calls, we’re not beholden to cost cutting 
just because we want to squeeze out that little last dollar for 
investors. We don't have to worry about that. The owners of the 
company are the Foundation and the employees” (S8) 
The idea of KualiCo was, rather than inviting investors to develop Kuali 
products, universities aggregate their resources 
“then they can take those aggregated resources and in a single 
contract with Kuali the company, which arranges for how they will be 
spent? What the priorities will be? What the governance of it will be? 
Then you have a single entity in the foundation and a single entity in 
Kuali the company that can execute contract with each other rather 
than having 13 or 15 different contracts in all of our procurement 
officers and lawyers helping with that” (S10) 
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The founders of Kuali community and the individuals who witnessed the 
development of Kuali believed that KualiCo was the right step. Creating 
KualiCo was not due to loss of belief in OSS route (Admin2). Instead, the 
aim of forming KualiCo was to focus on improving the products that were 
experiencing growing complexities: 
“I can’t speak for all of the KFS community, but as someone who has 
been around from the beginning and has witnessed all of our growing 
pains, I’m confident that this is the right next step and we will 
continue to be functionally driven, even if our software is made 
available in different technical ways” (Email, Nov 2014) 
In addition, KualiCo was created to add wisdom to the community. Kuali 
community comprised of research-intensive universities as well as small 
colleges. The community needed “the voice at the middle”, as explained by 
S10: 
“If we look back and reflect on our prior decade, the folks who 
brought the gold if you've heard us say golden rule before, we 
brought that money together… we built a software that we needed. 
It fit what investors needed to be done. But there was no one sitting 
at that table that was advising what does the rest of higher ed need” 
KualiCo became the controller of the community. It provided services on-
premises and on the cloud. Accordingly, the license of the Kuali products 
have been changed to AGPL license, which is a restrictive OSS license 
designed for OSS in the cloud (Admin2). Cloud hosting services are offered 
with a license fee. The AGPL license restricts derivative work to be published 
under the same license. 
The inception of KualiCo changed the governance structure of the 
community, and accordingly altered the sphere of influence and authority. 
The research findings revealed that KualiCo took over the control of the 
future direction of Kuali projects by introducing  
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“a new development discipline and a more streamlined decision 
making process that resulted in a more robust software” (Admin6).  
This was achieved by changing the structures of the projects. For example, 
PM1 explains the changes that has occurred to KFS structure: 
“So previously, there had been what was called the KFS Board that 
was operated at the higher level, and then the KFS functional council 
that operated below the board, and then even below the functional 
council were a bunch of Subject Matter Experts subcommittees... And 
as part of this transition, we really looked at how we could streamline 
that to improve our communication, improve our agility, and basically 
collapsed the functional council and the functional subcommittees 
into a group called the Customer Advisory Group” 
Forming KualiCo and granting it the authority to control has also eliminated 
the voting system that was used by project teams: 
“One thing that has changed is that we don't have that formal voting 
structure within the subcommittees now. So, the subcommittees are 
still providing a lot of input into our enhancements and providing 
guidance on how we roll out different things. But, they are not the 
only voice” (Tech5) 
Accordingly, project teams lost their authority to decide on the future 
direction of their projects. Admin7 explains the situation in KC project: 
“The KC community is very used to having its say in what happens 
next and we are not used to having another group that is also 
informing what is happening to the software” 
This suggests that the formation of KualiCo restructured the community. 
This had salient implications on the roles of the community members. This 
is explained in the following sub-section.   
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6.3.1.2. Adjusting Community Roles 
The main objective for creating KualiCo was to improve the OSS products 
regardless of the specific needs of the universities. KualiCo has a dedicated 
team to meet the new objectives. This has raised enquires regarding the 
roles of KualiCo, the Foundation, and the universities. Besides, having 
KualiCo as a controller questions the role of KCA’s in the community. The 
following are illustrations on how KualiCo introduced new roles, and 
adjusted the roles of the community members. 
Role of KualiCo 
As mentioned previously, KualiCo became the controller of the code 
development process. It has changed Kuali projects in a significant way. 
KualiCo transformed Kuali projects from complex dependent ERP modules 
to decoupled individual services, where the latter refers to controllable 
pieces of code: 
“We're moving away from having just a monolithic suite… to 
instead a set of individual services. We've made great strides in 
refactoring our financial product and our research product” 
(S8) 
The highlighted parts of the above quotation emphasise on the materiality 
of the OSS code. During the previous phase, restricting the contributions 
was the main desire, and thus the code was designed in a self-regulating 
manner; developers had no choice other than following the code. On the 
other hand, the third governance phase aimed to improve the efficiency of 
Kuali products, and thus the code was redesigned accordingly.  
Moreover, while KS was rewritten from scratch (again), KFS and KC were 
refactored to decouple their modules. Refactoring means changing the 
internal codes of the software without changing the overall functionalities. 
This was achieved by negotiating the changes with the corresponding 
project teams in the universities. In addition, KualiCo has replaced Rice 
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with CORE, where the latter is a less restrictive framework to build loosely 
coupled services: 
“Kuali Core is a set of independent services that would… support all 
of the different products... So if you just want to use the off-service 
or if you just want to use the workflow service, you'll be able to use 
those independent services” (S9) 
Another major role of KualiCo was improving the users’ experiences. 
KualiCo dedicated designers to improve the look and feel of Kuali projects, 
especially KFS, which had an outdated interface: 
“…one of the really good things that when the KualiCo company was 
formed, they hired a designer for the Financials team, and that 
designer has been working with users to try to improve the users' 
experience. Starting with the main dashboards sort of portal, and 
then move on to purchasing and travel as well. But, it is definitely 
different user communities with different needs” (Tech3) 
Besides, KualiCo focused on smaller, but specialised, teams of high 
performing individuals (Tech3). These dedicated teams of KualiCo initially 
consisted of former developers that were distributed among partner 
universities. ”They were the cream of the crop” (Admin3). Accordingly, 
universities no longer have developers working on the projects (Admin7): 
“KualiCo needed to steal, I hate to use that word, to steal those 
people from the universities because… they knew KRAD because we 
still have to maintain that code until we get rid of it; they know KNS… 
but also because they were the smart smart smart people that will 
be able to pick up all the new technologies” (Admin3) 
The findings revealed that KualiCo played the functional and technical roles. 
It communicates with universities as one-to-one to understand their 
requirements. Then, KualiCo decides on the priorities and the type of 
technology that will move the product to the next level (Admin7, Tech4). 
 171 
 
Besides its main responsibilities that are directly related to the code 
development, KualiCo is also responsible for handling the associated 
technical and administrative burden. 
Moreover, KualiCo offers cloud hosting services along with the on-premises 
services to ensure self-sustainability, which was one of the top priorities of 
Kuali during the third governance phase. The cloud hosting capability 
emerged from the community’s desire to have a self-sustained company, 
and thus less reliant on external entities. This is important to protect the 
specificity of the HE sector. Cloud hosting was designed and reconfigured 
according to the needs of the universities:  
 “when we sign a new cloud contract what do we do with the money 
that we make? We don't pay a venture capitalist or private equity 
person, we go hire more developers and designers. Every time 
we sign a new cloud customer…we take that money we reinvested 
in research and development which helps every one of you” (S8) 
Besides, the cloud hosting was an attractive solution, especially for the 
universities that lack the infrastructure and support to maintain a complex 
ERP system locally: 
“having it in the cloud, having somebody else manage it, having 
somebody else dealing with the upgrades and all of that, in the 
context of a more responsive relationship than what you would have 
with a profit-driven vendor, we think is the way of the future and the 
way we should go” (Admin6) 
This suggests that KualiCo with its dedicated services, including cloud 
hosting, will advance the projects and create a thriving OSS community: 
“…at the point of the move to the KualiCo partnership model, we felt 
that we were optimistic to be able to fix some of the constant delays, 
the inability to meet deadlines, the inability to produce functioning 
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code. We felt it [i.e. KualiCo] was a result of an unclear capacity 
to make decisions to actually move forward” (Admin6) 
“KFS has stalled in terms of adoption, probably for a couple of 
reasons that we, as institutions are not equipped to address – 
such as marketing, providing a complete suite of software, leveraging 
what makes us unique, our community, and offering a competitive 
cloud option to compete with other software providers” (Email, Nov 
2014) 
Despite the evident advancements in the progress of the projects, the 
formation of KualiCo caused unintended consequences. There were 
conflicting reactions towards authorising a profitable company the right to 
control Kuali projects: 
“So with the event of a KualiCo… we were I would say confused. There 
was a lot we didn't understand, there was a feeling of, you know, 
what are we losing? What are we gaining? So that was very unclear” 
(S11) 
“…the inclusion of the company kind of goes back around to the first 
step… We were kind of in the path saying ‘let's do it ourselves, let’s 
not have vendor engagement’, and now we have that. I think that 
has been mixed for some. We did lose some partners because of 
it. Because they felt that the ideals of open source were not being 
met” (Admin7) 
In the quotation above, Admin7 illustrates that loosing partners was one of 
the unintended consequences of forming KualiCo. One reason for this might 
be that the discourses about the new Kuali strategy, i.e. moving to 
portfolioness, focused on pure technical and business considerations. These 
discourses neglected the functional requirements of the partner 
universities, which suggested that their effort in building a community 
source is at stake. 
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Role of Kuali Foundation, Universities, and KCA’s 
The formation of KualiCo required adjusting the roles of the Foundation, 
partner universities, and KCA’s. The Foundation had a central role. It had 
a permanent representative in KualiCo’s Board of Directors. The 
representative was granted an access to KualiCo’s details, including 
financials: 
“The preferred director of the Kuali foundation can prevent us [i.e. 
KualiCo] from being sold. It can prevent us from going public. It can 
prevent us from trying to change our open source license. You need 
to know, when we created this company these are intentions 
anyway” (S8) 
With regards to the universities, their major role was to propose their 
requirements to KualiCo, where the latter is responsible for validating and 
prioritising them. Since Kuali projects continued to be open source, 
universities were allowed to modify the code internally. However, they were 
not eligible to contribute the code back to the base. This means that 
universities lost their capability to control the code: 
“We [i.e. universities] talk about ourselves as partners, but really… 
we don't have control, we just have greater influence. Whereas 
previously we had control, we were definitely in control under the old 
model” (Admin6) 
Regarding the role of KCA’s, the community was not yet clear about the 
future of the KCA’s at the time of data collection. However, the Foundation 
assumed that KualiCo will not be able to replace some of the existing roles 
of the KCA’s: 
“So we still need to have partners. We may change them from Kuali 
commercial affiliates to another name, we didn't decide yet. But we 
still need that, because whether someone decide to do a local 
implementation of one of our systems, just as they do now, it still 
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possible, even if KualiCo is there. Or whether they choose to buy the 
cloud solution from KualiCo. All of those needs still exist. Training, 
conversation, integration with your current systems, KualiCo is not 
going to do that. So, we still need commercial partners in the 
ecosystem institutions can work with to help them do that” (Admin1) 
To sum up, in the new settings, KualiCo became the controller, the 
universities are the influencers, the Foundation is the conveyer, and the 
KCA’s are the supporters. With this new settings, the community had to 
reconfigure the way it coordinates its collaborative effort. 
6.3.2. Reconfiguring Coordination and Communication 
Reconfiguring coordination and communication was a salient governance 
practice during the third governance phase. As summarised in figure 19, it 
was achieved by adjusting the communication patterns between the 
community members. It was also achieved by either rearranging the 
properties of the technical artefact used for communication and code 
development, or by introducing new artefacts.  
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Figure 19: Data Structure: Phase3-Reconfiguring Coordination and 
Communication 
 
Adjusting the means of communication involved replacing the functional 
councils with a one-to-one relationship. The former was a collective 
approach to gather the requirements of Kuali projects prior to the inception 
of KualiCo. The latter is similar to a customer-vendor relationship: 
 “it is a one-to-one sort of relationship as oppose to the functional 
council model which was much more integrated except it was so 
process heavy that we often refer to it as the dysfunctional 
council” (Admin6) 
“What we have done since the forming of KualiCo is our business 
analysts sit down with customers and ask them questions, go through 
their processes, and figure out what they are doing. So now, we can 
make it easier for them, we can make them better at their jobs, we 
can improve the product. We didn't have that kind of orientation 
before becoming the company” (Tech2) 
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The above two quotations illustrate that the functional approach was 
process-heavy; hindering the development of the projects. Thus, it was 
replaced by a more efficient approach. However, it is evident that in the 
one-to-one relationship the collaboration between university partners has 
vanished. This suggests that the community source has also vanished. 
Universities have the right to communicate directly with KualiCo, separate 
from the Foundation, as required (Meeting49): 
“Institutions then may, if they wish, choose to contract directly with 
Kuali the company if they want cloud services. So they may download 
the code and decide they want to run it on their own or they may say 
‘you know we'd like to just pay KualiCo to run this’” (S10) 
The research findings revealed that the collaborations between KualiCo and 
the customers, i.e. universities, varies depending on the service: 
“…one hosted customer may do things very similar to one Kuali 
community member. So, it is not like they are split in any particular 
way. It is just that the way we interact is slightly different in 
that hosted customers we are supporting them directly versus the on 
premise customers, we give them enhancements, we give them a 
new release every month. But, they are still customising things locally 
and it is a different structure” (Tech5) 
As mentioned previously, improving user experience was one of the main 
roles of KualiCo. Therefore, KualiCo created the Experience Centre to 
facilitate the interaction across Kuali projects. In the below quotation, S8 
briefly describes the communication between the designers:  
“One of our first two employees was an interaction designer, and we 
now have four designers. One designer per product… These 
designers meet with each other every day, every morning, 
they meet together and they share with each other the 
designs of the different products. So financial share with student, 
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student shares with research, and they comment on each other's 
designs”  
The emphasised part of the above quotation illustrates that the Experience 
Centre has introduced more frequent face-to-face meetings, which was not 
evident during the previous two phases. In addition, this quotation also 
highlights a new communication pattern among team members. Previously, 
the communications were between the members of the same project. 
However, the Experience Centre required teams across projects to 
communicate. 
The formation of KualiCo also adjusted the properties of the technical 
artefacts. This was evident in KS project because it has been rewritten from 
scratch, and thus KualiCo decided on the technology and the approach to 
be used in implementing KS project (Tech4). In addition, adjusting the 
technical artefacts was evident in the process of internationalisation. The 
global context of HE and the technology in-use reconfigured KS 
development approach. Instead of negotiating the best practices among 
the universities, as the case in the previous phase, KualiCo encouraged 
universities to accept their uniqueness and reject any attempt to change 
their internal work practices to cope with the KS project: 
“The International pieces are really important piece for us as well. So 
Student [i.e. KS] from the very beginning was written with 
international in mind” (S9) 
“Why should we, a software vendor [i.e. KualiCo], force you to 
drive internal change for something that doesn't matter for 
the sake of saying that we're the same. Now I'm not saying that 
we should not have best practices we should absolutely have best 
practices, but it's more important for us to create a 
configurable tool that allows people to create things the way 
they want… so that's why we created workflow completely 
configurable, fields completely configurable, even the object types, 
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courses, programs, experiences, field trips, dissertations, all 
configurable” (S9) 
As illustrated in the above quotation, KualiCo introduced configurable tools. 
The idea of configurable tools differs from the configurable code that was 
evident during the second governance phase (see section 5.3.2). The latter 
refers to pieces of code that are parametrised, such that they can be turned 
on or off depending on the requirements of the universities. On the other 
hand, the configurable tools are more like gadgets that allow universities 
to set their preferences without having to change the software code. These 
tools enable the universities to set their requirements, and KualiCo control 
the software development process. S9 briefly explains the use of 
configurable tools in KS project: 
“The forms are completely flexible. So you have the ability to change 
the forms anyway you want to. So all of the fields, 100% of the 
fields on the forms are configurable, literally a 100%. If your 
courses are crazy and you have some weird way of doing it, let's say 
you don't have the notion of credit hours at all in your university, you 
can make the forms reflect that. If you don't use learning outcomes 
or if you do use learning outcomes, that's completely configurable” 
In addition, KualiCo also altered how communication tools were used. 
Tech2 summarises these changes: 
“Since October 2014, we have moved to Git [i.e. GitHub]16. We have 
moved away from Fisheye … We still use Jira, and we still use it in a 
very similar kind of way. We have moved to an internal cube. … So, 
basically it is a little bit less transparent because we are more 
concerned about competitor as we used to be in the past” 
Regarding meetings, Tech2 continues: 
                                   
16 A web-based repository of open source projects. 
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“the other shift that I should mention is in KualiCo we use SLACK… 
Which is basically a kind of a Skype, except it is a web-based and it 
keeps all the messages for ever and it allows different people to 
communicate. So you can basically create a channel that different 
people join and they are always on that channel together and go back 
and search messages and stuff” 
The above two quotations by Tech2 highlight how the properties of the 
technical artefacts have been reconfigured to cope with the change in the 
context. The internal cubes of Jira and the special channels of SLACK were 
reconfigured to add security and privacy. These “offline” conversations 
were evident in the relevant literature (e.g. O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). 
However they referred to firms intentions to exploit the community’s 
efforts, which violated the OSS ethos. In contrary, private conversations 
between KualiCo teams enables KualiCo to control the code and sustain the 
community, which is the objective of the third governance phase. 
6.4. Consequences of Phase 3 
The significant adjustments that had occurred to the community structure 
and the means of collaboration were due to the tight control that was 
imposed during the second governance phase. However, the restructuring 
of Kuali community during the third governance phase transformed Kuali 
community from community source to a customer-vendor model. The 
intention of this shift was to treat every university as special. This might 
sound as the right direction conceptually; however “how do you get 
everybody who thinks that they are special to look for the common good” 
(Admin6). This means that the third governance phase has transformed 
Kuali from a pure community source to a market-driven OSS community. 
Another major consequence was with regards to the processes of analysis 
and design. Throughout the previous phases, the processes of analysis and 
design were performed collectively by connecting with the community 
members to understand what universities need. However, during the third 
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governance phase the focus was redirected towards improving the 
products. Thus, it was necessary to understand the needs of the market. 
Accordingly, the processes of analysis and design have been assigned 
exclusively to KualiCo, which is considered as a major change in the 
settings of Kuali community. 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I illustrated that Kuali community is in a continual process 
of becoming. The structure of the community is fluid. It emerges through 
collaboration. Therefore, the collective effort is governed by continuously 
changing the boundaries of the community to cope with the changes within 
the community on one hand, and the changes in the surrounding context 
on the other hand.  
Sustaining the community was a boundary decision to cope with the 
introduction of market-oriented concepts to Kuali strategy. This boundary 
decision altered the boundaries of Kuali by including KualiCo as the 
controller of the community. Accordingly, the salient governance practices 
during the third governance phase were focused on restructuring the 
community and the communication patterns among the members.  
Most importantly, the chapter highlighted control as the main governance 
practice throughout Kuali life. The data revealed that controlling the code 
was the desire behind creating Kuali in the first place. Control was also 
behind imposing the restrictive Rice framework and its growing complexity. 
Moreover, control was also the reason to spinout KualiCo, and thus 
transformed Kuali community into a different community.  
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Chapter 7: Theory Development and Discussion 
7.1. Introduction 
Governing OSS communities ensures that the OSS community remains 
viable despite its fluidity and dynamicity. Therefore, governance means 
possessing and distributing resources on one hand, and adapting to the 
changes that occur to the overall context on the other hand. The story of 
Kuali provides insights on how the community governed the collective 
efforts through changing its boundaries overtime; i.e. boundary decisions. 
Drawing on the empirical findings, I have developed a model to 
conceptualise OSS governance through boundary decisions.  
In this chapter, I describe the process of developing the emergent grounded 
theory from the empirical data that are represented in chapters 4, 5, and 
6. This is done by elaborating the OSS governance model that has been 
developed during the selective coding phase and introduced in section3.5.3. 
In this chapter, I also locate the emergent theory within the current 
literature. This is an essential theory building step to extend and refine 
existing knowledge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) with regards to OSS 
governance. 
The data analysis and findings illustrate that the governance practices 
emerge from the interactions between four main constructs: context, 
control, resources, and materiality. I explain each of these constructs in 
section 7.2. Then, I explain the emergent governance model in relation to 
the empirical data and the current literature in sections 7.3 and 7.4 
respectively. Finally, I evaluate the research process in section 7.5. 
7.2. The Emergent OSS Governance Model 
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a substantive theory to 
explain OSS governance. A theory, in general, is an interrelated set of well-
developed concepts that can be used to explain a particular phenomenon 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). A substantive theory is a “theoretical 
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interpretation or explanation of a delimited problem in a particular area” 
(Charmaz, 2014:344). Although substantive theory is grounded in research 
in one particular substantive area, it may have implications and relevance 
to a wider context and become a stepping stone to the development of a 
formal grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In this section, I briefly 
explain the main constructs of the proposed OSS governance model. 
The research findings represent OSS governance in a way that departs from 
the current views by encountering two main, yet neglected, aspects of OSS 
governance: dynamicity and materiality. In this thesis, I argue that OSS 
communities are governed through boundary decisions that identify the 
actors, resources, and domain of action to accomplish a particular 
governance practice. The decisions change the boundaries of the 
community to control the community and adapt to its dynamicity.  
The role of boundary decisions has been discussed in the relevant literature 
in terms of promoting innovations in online communities (e.g. Jarvenpaa 
and Lang, 2011; Lauritzen et al., 2013; Teigland et al., 2014), how 
materiality of technology enables and constrains boundary decisions (e.g. 
Akoumianakis, 2014), and the role of boundary decisions in facilitating 
knowledge collaboration in online communities (Faraj et al., 2011). 
However, theorising boundary decisions as a governance mechanism in 
OSS communities and their consequences is an underdeveloped area of 
research (Akoumianakis, 2014). 
 183 
 
Figure 20: The OSS Governance Model 
 
Based on that, I have developed a theoretical foundation that acknowledges 
that OSS communities are in a constant state of becoming. I demonstrate 
that the OSS governance practices are emergent, contextual, and 
temporal. In order to explain the emergent theory, I have developed an 
OSS governance model, as shown in figure 20. The OSS governance model 
represents boundary decisions. A boundary decision is preceded with 
analysis and design to contextualise governance practices. This is 
represented by the construct of context. The main construct of a boundary 
decision is control, which consists of governance practices that aggregate 
and distribute resources. These practices are accomplished by the 
interaction with the available resources and the materiality of technology. 
In the rest of this section, I explain the theoretical constructs of the 
emergent OSS governance model. 
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7.2.1. Context 
When explaining governance practices in OSS communities, scholar tend 
to situate the community within a wider context (Aksulu and Wade, 2010; 
Lauritzen et al., 2013), where the governance practices are bounded by an 
overarching social context (Winter et al., 2014). The current literature 
illustrates that the surrounding context is not passive. Instead, each 
governance practice is associated with non-governance-related technical 
and social practices that are context-related. Besides, the output of these 
practices are also inputs to others (Crowston et al., 2012). 
The literature on OSS governance shows a growing interest in 
understanding how governance practices emerge in OSS communities (e.g. 
Demil and Lecocq, 2006; O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; Germonprez et al., 
2014). However, current accounts do not provide sufficient explanation on 
which governance practices work together and in what context (Di Tullio 
and Staples, 2013). The research findings contribute to the current 
literature by emphasising on contextualising the governance practices. 
Here, I first explain what is meant by contextualising the practices and how 
contextualisation is essential to maintain the community identity and 
legitimise the governance practices. Then, I explain that contextualisation 
is performed through the processes of analysis and design. 
Contextualising governance practices means adapting them to the growing 
complexity of the OSS community (Aaltonen and Lanzara, 2015). Based on 
an earlier study conducted by Fitzgerald (2006), OSS communities have 
been transformed to a new generation that introduced OSS to domain-
specific industries, which generated goal-specific contexts. Therefore, 
scholars (e.g. Crowston et al., 2012) called for attending to the context in 
order to identify the governance practices that are more amenable than 
others in that particular context. 
Contextualising governance practices is important to maintain the identity 
of the community by defining the objectives of the community (i.e. who 
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they are) and achieving coherence between the mission of the community 
and its activities. OSS communities are described as identity-based 
communities because the members collaborate towards a common goal and 
feel committed to it; i.e. members are attached to the community as a 
whole (Ren et al., 2007). While conventional organisations maintain sense 
of identity to create competitive advantage over others, maintaining the 
identity of the OSS community is essential even in the absence of direct 
competitor (Chen and O’Mahony, 2009). Community members that share 
a sense of shared identity have more willingness to collaborate and more 
likely to achieve the common objectives (Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011).  
However, the identity of OSS communities can be ambiguous because 
resources can easily flow in and out of the community (Ren et al., 2007; 
Watson‐Manheim et al., 2012). This means, it is challenging to maintain a 
sense of community among unknown diverse community members 
(Markus, 2007). In the current literature, scholars argue that the identity 
is maintained through governance practices, such as social practices 
(Markus et al., 2000), OSS license (Ojha and Rao, 2014), and memberships 
(West and O'Mahony, 2005; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). These accounts 
neglect the role of context in identifying and legitimising governance 
practices. Most importantly, the current accounts neglect the significance 
of being sensitive to the constant changes that occur in the context. I 
extend these views by demonstrating that the processes of analysis and 
design determine the governance practices that maintain the identity of the 
community based on the context.  
One of the significant research findings is illustrating that contextualising 
the practices is performed through analysis and design, which are typical 
processes in the software development life cycle. The significance of these 
processes in vertical OSS communities was previously highlighted in the 
relevant literature (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2006). In this thesis, I contribute to the 
current literature by providing empirical evidence, not only on the role of 
analysis and design in vertical OSS communities, but on how analysis and 
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design trigger boundary decisions and produce governance practices. I also 
extend the current views by arguing that analysis and design are not limited 
to vertical OSS communities. Instead, they are ongoing processes in any 
OSS community to situate and legitimise governance practices in a 
particular context. I highlight that the context assess the dynamic changes 
of the community, and thus sets and resets the objectives of the 
community.  
Moreover, as previously mentioned, one of the main objectives of the 
research is to highlight the role of materiality in governing OSS 
communities. Scholars (e.g. Faraj and Azad, 2012) demonstrate that, in 
order to conceptualise materiality, context has to be taken into 
consideration. The research findings illustrate that both the community and 
the technology in-use are in flux. Therefore, context is introduced as a 
construct that is representing the conditions that trigger boundary 
decisions.  
7.2.2. Control 
Control sets the community structure, and determines the domain of 
authority and influence (Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011). Control has emerged 
as the core construct of the proposed governance model. This resonates 
with the current literature (e.g. West, 2003; Markus, 2007; O'Mahony and 
Ferraro, 2007) that has focused on controlling the behaviour of individuals 
and controlling the code development process as major practices to govern 
the community. It is evident from the relevant literature that control is the 
main motive to form OSS communities. The formation of Linux as the first 
OSS community was to allow users to control the destiny of their platforms 
(West, 2003). Besides, firms form alliances with OSS communities to retain 
control over the community resources to achieve their business success 
(West and O'Mahony, 2008). This suggests that controlling the resources 
is considered as the ultimate objective of governance and ensures the 
sustainability of the community. 
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Scholars argue that control is not directly imposed on the community 
(Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008). It is applied through various practices 
and mechanisms depending on the context of the community. In certain 
contexts, controlling resources is practiced through membership, licences, 
and voting procedures (Sharma et al., 2002), while in other context 
leadership was salient in controlling resources (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015). 
Moreover, informal control (i.e. social practices) practices are more 
common in autonomous communities; while sponsored communities 
experience more formal control. Scholars demonstrate that “heavy-
handed” control mechanisms hinder participations in volunteer-based 
communities. On the other hand, domain-specific or mission-specific 
communities are in favour of strict control (Shah, 2006).  
This suggests that control determines the other governance practices that 
best govern the community at that particular context. However, the current 
literature explains control by either describing the community structure, or 
the governance system. The community structure determines how decision 
rights and authority are distributed among different community members 
(Demil and Lecocq, 2006). As illustrated in the literature review, OSS 
structure have been described as network, bazaar, and peer-production. 
Each structure follow certain mechanism to efficiently exchange resources 
among contributors. The governance system refers to the rules that enable 
autonomous community members to share a basis of authority, such as 
bureaucratic, autocratic, and meritocratic forms of governance (O'Mahony 
and Ferraro, 2007).  
Although the existing literature explained control as a governance 
mechanism, the antecedents and consequences of control needs further 
attention (Tiwana et al., 2013). In this thesis, I propose a governance 
model that departs from the current views by explaining control as an 
evolving and contextual governance practice. From a boundary decision 
perspective, I illustrate that control is about identifying the required 
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resources, and channelling them among the contributors in order to meet 
the objectives that were set by the processes of analysis and design.  
7.2.3. Resources 
As aforementioned, the ultimate objective of governance is to control the 
communal resources in order to produce an OSS product. In previous 
chapters I explained that resources refer to skills, ideas, money, time, OSS 
code, and technical artefacts. Early publications related to OSS governance 
(e.g. Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006) describe OSS communities as a new 
form of organisation that convert dispersed knowledge into resources that 
are inaccessible through conventional forms of organisation. Therefore, 
firms tend to benefit from OSS communities to extend their resource base 
and accelerate their technological development (Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2008). Similarly, OSS communities form alliances with firms 
to benefit from the resources that firm could provide (O'Mahony and 
Bechky, 2008). 
It is evident that the literature is dominated by studies that focus on 
technical capabilities as the main community resource (Aksulu and Wade, 
2010). This directs the attention towards the roles and responsibilities as a 
major property of human resources (Crowston et al., 2012). This explains 
why governance literature payed extensive amount of attention on 
attracting and retaining technical capabilities to sustain the community. 
More recent studies demonstrate that the OSS communities are fluid and 
dynamic, and thus resources are in flux (Faraj et al., 2011; Aaltonen and 
Lanzara, 2015). This suggests that it is not possible to realise the potential 
resources and the roles at the outset. Moreover, the fluidity of the OSS 
community and the emergence of variety of resources produced divergent, 
and often, conflicting interests. Therefore, the topic of managing resources 
in the literature is often related to resolving tensions, mainly between the 
communities and firms (e.g. O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008), donators and 
rent seekers (i.e. hobbyists and professionals) (e.g. Franck and Jungwirth, 
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2003), and community openness and ownership (West and O'Mahony, 
2008). In general, relevant literature focuses on the governance 
mechanism that takes the community to state of stability. 
The proposed OSS governance model extends these views by 
acknowledging that stability is not a desirable state in OSS communities. 
This resonates with the more general argument by Faraj et al. (2011), who 
argue that further studies need to focus on how resources responds to the 
various tensions rather than examining the stable structural mechanisms 
of online communities. Therefore, the proposed OSS governance model 
focuses on the properties of resources rather than resources as whole. I 
illustrate that the properties are not fixed. Instead they emerge through 
interactions with the surrounding context. Therefore, resource, as a 
construct in the proposed model, represents the fluidity of the community. 
7.2.4. Materiality 
Given the significance of technology in OSS communities, their role in 
governance cannot be ignored. However, technology is considered in the 
relevant literature as separable from the surrounding context. The current 
literature explains OSS governance either using technological determinist 
or human-centred approaches. However, today, OSS communities 
represent complex ecosystems (Kallinikos et al., 2013). Therefore, there is 
a growing need for conceptualising the role of technology in the change and 
stability of the ecosystems (Tilson et al., 2010). However, technology is not 
fixed. 
The research findings resonates with the existing literature in 
demonstrating that technology is editable, interactive, and generative. 
Generativity means that the technology is self-contained and capable of 
producing outcomes without human intervention (Tilson et al., 2010). It 
also refers to the unintended consequences of technology (Kallinikos et al., 
2013). This suggests that technologies are prone to changes. Current 
studies (e.g. Chua and Yeow, 2010) urged researchers to conduct further 
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studies that surface the role of the material properties of technology in 
governing OSS communities.  
As mentioned in chapter 2, the role of materiality in governing OSS 
communities in an under-theorised area of research. Therefore, I referred 
to a broader literature to understand how materiality is theorised. It is 
evident that the concept of materiality is debatable causing inconsistencies 
in the relevant literature (Jones, 2014). In this thesis, I have adhered to 
the definition of materiality that is grounded in the concept of affordance, 
which is rooted in a relational ontology that gives equal play to the material 
as well as the social aspect of the target phenomenon (Faraj and Azad, 
2012).  
Therefore, in the emergent governance model, materiality is introduced as 
a construct to stress its integral part of the organisational change 
(Orlikowski, 2007). The construct of materiality focuses on what the 
technology can perform in a given context and what are the consequences 
(Pentland and Singh, 2012). This highlights the specific properties of 
technologies that make a difference in boundary decisions, and thus in 
governing OSS communities. 
7.3. The Emergent Governance Model in Relation to Kuali 
In this section, I illustrate the OSS governance model with relation to Kuali 
community. I explain how the constructs of context, control, resources, and 
materiality interacted with each other to produce boundary decisions that 
have governed Kuali community.  
As previously mentioned, the construct of context represents the conditions 
that trigger boundary decisions. The conditions are determined by the 
ongoing processes of analysis and design. As illustrated in figure 21, the 
context prior to the inception of Kuali reflects the negative experiences of 
the universities in USA with regards to the acquisition and implementations 
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of ERP systems. This triggered the need for forming a university-specific, 
i.e. vertical, OSS community. 
Figure 21: Creating the Community 
 
Accordingly, creating the community was a boundary decision to delineate 
the boundaries of the community by determining who is included in the 
community, and what their rights are. It was also a boundary decision to 
delineate the software development process to ensure the quality and 
reliability of the OSS. This was essential to distinguish Kuali from other OSS 
communities and from competing ERP vendors. 
As previously discussed, control is the ultimate objective of OSS 
governance. According to the governance model, control is practiced 
through the interaction between resources and materiality. As shown in 
figure 21, resources during the first governance phase were mainly about 
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selecting knowledgeable contributors as the main resources to maintain a 
university-specific community. In terms of materiality, control was imposed 
mainly through, first, building KFS on top of the approved functionalities of 
IU’s legacy finance system to attract potential universities. Second, control 
was imposed through imposing Rice framework to protect the software 
development process. This particular arrangement of the material 
properties of the KFS and Rice created an exclusive vertical OSS community 
that provides HE-specific finance system. Consequently, it attracted the 
interests of a wider range of stakeholders, and thus led to the expansion of 
the community. 
Expanding the scope of Kuali increased the fluidity of the community, and 
thus resources were in flux. The main contextual factor that triggered the 
second boundary decision was the emergence of multiple trajectories, 
which gave rise to divergent interests. Therefore, balancing interests was 
a boundary decision that emerged to balance between maintaining diversity 
to enrich the community on one hand, and controlling the resources to 
maintain the quality and reliability of the OSS products on the other hand, 
as summarised in figure 22. 
In general, deciding on the control mechanisms in OSS communities is 
challenging (Curto-Millet and Shaikh, 2017), especially with the existence 
of diversity (Schaarschmidt et al., 2015). The main challenge is how to set 
the boundaries of the community in a way that balances between control 
and growth. This is explained by Ferraro and O'Mahony (2012) as follows: 
“If project boundaries remain open, how do they ensure that 
incoming contributors do not violate the project’s mission? If project 
boundaries close, who become the gatekeepers of such forms?” 
(p:545) 
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Figure 22: Balancing the Interests 
 
The governance practices that emerged are focused on aggregating and 
distributing resources. This is consistent with the current literature, which 
demonstrate that the diverse resources improve the quality of the product 
(O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). However, resources are not fixed. 
Therefore, the salient governance practices during the second governance 
phase mainly focused on emergence by including the properties of 
resources, and excluding others. In terms of materiality, the properties of 
technology were constantly rearranged in relation to each other to 
accomplish governance practices.  
Throughout the second governance phase, the resources and the 
collaborative efforts were directed towards fulfilling the requirements of 
universities. Besides, the technical and non-technical work practices were 
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conducted by university employees and constrained by university rules. 
This has risked the efficiency of Kuali projects. Thus, the Foundation 
introduced market-driven concepts to improve Kuali products, which has 
caused profound changes to the context of Kuali. This triggered the third 
boundary decision; sustaining the community. 
Figure 23: Sustaining the Community 
 
Sustaining the community is a boundary decision that aimed to improve 
Kuali products, and at the same time control the future direction of the 
community in a way that retains the university-specific nature of Kuali. The 
aim of this boundary decision was to reduce the risks of limiting 
contributions to the community of universities. Accordingly, the Foundation 
formed KualiCo. 
Introducing KualiCo as the main player changed how the collective effort 
was controlled, as summarised in figure 23. This required reconfiguring the 
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structure of the community, and thus redefining the roles and 
responsibilities. The role of materiality was also evident during the third 
governance phase. KualiCo has changed the way artefacts were used. For 
example, KualiCo started using the internal cubes in Jira for their private 
discussions. This suggests that OSS communities do not solely rely on 
complete openness. Instead, they tend to balance openness based on the 
context. This is consistent with the findings of Shaikh and Vaast (2016), 
who illustrate that extreme openness in some cases can be limiting and 
lead to extreme failures. They demonstrate that OSS communities 
experience shifts in their setting, and accordingly they tend to experience 
moments of closure and opacity.  
To sum up, Kuali was originally inspired by the ideology of the American 
universities during the early 2000’s. However, how the community actually 
works today turns out to be very different from the original idea. This 
transformation in the context of Kuali community; i.e. from community 
source to market-driven community, is consistent with the findings of the 
current literature. In a recent study, Curto-Millet and Shaikh (2017) 
demonstrate that the continuous change in the boundaries ensures the 
sustainability of the community. They argue that reducing OSS to the 
opposite of the proprietary software “does not do justice to the 
community”. This suggests that the community governs the collective effort 
by changing the boundaries based on the change in the context; i.e. 
boundary decisions. 
7.4. The Emergent Governance Model in Relation to the 
Existing Literature 
In the relevant literature, boundary decisions in online communities in 
general are discussed using various constructs that tend to describe 
boundaries as a static demarcation that separates individuals and 
organisations (Akoumianakis, 2014). They are explained in terms of spatial 
and temporal constructs to explain the changes that occur to the 
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boundaries of the community (Watson‐Manheim et al., 2012). Besides, 
demographic dimensions are also considered as a boundary construct in 
research that focuses in social distance (Gibson and Gibbs, 2006). In 
addition, it is evident in the literature that boundary decisions are also 
discussed in terms of boundary objects (e.g. O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008), 
which are any sort of arrangements that facilitates collaboration (Star, 
2010). The OSS communities tend to form an organisation, either for-profit 
or not-for-profit, to act as a boundary object that negotiates the divergent 
interests of the community members (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008).  
These explanations were acceptable in explaining the settings of 
autonomous communities that are self-governed and rely on voluntarily 
efforts. However, these constructs, such as time and space, do not provide 
sufficient explanations on the specificity of the governance practices 
(Howison and Crowston, 2014). Besides, the advancements in technology 
fragmented resources across multiple functional, geographical, 
hierarchical, and professional boundaries, which requires multi-dimensional 
constructs (Lindgren et al., 2008). Therefore, recent literature has 
developed broader views of boundaries to provide a deeper understanding 
of boundary decisions in online communities. One of the explanations that 
has attracted the interest of scholars is the explanation provided by Santos 
and Eisenhardt (2005). 
Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) argue that boundaries reflect the essence of 
the organisation. Therefore, they propose four boundary constructs that 
have been given a great attention in the literature of OSS and online 
communities because they provide a dynamic understanding of the changes 
that occur to the boundaries of the community, and thus unfold the 
emergence and dynamicity of the governance practices (Liang et al., 2016). 
These constructs are: power, identity, competence, and transactional 
efficiency. Power is about controlling the resources, reducing uncertainty, 
improving the performance, and managing relationship with external 
entities (Liang et al., 2016). Identity is concerned about defining “who we 
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are”. Competence is about developing the capabilities of the community 
members; especially with regards to the administrative and technical skills 
(Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011; Teigland et al., 2014). Transactional efficiency 
focuses on facilitating collaboration and providing the community with 
artefacts that develop the OSS product (Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011). 
In the context of online communities in general, there are modest attempts 
to explain boundary decisions using the constructs proposed by Santos and 
Eisenhardt. One of the prominent studies is the one conducted by 
Jarvenpaa and Lang (2011). They have adopted a holistic perspective to 
explain how online communities change their boundaries overtime. Based 
on a comparison between sponsored and autonomous communities, they 
illustrate the interactions and interdependencies among power, identity, 
competence, and efficiency to balance between openness and control. 
While they have underlined the importance of context in defining how the 
community controls the resources, their study did not touch upon the issue 
of materiality. 
Besides the work of Santos and Eisenhardt, there are other modest 
attempts to highlight the multi-dimensional nature of community 
boundaries. For example, the research conducted by Chua and Yeow (2010) 
takes into consideration the dynamicity and the materiality of the 
coordination practices in an OSS gaming community. They provide 
empirical evidence to explain coordination practices in terms of actors, 
interactions, and artefacts. Another example is the research conducted by 
Aaltonen and Lanzara (2015). They have studied Wikipedia community and 
observed the changes that has occurred to the community over a period of 
9 years. They illustrate how Wikipedia governed the collectives from 
inception to maturity. They have demonstrated OSS governance as an 
evolving, enabling, and embedded process. Evolving means that the 
community changes its practices as the context changes. Enabling refers 
to the materiality of the technology that enable governance practices. 
Embedded means that governance does not reside on an administrative 
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body or performed through defined functional routines. Instead, OSS 
governance is implicit in the technology and in the interactions between the 
actors. However, they have based their study on the assumption that OSS 
communities lack contracts and authority to control the behaviours of 
individuals, which neglects the fact that formal organisations coexist with 
OSS communities adding sort of formalities to OSS governance practices.  
The proposed OSS governance model relates to these influential 
explanations. However it differs from them by proposing a more 
comprehensive theoretical foundation that does not overemphasise on 
human actors or non-human actors. Besides, the proposed OSS governance 
model balances between the openness and control to maintain the 
standards of the community. The emergent OSS governance model 
contributes to the theoretical understanding of how OSS communities 
govern the collectives through boundary decisions. Although this model is 
grounded on a particular context; i.e. vertical OSS community, it has 
implications to a wider range of phenomena in the field of information 
systems and organisation studies.  
7.5. Research Evaluation Criteria 
In this section I assess the validity and credibility of the thesis. This is 
achieved by evaluating the emergent grounded theory based on the criteria 
proposed by Corbin and Strauss (1990).  
Criterion 1: Are concepts generated?   
As clarified in chapter 3, the open coding phase began with 
conceptualisation. The concepts emerged from the empirical data using the 
participants’ words in case of primary data, and using words that are close 
to data in terms of secondary data.  
Criterion 2: Are the concepts systematically related? 
 199 
 
After conceptualising the raw data, the concepts were compared to each 
other in order to create categories. This involved sorting, synthesising, and 
aggregating the concepts into categories that relate to the research inquiry. 
Criterion 3: Are the categories well developed? Do categories have 
conceptual density or theoretical saturation? 
I have adopted the Straussian coding paradigm that assisted in 
systematically generating categories, sets their properties, and extensively 
comparing and contrasting them to data. Besides, I have verified the 
conceptual density, i.e. theoretical saturation, by evaluating whether the 
emergent substantive theory explained the case under study. I have also 
illustrated that the emergent theory provided insights for a wider context, 
as will be further explained in chapter 8. 
Criterion 4: Are the broader conditions that affect the phenomenon 
under study built into its explanation? 
The proposed OSS governance model was based on a study on Kuali 
community during the period between 2004 and 2016. Kuali community 
went through various complexities that represent a variation of conditions, 
interactions, and consequences. Although Kuali represents a single OSS 
community, it comprises of multiple OSS projects that have their own 
specific contexts, objectives, user groups, resources, and consequences. 
Therefore, the proposed OSS governance model takes into consideration 
wide range of OSS contexts. In addition, it shows relevance to the 
governance of online communities in general.  
Criterion 5: Has process been taken into account? 
Process here refers to the temporal dimension of the phenomenon under 
study. In this thesis, I describe the process of movement of Kuali 
community since its inception. This was described in terms of governance 
phases that emerged from conditions, experienced various interactions, 
and produced consequences. 
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 Criterion 6: Do the theoretical findings seem significant and to 
what extent? 
The research findings and contributions are salient. As will be explained in 
chapter 8, the research findings contribute to the literatures of OSS 
governance, and boundary management. Besides, the findings have 
practical contributions. In addition, the proposed OSS governance model 
stimulates further studies. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Thesis Contributions 
8.1. Introduction  
I begin this chapter by concluding the thesis. Then, I illustrate the potential 
contributions of the research. Finally, I summarise the limitations of the 
research, and I provide insights for future studies.   
8.2. Conclusion: Answering the Research Questions 
This thesis started with a general objective to understand how OSS 
governance practices emerge and evolve overtime. During data collection 
and analysis, two main aspects of governance have emerged. First, OSS 
communities govern their collectives through changing their boundaries; 
i.e. boundary decisions. Second, OSS governance cannot be sufficiently 
explained without encountering materiality. 
This PhD contributes to the existing literature by developing an OSS 
governance model to explain OSS governance. The way I have approached 
OSS governance departs from the dominant perspectives in the relevant 
literature. Although, I resonate with the current accounts in describing OSS 
governance as emergent and evolving overtime, I depart from them in 
bringing to the fore the dynamicity and materiality aspects of governance. 
The proposed OSS governance model highlights the importance of shifting 
the current emphasis of OSS literature to the hybrid forms of OSS 
communities that merge OSS ethos with the market-oriented software 
development practices. 
This thesis has achieved its objectives by developing a substantive theory 
to explain OSS governance. The substantive theory is represented through 
an OSS governance model. The governance model illustrates that OSS 
communities are governed through boundary decisions. These decisions 
delineate the boundaries of the community through identifying the actors, 
resources, and actions required to control and coordinate the collective 
effort in a particular context.  
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The answer to the first research question, how governance practices 
emerge in vertical OSS communities? Based on the OSS governance model, 
governance practices emerge from the processes of analysis and design 
that are necessary to contextualise and legitimise the governance practices. 
In other words, the context forms the antecedent conditions for governance 
practices. This challenges the predominant assumptions that the OSS 
governance is determined by the communication patterns of the 
developers. It was evident that analysis and design were ongoing 
throughout Kuali life. The community continuously observes the changes 
that occur to Kuali projects and evaluates the existing governance 
practices.  
The relevant literature raised open questions regarding how frequent the 
community members need to observe the changes in the community and 
react accordingly? (Singh and Tan, 2010), and who is responsible for 
analysis and design? (Fitzgerald, 2006). In this thesis, I have illustrated 
that these processes are ongoing. However, boundary decisions are taken 
only after the occurrence of profound changes on the context and objectives 
of the community. Regarding who is responsible for analysis and design, 
Fitzgerald (2006) argue that in horizontal OSS communities all 
development processes (planning, analysis, design, and implementation) 
are performed by the same developer, while in vertical communities they 
are performed by different knowledgeable developers. 
My research findings support this argument as the findings demonstrate 
that analysis and design were performed by different knowledgeable 
individuals; not necessary developers, during different governance phases. 
During the first governance phase, university representatives were 
observing the dynamic changes and performing analysis and design. During 
the second governance phase, this responsibility was assigned to the Board 
members in Kuali Foundation. Then KualiCo formed a dedicated team to 
handle the analysis and design. 
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With regards to second research question, how OSS community governing 
contribution shapes its boundaries over time? I have demonstrated in 
section 7.3 that OSS communities govern their collective effort through 
boundary decisions, which I have explained through the interaction 
between the constructs of context, control, resources, and materiality.  
8.3. Thesis Contributions 
Theorising OSS governance was inspired by the empirical data. However, 
it has implications beyond the case of Kuali, as summarised in table 17. 
This thesis represents a unique form of OSS community that challenges the 
taken-for-granted assumptions on OSS governance. In addition, the thesis 
demonstrates the governance of a community from inception to maturity. 
This is a contribution to the OSS literature that often neglects the initial 
stages of the community and assumes that the community is in a mature 
stable state and needs governance to be sustained (Crowston et al., 2012; 
Hallerbach et al., 2013). 
Area Contribution 
OSS Governance -Explain OSS governance beyond the dyadic firm-community 
relation 
-Theorise OSS governance as ongoing boundary decisions 
-Highlight the role of materiality in governing OSS communities 
Boundary 
Management 
-Move beyond the concept of efficiency in explaining boundary 
decisions 
-Adopt problem-driven boundary phenomena 
Practical 
Contributions 
-Highlight the importance of analysis and design in 
contextualising governance practices 
-Recognise that the requirements of the community changes as 
the community evolves 
Table 17: Summary of Thesis Contribution 
The thesis also contributes to the literature on OSS governance by 
providing empirical and theoretical insights that move beyond the 
conventional dyadic relation between the firm and the OSS community. The 
existing literature is dominated by explanations of OSS governance where 
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OSS is a software development strategy in the firm (e.g. Rolandsson et al., 
2011). This explains the dynamicity and stability of the community as the 
result of tensions between the community and the firm, which does not 
adequately represents the current status of the OSS communities. There 
are growing concerns in the literature of technology and organisation 
studies in general (e.g. Tilson et al., 2010; Tiwana et al., 2010) with 
regards to the dynamicity and stability of modern digital infrastructures and 
ecosystems, such as OSS communities. This thesis proposes a governance 
model that stresses the importance of emergence, which enables complex 
and dynamic interplay between variety of resources and stakeholders. The 
proposed model also focuses on the consequences of the interplay. This 
provides a deeper understanding of OSS governance beyond community-
firm relationship.  
Besides, introducing materiality as a theoretical construct is an important 
theoretical contribution because it addresses critical, yet poorly 
understood, issues with regards to stability and dynamicity. For example, 
the thesis responds to the recent calls for understanding the consequences 
of technology in complex ecosystems (e.g. Kallinikos et al., 2013; Eck and 
Uebernickel, 2016). The thesis demonstrates that technology is generative, 
where generativity is considered as a powerful concept in describing 
contemporary transformations that has occurred to the OSS communities. 
Therefore, proposing a theoretical model that surfaces the materiality of 
technology is a major contribution (Yoo, 2013).  
The thesis also contributes to the studies related to boundary management 
in online communities. Boundary decisions have strategic importance in any 
organisation (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) 
urged researchers to advance the literature of boundary management 
through adopting integrative view of the various boundary conceptions. 
They urged scholars to move beyond the concept of efficiency in explaining 
boundary decisions. On way of doing so, according to Santos and 
Eisenhardt (2005), is to focus on boundary decisions in environments that 
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do not solely rely on efficiency. As explained in chapter 2, OSS communities 
represent a unique form of organisation that cannot be explained through 
market and hierarchal governance mechanisms. The research findings 
contribute to the literature of boundary management by providing empirical 
evidence on the role of non-efficiency boundary concepts in shaping 
boundary decisions. This thesis reviews the traditional assumptions of 
boundary decisions and contributes to the development of new theoretical 
concepts.   
In addition, Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) also called for more research 
that focus on problem-driven boundary phenomena. The literature on 
boundary decisions in often theory-driven. These type of studies neglect 
the contemporary organisations that have been transformed by boundary 
decisions. Therefore, adopting a problem-driven research may lead to novel 
considerations and innovative theoretical insights. In this thesis, I have 
adopted a grounded theory approach that has started from the data, where 
the case represents non-traditional organisational settings. Besides, the 
emergent governance model highlights the role of contextualisation. This 
responds to the call by Puranam et al. (2014) for developing theory that 
explains and predicts emergent forms of organising. 
Besides the theoretical contributions, the thesis also have important 
practical implications, especially in light of the proliferation of OSS 
communities in various industries (Haefliger et al., 2011). The proposed 
OSS governance model can be useful for practitioners in terms of 
structuring the OSS communities. The research findings demonstrate that 
the governance of OSS communities is inseparable from its context. 
Therefore, OSS governance is influenced by the purpose of the OSS 
product, the type of the software, and the type of stakeholders. Some 
communities are sponsored by firms, and thus focus on leveraging 
innovation. Others are more focused on the public good, and accordingly 
focusing on how to attract and sustain participation.  
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The proposed OSS governance model encourages practitioners to be aware 
of the specificity of the target OSS product. This also emphasises the 
importance of avoiding the act of imposing formalised structures and roles 
to achieve stability. The research findings illustrate that it is possible to 
achieve stability while allowing resources and roles to emerge based on the 
context. Besides, with respect to materiality, the research findings illustrate 
that the materialisation of technologies make a difference in OSS 
governance. This draws the attention to the design of the OSS code and 
the artefacts in use and their significant implications on governance. The 
design should be flexible to accommodate the emergence of the OSS 
community. 
8.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Work 
The theory and empirical work presented in this thesis makes useful and 
significant contributions, albeit not without limitations. First, the context of 
country was limited to USA, South Africa, and Canada. Universities from 
Europe were meant to be included to enrich the research; however such 
universities were difficult to reach due to the poor online documentations 
with regards to their collaboration in Kuali community.  
Second, there are other aspects of materiality that have not been covered 
in the research. After the formation of KualiCo, social media was introduced 
as an essential artefact for communication and collaboration, which may 
provide more variations in validating the proposed OSS governance model. 
Third, a single case study is useful in the case of Kuali, which is a novel 
case. However, additional case studies can be further conducted to test the 
emergent substantive theory. 
In terms of future research, the thesis offers a theoretical foundation for 
other scholars to validate and refine. The emergent grounded theory can 
be further validated and compared within existing theories to promote a 
more formal theory to explain OSS governance. The findings of the thesis 
also provide insights for developing the methodological tool used to explore 
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OSS communities. Highlighting the role of materiality encourages further 
research to broaden the scope of acceptable and credible data sources. One 
way of doing so is digital traceability. The technical artefacts produce 
massive amount of traceable data that represent the interactions in the 
community. Such data can supplement primary and archived data, which 
are the most common data sources in studies related to OSS. Digital traces 
are considered as a promising data sources for theorising in the field of 
organisation studies and information systems. 
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Appendix A: Sample Interview Guides 
Interview Guide-Admin2 
1. Could you please describe your roles and responsibilities in Kuali community? 
2. “Keeping your money in your mission” is one of the main purposes for creating 
Kuali community. From my understanding, it means aligning Kuali with the 
strategic plan of universities. Could you please explain how is Kuali aligned with 
higher education? 
3. Can you please elaborate on the process of membership? 
4. What is the difference between a member and a partner? 
5. Do you keep track on Kuali adopters; those who download Kuali projects without 
contributing back or joining the community? 
6. In Kuali documents, another group of the community are called ‘lone wolves’. Who 
are they? How do you identify them? 
7. What are the roles of the constituency members? 
8. So now we have the Kuali products, each is considered as a separate project. Kuali 
foundation is governing the overall thing. So are the membership financial 
contribution used for Kuali projects as needed or they are directed on projects?  
9. Are Kuali projects governed in the same way, or each project has its own rules and 
regulations? 
10. Does Kuali have an assessment tool for its governance? Does it follow a certain 
governance framework? 
11. Attracting universities to join the community is mostly done from cost perspective. 
Is it just the cost that distinguishes Kuali from other software development 
solutions? 
12. How Kuali policies are made? Did the policy making mechanisms changed as Kuali 
community grew? (The formality of policy making). 
13. Kuali website contains mainly content-related policies. Are there any behaviour-
related policies? 
14. Monitoring is an essential concept in governance. How do you monitor the 
behaviour of individuals, universities and KCA to check whether they are adhering 
to Kuali values and practices? 
15. The peer-reviewing nature of HE, the collaboration and capacity building are all 
characteristics of HE, and in the same time are main values of OSS community. 
From you point of view, is the nature of HE played any role in governing Kuali? 
 221 
 
16. As you know, opening up the code for the public is one way for inviting innovation 
to the software development process. Kuali adds sort of restrictions on code 
contributions by setting rules and requirements for the contributed code. This is 
also obvious in the absence of volunteers from outside the community, and not 
accepting code contributions from outsiders (or their contribution is placed under 
scrutiny). How does that impact on the innovation and creativity? 
17. What are the mechanisms applied to avoid Kuali projects from being dominated by 
the requirements of certain universities? 
18. Do Kuali face situations where one or more member has specific requirements that 
are not fulfilled by Kuali? Do they implement the changes on their own without 
contributing back? How does Kuali handle this? 
19. Commercial affiliates played an essential role in building and sustaining Kuali 
community. We know that CA have their own agenda that contradicts with Kuali 
values in terms of maximizing profits. How does Kuali fulfil these contradictory 
agenda and maintain Kuali values at the same time? 
20. In terms of control, OSS solutions allows universities to have control over their 
software in all aspects. In the same time Kuali foundation has imposed some sort 
of control over the community to ensure the quality of the product. So, how does 
Kuali balance between empowerment and control? 
21. I’ve noticed that Kuali projects are less likely to be forked. Why is it the case? 
22. With regards to the public documents of Kuali website, wiki, KIS, are they accurate 
and reflect Kuali community? How frequent are they updated? 
23. Kuali turned into 10 years old in August 2014, and it was considered as a turning 
point in Kuali’s life. Can you please briefly talk through how did you get back to the 
community to build a new Kuali strategy? 
24. Did any universities leave Kuali? Why? 
25. Can you please guide me on who else can I interview to know more about the 
community? 
26. Is there anything else you think is useful for my research on governance and I did 
not cover in the interview? 
27. Is there anything you would like to ask me? 
 
Interview Guide-Admin3 
1. Let’s start with the event that happened in 2005/2006 when MIT decides to give 
the intellectual property of MIT Coeus to Kuali. What was MIT’s motive behind that 
decision? 
2. The structure of Kuali was initially built to accommodate KFS. When Coeus joined 
the community, did it had to inherit the existing structure and development 
framework, or you had to build your own? 
3. You have moved from having a local development team to an ecosystem of pooled 
resources. What are the actions taken to cope with overhead tasks and time 
commitment? 
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4. Are there any KC partners outside the US? If yes, what is the experience? If no, 
why not? 
5. As a member of Kuali Boards, what are the changes that have occurred in Kuali 
priorities?  
6. So, now what are the plans with regards to KualiCo, how would this change 
7. Is there anything else you think is useful for my research on governance and I did 
not cover in the interview? 
8. Is there anything you would like to ask me? 
 
Interview Guide-Tech2 
1. Can you please describe your roles and responsibilities in Kuali community? 
2. From my observation on Kuali community, I have noticed that there are 2 main 
tools used to organise the developers work: Jira, and Fisheye. Can you please 
summaries how each work in terms of your day-to-day tasks. Let’s start with Jira. 
3. What is the role of watchers? 
4. So, the communication in Jira is between developers within the same universities, 
or do you have communication between developers from different uni’s? 
5. Can you summarise the role of fisheye? 
6. Up to what extent the developers (technical teams) have a say on Kuali direction? 
7. Are there any monitoring tools to ensure that the code is written according to 
standards? 
8. Is there a high reliance on core developers? Limited number of developers 
performing large amount of tasks? 
9. With regards to KualiCo, what are your current responsibilities towards Kuali? 
10. Is there anything else you think is useful for my research on governance and I did 
not cover in the interview? 
11. Are there any other Kuali members that you think that may be beneficial for my 
research? 
12. Is there anything you would like to ask me? 
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Appendix B: Meeting Summaries 
 
Meeting code Date  Meeting code Date 
Meeting1 Jan-10  Meeting29 Feb-13 
Meeting2 Feb-10  Meeting30 Mar-13 
Meeting3 Mar-10  Meeting31 Apr-13 
Meeting4 Apr-10  Meeting32 May-13 
Meeting5 May-10  Meeting33 Jul-13 
Meeting6 Jun-10  Meeting34 Aug-13 
Meeting7 Jul-10  Meeting35 Sep-13 
Meeting8 Sep-10  Meeting36 Oct-13 
Meeting9 Oct-10  Meeting38 Dec-13 
Meeting10 Nov-10  Meeting39 Summer 2013 
Meeting11 Dec-10  Meeting40 Jan-14 
Meeting12 Jan-11  Meeting41 Feb-14 
Meeting13 Mar-11  Meeting42 Apr-14 
Meeting14 Apr-11  Meeting43 Jun-14 
Meeting15 Jun-11  Meeting44 Jul-14 
Meeting16 Jul-11  Meeting45 Aug-14 
Meeting17 Sep-11  Meeting46 Oct-14 
Meeting18 Oct-11  Meeting47 Dec-14 
Meeting19 Nov-11  Meeting48 Jan-15 
Meeting20 Jan-12  Meeting49 Feb-15 
Meeting21 Apr-12  Meeting50 Apr-15 
Meeting22 May-12  Meeting51 May-15 
Meeting23 Jul-12  Meeting52 Sep-15 
Meeting24 Aug-12    
Meeting25 Sep-12    
Meeting26 Oct-12    
Meeting27 Dec-12    
Meeting28 Jan-13    
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Appendix C: Sample Emails 
Technical Emails 
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Functional Email 
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